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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation analyzes the budget strategy and behavioral patterns of 36 
agencies in South Carolina, with the purpose of understanding the condition of equilibrium 
and disturbances in  South Carolina state’s budgeting process. This analysis will further 
use new variables to better our understanding of state’s budgeting process. Research paper 
one examines the impact of the relationships among the governor’s recommendations and 
agencies’ political environment, type, method of head selection, agency size and agency 
age on legislative appropriations. Research paper two is a qualitative analysis of budget 
success, strategies and outcomes Finally, research paper three examines the determinants 
of higher education funding and the need/ merit-based program. A brief conclusion for each 
paper is presented followed by recommendations and suggestion for future research.  
Essay 1 examines internal and external factors affecting agency appropriation. The 
analysis provides new perspectives on the South Carolina budgeting process. Agencies use 
different approach in presenting their budget request to governor and legislators. The 
recognition and pattern of differences in  gubernatorial recommendation provides evidence 
that some agencies are more aggressive in their request than others. There is evidence that 
agencies do appeal to legislatures when governor cut their request. In some cases, 
legislatures do honor appeals made by agencies when their request are cut by governors. 
In most cases of support for long-term budget growth, the legislature appears to be the most 
crucial actor.  
The governor’s recommendation does not appear to support the idea of budget 
expansion in moderately acquisitive agencies. The results confirm that agencies that 
iii 
request the largest incremental change in the budget will receive the largest percentage 
growth over their current budget, while agencies requesting little or no incremental change 
will receive little to no growth in their budget. While this relationship may seem obvious, 
it is important confirmation of the “budgeting game” in practice through a research lens. 
In South Carolina, strong gubernatorial appointive power is found in conjunction with 
weak gubernatorial budget power. The principal feature which makes the South Carolina 
governor’s budget powers weak is that the governor does not have sole responsibility for 
preparing the budget. therefore, in a weak position to influence the budgetary success 
achieved by state agencies.  
Essay two examines agency budget strategies and success. One important variable 
determining the behavior of participants in the budget process is the adequacy of revenues 
as confirmed by one of the state’s budget officials during the qualitative interviews. The 
primary concern of professional budget managers during deficit periods is finding 
resources to fund programs while at the same time curbing an increase in spending. This 
research reveals that agencies have two primary budget goals: one focuses on agency 
growth and expansion and the other on agency stability. Agencies interested in expansion 
may focus on budget growth, i.e. a large percentage increase in appropriation, while 
agencies interested in stability may focus on achieving a larger percentage of the current 
request appropriated. In summary, budget success is dictated by agencies  using various 
approaches that suits their mission and need. Budget official reported that gaining support 
from the governor provides an avenue for program expansion, implying that budget 
officials are not just concerned about higher appropriation alone.  
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Essay three examines South Carolina budgets for higher education and which 
factors best predict changes in state appropriations. This study found evidence that state 
spending in other priority categories appears to displace funding in higher education. 
Several conditions can impact the ways in which states finance post-secondary institutions. 
the share of funding that higher education receives is not reduced when all categories of 
Medicaid  receive increased funding with some exception: Medicaid recipient as a 
percentage of population and statewide Medicaid expenditure are the only categories that 
dampen higher education funding as this category increases. Other categories of state 
spending on Medicaid as a share of state revenue and the number of Medicaid recipients 
indicate an increase in spending for higher education. In contrast to other findings, this 
study found a statistical positive relationship between merit/need based scholarship 
program. An increase in need-based scholarships to private institutions, Palmetto Fellows 
and the LIFE Program are associated with increases in need-based scholarships to public 
universities. The assertion that state spend less when revenue increase is not significant, 
this study point out that increase in state revenue does increase funding for need/merit-
based scholarship program. 
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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Policy scholars begin their research using a broad lens as they consider how and 
under what circumstances government activity affects the lives of citizens. All levels of 
government impact the everyday lives of citizens, whether through local trash pickup, 
maintenance of state roadways, or federal defense policies. These services provide at the 
various levels of governments are dependent on the tax revenue and the budgets that 
appropriate this revenue. As Ripley et al. (2007) argue, budgets are both fundamental to 
questions of public policy and indications of policy actions in two ways: first, they map the 
funding of all activities of an agency (however diverse, frequent or important); and second, 
aggregate budgets represent the limits of activity for an agency. Thus, in a sense they define 
the achievable goals for the agency. 
Understanding how and under what circumstances policy actions are taken depends 
at least in part on understanding how and under what circumstances budget decisions are 
made (Ripley et al. 2007). Policy scholars who focus on public finance and budget 
processes explore a range of critical questions within the broader policy environment. For 
example, how an administration formulates policy priorities and what factors influence 
these decisions are critical elements for understanding budgeting decisions. The 
development of agency budgets is also impacted by various institutional actors. 
Moreover, understanding how agencies interact with the legislative environment 
and at what stage agencies exert the most influence over the budget process adds clarity to 
the nature of the policy process. In addition, we might consider what political conditions  
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influence agency program expansion. These environmental factors, which are 
usually outside the organization, also affect the organization and its decisions as agencies 
within the same or different policy arenas compete with one another for limited resources; 
for example, the higher education budget competes with Medicaid and other social welfare 
agencies. Multiple factors or forces have been identified as being involved in shaping 
public policies, one example being how internal administrative conditions affect the 
increase or reduction of an agency’s budget and, presumably, its activities. While the 
research reported here cannot address all these questions, it will examine a number of these 
issues to improve our understanding of the complicated factors that influence agency 
budget priorities, goal setting and processes.  
Recently, several factors have contributed to affect state budget process and 
decisions made by legislatures.  Specifically, Thurmaier & Willoughby (2001) recognized 
that sudden change in population growth and market volatility have increasingly burdened 
decision makers in state government . The federal government’s abdication of program 
responsibility to the state has led to the implementation of a wide range of policies by the 
latter. Leloup argues that  “As the costs of health care and social programs expanded and 
deficits grew, politicians attempted to adopt long-term macro-budgetary strategies to 
control fiscal balances” (Khan and  Hildreth,  2002, p.18). 
The changes in budget environment in the 1960s and 1990s has made the budget 
strategies and approach used by agencies in the state and federal to change as well. Budget 
actors have experienced some difficulties in the budget process. Rubin (1968) suggests that 
the internal and external factors affecting budget environments have placed a great effect 
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on budgetary decision-making, an analysis that appears to valid when considering the when 
considering the whole environment in which budget decision is made Lowery et al (1983).  
During the budget process, priorities of agencies are determined through allocation 
of resources. Therefore, budget process is important and has implication on budget success. 
As the budget process in each state highlights key issues, it demonstrates the dynamics  in 
state budgeting practices (NASBO, 2008). In addition, while allocating limited resources 
among competing interests is inherently difficult, these decisions are also vitally important 
to the fiscal health and future sustainability of individual communities within the state. 
However, most of the members of community pay little attention to the budget. Addressing 
this issue by studying the impact of the budget process on a community will assist 
policymakers in effective allocation of resources. Further, public officials’ awareness have 
been increased with issues associated with budgetary recommendation and appropriation.  
Despite these challenges, there is little research about the state budgetary process 
that focuses on decision makers below the level of elected official. Most studies on 
budgeting such as Axelrod (1995) and Gosling (1997) have explored the politics and 
economics of national budgeting. While scholars have provided evidence to support our 
understanding of budgeting at the federal level. There is a need to fill the gap in budgeting 
research by investigating budgetary process at the state and local level. This research 
intends to address this lack of information concerning the budgetary process and politics 
in state government.  
An agency budget is a plan or forecast of revenues, expenses, or both for a future 
specified time frame, such as a fiscal year. An approved expense budget serves as a  
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spending allowance and keeping spending within this plan helps fulfill program 
goals and ensures that the agency spends only what it has been appropriated. However, 
agency deliberations to determine this budget are a dynamic interaction among many 
actors, with the representatives from the legislative and executive sides, agency officials, 
stakeholders, and interest groups interacting to develop budget proposals, which are then 
formally considered by the state legislature. Smith and Jensen (2017) mentioned in their 
analysis of factors important to legislators in budget decision that the budgetary process is 
further complicated by differing perceptions about the relative importance of various pieces 
of information and differing priority items that legislators base their decisions on, all of 
which agency officials may or may not be able to impact or control. Smith and Jensen also 
mentioned that “despite the efforts of agency officials in developing their requests, the 
legislative approval of the budget can be unpredictable, and at the end of the process, this 
body may approve funding for programs that were never requested or envisioned” (Smith 
and Jensen 2017, p. 112).  
One of the rationales for government funding of any program is perceived market 
failure. For example, providing federal and state funding for air or water pollution 
monitoring, clean up and prevention is because of years of market and government failures 
that resulted in substantive negative environmental externalities. As such in order to 
reconcile past damage and prevent future damage public monies are allocated to 
programming and prevention of air and water pollution. The transfer of funds from one 
level of government to another that is primarily responsible for providing services is 
referred to as intergovernmental grants. The presence of externalities (negative or positive)  
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could call for more centralization but these externalities in one way can be 
addressed using intergovernmental grants. There are arguments as to the necessity for 
government intervention when the markets fails. Market failure may be due to externalities 
or presence of information asymmetry. The main feature of public goods are  nonrivalry 
and non-excludability. The non rivalry means that  good use by one person does not affect 
its use by others, and non excludability means its individuals cannot be excluded from its 
use or could benefit from without paying (Whicker et al. 2002).   
Scholars in the domain of budgeting argue that agency budget determination is 
fundamental to a broader understanding of public policy that explains why some agencies 
experience an increase, decrease, or stable budgets over time. For example, in some states 
the heads of several executive branch agencies are elected officials, a situation which may 
weaken the governor’s ability to exercise the same degree of budgetary control over them 
agencies as can be exercised over agencies with appointed heads. Sharkansky, (1968, 
1969), for example, found that agencies are more likely to have their recommendations 
altered by the legislature in states with many elected officials, South Carolina and Georgia 
being two examples of states with a number of agencies with elected heads. More 
specifically, currently, South Carolina has nine agencies with elected heads, the 
Department of Education and Department of Agriculture being two of the most important.  
Agencies involved in the budgetary process are political actors operating in a given 
political environment. While some aspects of the environment are uniform for all agencies, 
many are unique to each agency. For example, some operate in a more supportive executive 
environment than others, which is, in part, influenced by political party within state  
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legislatures. Previous research on budgeting at the state and federal levels has found 
that understanding agency budget requests throughout the different stages in the budgeting 
process is important (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). As a result, the initial focus of this 
research centers on budget strategy throughout the entire budget process, specifically the 
links between the goals of the agencies and their perceptions of the actions that will be 
effective in obtaining the required funding in their political environment (Wildavsky 1968). 
The research questions will be examined at the individual agency level and 
subsequently aggregated across agency type and mission, and then aggregated across broad 
agency. To better understand the agency budgeting environment, this research will address 
the following key questions: 1) How do variations in the structural, economic and political 
environment affect budget determination and how do these dimensions combine to affect 
one another and 2) How do organizational external, structural and internal factors impact 
budget strategies used by agencies. Succinctly, the primary research questions focus on 
why some agencies see their budget’s grow and others do not, and the role of the governor 
and the legislature in agency budget support and approval.  
Paper one will use Ripley’s budgeting incremental budget model (2007), or 
conceptual framework, to examine various aspects of incremental budgeting in 36 South 
Carolina state government agencies. By examining the state budgetary process and the 
relationship between agency, governor and legislature, this paper will assess the 
implications of incremental budgeting in the agencies budget process. This research will 
examine  agency budget success, budget size, agency assertiveness, legislative and 
gubernatorial support. Secondly, it examines agencies by classifying them into agency  
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type, method of agency head selection and policy area of influence and/or focus. 
Finally, this paper will analyze the environmental factors affecting  agency budget request, 
the governor recommendation and the state legislative appropriation 
Much of the research on the output of public policy has focused upon the budgetary 
process, most examining the interactions between agencies and Congress with respect to 
various budgetary decisions (Wildavsky, 1974; Fenno, 1966; Lindblom, 1959). After 
analyzing the budgetary outputs of various public organizations, many researchers have 
concluded that an incremental process of mutual adjustment exists between Congress and 
Executive Branch agencies. However, this conclusion about budgetary theory does not 
include the entire range of relevant phenomena. 
While the incremental theory of budgeting allows for potential variations in 
agencies, administrators, and circumstances, it does not take into account the variations in 
agency strategies. Examining stable patterns of requests to Congress, incrementalism posits 
the general behavioral characteristic of agency moderation but provides relatively little 
information on the budgetary roles of the legislative and executive branches and the 
departments. In relation to states, the primary responsibility of the executive budget office 
is to support the governor assume the budget cutting role of guardianship. However, the 
budgetary role of departments is less clearly specified in the theory. The question becomes 
if these departments should allow agencies to ask the governor for as much as revenue as 
they want, or should they play an active role in reducing requests or reshaping estimates. 
The lack of data has limited the development of generalizations on the budgeting behavior 
of either agencies or the governor’s office. An increasing number of studies have  
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challenged this incremental theory of budgeting on methodological, substantive, 
and normative grounds. 
This research will argue that alternative strategies are followed by agencies; that 
further differentiation of agency mission into distributive, redistributive, regulatory and 
market-oriented is necessary to understand the behavior of the agency, the governor and 
the legislators; and that agency mission, state government structure and agency strategies 
have different impacts on budgetary outcomes. In doing so, these findings may pose an 
additional challenge to incrementalism, which theorizes that the budgeting environment is 
outside of the budget process. To address this issue, Rubin (1968) “suggested an expanded 
model of the budgetary process that includes budget participants and environmental 
influences”  (Ryu et al. 2008, p. 24).   
The close relationship that exists between governing and budgeting suggests that 
whether an agency is headed by an elected official has implications on the budgeting 
process (Wildavsky, 1992). In some states, for example Georgia and South Carolina, 
several heads of executive agencies are elected officials. This practice, however, may 
weaken the governor’s ability to exercise the same degree of budgetary control over them 
as over agencies with appointed heads. Sharkansky (1968, 1969), for example, found that 
agencies are more likely to have their recommendations altered by the legislature in those 
states with many elected executive branch officials. 
Previous research has not examined whether the effects of the method for selecting 
agency head, agency type (cabinet or executive), agency mission or other characteristics of 
state political culture influence how legislatures treat agency requests and gubernatorial  
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recommendations. In addition, we do not know from this previous research if the 
method of agency head selection itself or some other characteristic of the state political 
culture accounts for how legislatures treat agency requests and gubernatorial 
recommendations. Perhaps a better indication of the impact of the method of agency head 
selection on gubernatorial influence over budget requests and appropriations can be 
obtained from a comparison of the budgetary experiences of agencies within the same state 
which have their heads selected by different methods, thereby controlling for the effect of 
political culture.  
Even though agencies with elected heads have the potential for greater 
independence from the governor than those with appointed heads, they may nevertheless 
choose not to deal directly with the legislature in budgetary matters. Independence from 
the governor is a double-edged sword: Although direct access to the legislature might 
enhance the likelihood of agency budget success, it may also increase agency vulnerability 
to legislative influence over programs and priorities. On the other hand, agencies with 
elected heads may find the political relationship with the governor more of an asset than a 
liability in their budgetary dealings with the legislature. For this reason, this research 
hypothesizes that within a state with strong gubernatorial budget powers, gubernatorial 
recommendations rather than agency requests will be the more important determinant of 
legislative appropriations irrespective of whether the head is appointed or elected 
(Thompson, 1987). 
An important difference between this research and previous budget studies is the 
availability of data in South Carolina related to agency requests, the executive’s  
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recommendation and legislative appropriations. Unlike previous studies, this 
research will examine the responses of the governor and legislature to the agency’s initial 
budget request to frame a clearer picture of the budgeting process.  
Following the lead of Sharkansky (1968), two indicators of gubernatorial and 
legislative influence over state agency budget requests are used in the analysis: short-term 
success and success in budget expansion. This is to determine the success of each agency 
in receiving its appropriations from the legislature in the previous budget period based on 
two reasons: to determine if certain agencies were successful in the budget process, while 
others were not; and to determine whether the executive or the legislature base current 
decisions for each agency on decisions from the preceding budget review. Short-term 
success is a measure of an agency’s success in receiving approval from the legislature in a 
given fiscal year. Success in expansion measures an agency’s success in receiving approval 
from the legislature for an increase in its current budget. 
Another distinction between this research and previous budget studies for example, 
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1974) lies in observations about government structure. 
Previous studies have researched budgetary process at the national level. At the national 
level, for example, the difference in federal budget has continued to occur occurred over a 
period of time, which makes the budgetary relationships between the presidency and 
Congress to be relatively easy to analyze. The same cannot be said generally of state and 
local budgeting. To investigate this hypothesis, this study will use the original budget 
requests for 36 state agencies in South Carolina over a 28-year period. In addition to these 
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original requests, the South Carolina Archive has records on the governor’s budget requests 
and the final legislative appropriation for each agency.  
The second aspect reported this first paper will explore the question to what extent, 
if any, structures and environments of state budget actors affect their budget behaviors and 
budget success. A key issue in this area of research is whether budget behaviors and budget 
success are significantly altered, as some suggest, by the influence of the governor and the 
legislature (Thompson 1987). Using the data from the same 36 agencies in South Carolina 
from 1990-2018, this aspect of this study examines how agency size, agency age, partisan 
strength in the electorate, expenditure, budget request, budget size, status of governor’s 
party, governors, economic conditions, and previous appropriation relate to agency 
appropriation. The results reveal explanatory power in the models and support the concept 
of a life cycle of agencies: while agencies are younger, their appropriations increase, a 
relationship that reverses as agencies become older and their policy actions begin to 
decrease. Moderate size/age agencies experience stability in their appropriations and 
recommendations from the governor.  
In attempting to analyze organizational life, sociological theorists have focused on 
a variety of factors including growth, adaptiveness, innovation, change, stability, 
effectiveness, and survival, among others. However, various researchers define and use the 
same terms differently, meaning it is often difficult to organize, much less evaluate, much 
of the organizational literature. Two  major classic models of organization structure by 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961) are the mechanistic and the organic, and both determine the 
environments of the organizations. The mechanistic form emphasizes structure and 
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hierarchy for control, authority, and communication to achieve goals and accomplish tasks, 
while the organic relies on individuals with specialized knowledge and recognizes unique 
and individual capabilities.  
Organizations are viewed as possessing characteristic ways of responding to 
environmental pressures. The Burns and Stalker (1961) models are illustrative of this 
research in that they present two broad types of organizations. Their research and that of 
others support the view that organizations either exhibit a tendency toward stability, 
rigidity, and limited growth or one toward expansion, rapid growth, and adaptiveness. 
These environmental factors, which are usually outside the organization, are seen as 
affecting the organization and its decisions. The factors or forces that have been identified 
as involved in shaping public policies are numerous. 
Budgetary incrementalism argues that three institutional actor agencies, the 
executive budget offices, and legislative committees dominate budget outcomes. The main 
actors in budgetary decision at the federal level are: the president, congress and agencies 
while at the state level, the main actors in budgetary process are the governor, legislators 
and agencies (Wildavsky et al. 1966). Ryu et al. (2008) also found that internal and external 
factors affecting are more important to gain a complete understanding of budgetary 
process.  
The third paper investigates the state’s higher education appropriation in detail, 
comparing its levels to both the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriation 
levels by examining the various institutional, economic, demographic, cultural, political, 
and fiscal factors. More specifically, it begins with two basic questions: 1) Why is there  
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variation in public higher education funding in South Carolina and 2) How does 
spending for higher education relate to state level budget expenditures? e budget literature 
argues that examining budget competition is important for understanding the tradeoffs in 
state higher education appropriation. The variations in legislator and governor support have 
implications for tuition, low income students, and  public higher education standards. As 
such, this research will examine the dynamics of budget competition to provide insight into 
the variations in state support for research institution, public universities in the state of 
South Carolina.  
“Hovey (1999) argued that higher education spending is used as a “balance wheel 
in state finance.” When state finances are strong, higher education benefits 
“disproportionately”. However, when a state experiences financial problem, legislators see 
higher education as a place where they can cut budgets to assist other state priorities since 
these institutions are viewed, probably correctly, as having greater fiscal flexibility and the 
ability to tap other resources such as tuition not available to other state programs” (Buhler  
2014, p. 12). 
Hovey (1999) “addresses the future financing of higher education, focusing 
primarily on the states and presenting state-by-state data on important trends” (Hovey 
1999, p.1).  He assesses the health state’s revenue and expenditure in the context of other 
state competing priorities and how these priorities affect funding for higher education.   
Hovey finds that most states expenditure will grow more than revenue which will lead to 
funding cut for higher education. However, during favorable budget environment, 
lawmakers  have been in support of funding major changes in higher education request. In 
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contrast, McLendon et al (2009) concluded that state appropriation for higher education 
remains an issue in united state educational system. The author noted that demographic and 
economic factors combined with higher education climate are certain conditions 
influencing funding for higher education.  
While other scholars (McLendon et al 2009; Tandberg, 2009) have advocated for 
governance structure in higher education system, Delaney and Doyle (2011)  found that the  
governance structure may have negative impact on higher education funding. was not 
statistically significant. This view is different from other scholars who advocated for 
centralization to be a factor to increase funding for higher education.   
While these literatures  have  identified some variables and factors that could affect 
funding for higher education. Weerts et al (2006) noted two important areas needing 
additional research. “First, the majority of studies are anchored in economic and political 
conceptual frameworks, thus limiting our theoretical understanding of this issue. They 
suggest that future studies should investigate this topic through other disciplinary lenses to 
provide new perspectives to inform our understanding of it. Second, past studies have 
typically relied on state-level finance data (i.e., share of higher education budgets) as the 
primary unit of analysis. Consequently, little is known about how state support for higher 
education may vary among sectors (research universities, regional comprehensive 
institutions, community colleges) and even at institutions themselves” (Weerts et al 2008, 
p.4). 
The final part of this dissertation employs a qualitative approach to assess the link 
between agency mission, budget strategy and budget success. In defining agency budget 
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success and discussing their definitions, agency budget officials provide useful insights 
into the strengths and limitations of specific measures of budget success and, in some cases, 
the tactics used in achieving it. Using a qualitative approach, this chapter aims to explore 
the following: 
Agency budget success from an administrator’s perspective 
The primary resource constraints 
How public support helps agencies with budget success.  
Who has power with the state budget and how do they use it to achieve their 
ends?  
This dissertation attempts to address ongoing budgeting questions through several 
lenses. Its results will enable future state level researchers and practitioners gain insight 
into how agency characteristics may play a role in the success and/or failure of the 
budgeting process. This chapter will highlight on agency budget strategies and behavior of 
budget officials in the budget process. It extends the budget strategy studies of previous 
scholars that have describe, explain and possibly predict in some situations various factors 
that affect agency outcome in the budget process. The budget policy research area has been 
dominated by other lines of inquiry, and this dissertation seeks to expand that with a focus 
on the agency and legislative processes being employed to arrive at budget policy.  
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Chapter Two: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
FACTORS AFFECTING AGENCY 
APPROPRIATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Historically, theories of incrementalism, which explain the strategies and behavior 
of the participants as well as the observed patterns of budgetary stability, have argued that 
successive limited comparisons of policies are more feasible and rational than 
comprehensive analysis in governmental decision-making (Lindblom 1959). The 
incremental model developed by Charles Lindblom breaks down the decision-making 
process into small steps using various combinations of experience and intuition. Wildavsky  
in his book, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, examined the relationship between  
agencies, Congress and appropriations committee decisions. Wildavsky assumes that 
budget reviewers  only base their decision on last year appropriation. (Wildavsky, 1964). 
Agency assertiveness, the primary focus of the research reported here, is the 
tendency for agencies to use strategy of expansion/budget growth in their programs and 
funding (LeLoup et al. 1978) and, thus, to request budget increases effectively and 
aggressively. As a result, agencies that employ such a strategy may have a different 
outcome in their budget success. While assertiveness may be a function of the orientation 
of the agency, it is also recognized that assertive behavior in budgeting is constrained by 
numerous external factors (LeLoup et al. 1978).  In addition, while assertiveness can be a 
good budget strategy, all agencies are not equally free to request budget increases. 
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As agency assertiveness is an underdeveloped area of study in the budgeting 
literature, this paper explores and extends this field by focusing on budget strategy. 
Research suggests that the internal and external factors of budget actors best describe the 
strategic behavior of an agency or its appropriate reviewing agent over a certain period 
(Ryu et al. 2008). More specifically, institutional actors, institutional rules, and the personal 
characteristics of an actor can influence the budget outcome or the process itself (Ryu et 
al. 2008).  
While the budget process and the budget environment constrain decisions that 
budget actors make, the incremental theory contends that the environment surrounding 
budgeting is not part of budget process (Rubin 1989). Rubin emphasized that if the 
environment is viewed as part of this process, we may expect it to influence the budget 
outcome. This contention has encouraged researchers to link changing environmental 
conditions, the budget process and the budget outcome. However, (Rubin (2008) found that 
governors and legislatures still play major roles in the state budget process.  
There is a need to understand the factors that affect budgeting at the state level, 
more importantly, how well the current literature describes the realities of the budget 
process at this level. This study joins other scholars of budgeting at the state level to 
investigate the influence of institutional budget actors and the exogenous budget 
environment on the budget outcome, specifically focusing on the State of South Carolina.  
It examines the relationship between budget assertiveness and budget success for 
fiscal years 1990 – 2018 using the incremental model to study the relationship between 
agency request, governor recommendation and legislative appropriation. This study is of  
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importance at the state level to identify the elements of incremental budgeting in 
state of South Carolina governments Also, to identify state features that affect the budging 
process and outcomes. Previous research have not examined whether the effects of the 
method for selecting agency head, agency type (cabinet or executive), agency mission or 
other characteristics of state political culture influence how legislatures treat agency 
requests and gubernatorial recommendations. In addition, we do not know from this 
previous research if the method of agency head selection itself or some other characteristic 
of the state political culture accounts for how legislatures treat agency requests and 
gubernatorial recommendations.  
Perhaps a better indication of the impact of the method of agency head selection on 
gubernatorial influence over budget requests and appropriations can be obtained from a 
comparison of the budgetary experiences of agencies within the same state which have 
their heads selected by different methods, thereby controlling for the effect of political 
culture. The study explores the research question why some agencies boldly ask for large 
increases and others timidly propose cuts. Further, it examines the relationships between 
agency assertiveness and the internal and external factors of the agency. Overall, the goal 
of this analysis is to better understand the effect of these relationships on budget outcome 
or growth rate of the agency.  
Incrementalism posits that the dominant agency strategy is one of moderation, 
asking for a budget increase but not a large one. Previous research (Leloup 1978) has used 
requests in the President’s budget to indicate agency behavior. While availability of data 
has been a major problem, many of the conclusions were based on the crucial assumption  
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that final requests reflect an agency’s goals and actions. This study suggests that 
the annual appropriations process, when viewed as a whole, is considerably more stable 
than its component stages. To identify an agency’s strategies and define the roles of the 
reviewing bodies, it is necessary to examine the early stages of the budgetary process. This 
research will begin to do so at a state level by asking questions related to initial agency 
requests and the level of assertiveness in seeking new funds, the consequences of alternate 
strategies, and under what conditions agencies request large increases. These and other 
questions that have seen limited study form the core of this research. 
2.2 Contributions to Knowledge 
Wildavsky (1964) provides evidence that budgeting includes more than the formal 
submission of information and easily reached decisions. He also identifies many 
administrative and legislative tactics that budget actors employ. However, there is no 
rigorous examination of what types of actors are likely to have what degree of budgetary 
success. One reason for this omission may be that Wildavsky does not compare the 
behavior of multiple agencies in a systematic fashion, giving the impression that 
administrators uniformly seek to get everything they can from appropriations sub-
committees in terms of money and autonomy. Yet this is not necessarily the case. This 
research will provide evidence on which types of actors are likely to take what types of 
action and with what degree of success. 
The recognition and verification of variations in the budget strategies of different 
agencies are important contributions to the current view of budgeting and politics. In 
addition, the discovery of differences in agency strategies could  
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suggest the likelihood of differences in the posture that legislative committees 
assume vis-a-vis different administrators. This dissertation begins to explore the potentially 
subjective nature of budget strategies suggested by Wildavsky and other scholars using a 
measurable framework. As mentioned earlier, this research will systematically compare the 
budgeting behavior of different state level administrative units or agencies.  
The use of time series data allows this study to examine the changing environmental 
conditions of the budget process and clarify the extant theory of agency-level budget 
outcome. According to Rubin (2008) the lack of empirical studies testing explanatory 
theories can be attributed to the difficulty in obtaining data that connect behavior of budget 
actors with the fiscal information of the agency. 
Finally, this research highlights  state agency budget strategies, an area which has 
received limited research attention and, as a result, the theory of incrementalism has been 
the predominate theory applied to explain this process. This study will extend the budget 
strategy studies of other scholars that identified several factors that affect agency strategy 
and budget success but will go further by examining additional factors and interactions. 
Specifically, this research explores the potential impact of various agency missions and the 
importance of agency budget strategies in relation to budget requests. Extending the public 
policy literature, and specifically the public budgeting research, in this way  provides an 
important lens into a wide range of potential state and state agency characteristics. The 
both qualitative and quantitative frameworks and analysis presented here will benefit future 
researchers for years to come. 
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2.3 Research Questions 
The state budget process resembles both federal and local government budgeting, 
but in details, it is not identical (Wildavsky 1964). The primary research question explores 
why some agencies boldly ask for large increases and others timidly propose cuts. 
Primary Research Question 1: What are the patterns of assertiveness/moderation in 
initial agency requests? 
1a. How does budget size affect the level of support from the governor and 
legislators? 
1b. How does agency assertiveness affect the level of support from the 
governor and legislators? 
Primary Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between the governor’s 
recommendations and the legislature’s appropriations? 
2a. Does the legislature rely on the governor’s budget for appropriation? 
2b. Is the relationship between the governor’s recommendations and the 
legislature’s appropriations more direct than the relationship between the 
agency’s request for an increment and the legislature’s appropriation? 
Primary Research Question 3: What are the structural and environmental factors 
affecting agency appropriation 
3a. How does an agency’s political environment affect agency outcomes? 
3b. How does agency type affect the level of support from the governor and 
the legislature? 
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3c. How does the method of agency head selection affect agency 
appropriation? 
3d. What are the determinants for agency appropriation? 
3e. What is the effect of agency age on agency budget outcome? 
3f. What is the effect of agency size on agency budget outcome? 
2.4 Literature Review 
The budgeting literature in general provides empirical evidence on the behavior, 
role, and strategies of individual agencies, governors and legislators. Much of the previous 
literature has been limited to non-systematic case analyses (Russett 1970) and has engaged 
in little, if any, quantitative analysis, with incrementalist studies being the most influential 
works on budgeting over the last two decades (Leloup 1978). In “The Science of Muddling 
Through,” Lindblom suggests that in governmental decision-making, successive limited 
comparison of policies is more feasible and rational than comprehensive (Leloup 1978, p. 
489). According to Wildavsky “budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive” 
(Wildavsky1964).  
In Sharkansky’s study of agency request and gubernatorial recommendation 
(1968), Sharkansky (1968) assessed the agency increment, assertiveness and how 
legislative and gubernatorial support affect budget outcome of agencies both in the long- 
and short-term budget success. Shakansky argued that assertiveness is a perquisite for 
agency budget expansion.  importance of both the assertiveness of the agency and the 
support from the state governor for short- and long-term agency expansion.. Legislators do 
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accept agency’s request and use heuristics as a cue in aiding their calculation when making 
budget  
decisions. The lack of resource has been mentioned as an important reason as to 
why legislators use incremental methods in budgetary decision. Shakansky concluded that 
for agency to have success both in the short and long term, Governor recommendation is 
more important than agency assertiveness.  
The incrementalism school of thought sees time and information as the two most 
important factors for legislators and governors who make final decisions on budgets. These 
factors are especially important in deciding whether an agency’s budget is perceived as 
comprehensive. The strategy used by agency can also be classified as politically satisficing; 
generating a satisfactory outcome but one that may or may not be optimal. 
Leloup (1978) showed that the dominance of incremental theory has been 
detrimental to an overall understanding of the dynamics and processes of budgeting. Under 
the incremental theory of budgeting, the focus has been on the stability of budgeting at the 
local, state and national level. Theoretical developments in incremental budgeting have 
been concerned with explaining why changes in the final appropriation or the entire budget 
process are minimal. However, many scholars have argued that budgeting is more complex 
than incremental theories explain; the findings of incrementalism concerning the budgetary 
process have left scholars to conclude that agencies have little opportunity for discretion 
and initiative in budgeting and in other areas of the policy process. The research over the 
past 53 years has concluded that the single most important determinant of an agency’s 
budget is the previous year’s level of funding (Wildsaky 1976).  
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The incremental process of has been used to explain the decision-making process 
and budgetary outcome of agencies (Moreland, 1975). The primary strategy is to ask for a  
budget increase, but only a modest one. While agencies do not expect their requests 
to be completely denied, it is assumed there is a clear budget strategy in which an 
extravagant increment in what agency ask for may lead to reduction in their appropriation.  
The expectation of agencies by the appropriation committee is to request for more 
since the dominant rule that is used to calculate agency requests is for agency to deviate 
from using moderate strategy. The behavior of budget reviewers summarize the process, 
with the results supporting the theory of incrementalism: as Moreland (1975) summarizes, 
the main similarity of the budgetary process is the stability in the rules used by the 
participants. However, Moreland’s (1975) research did not examine the causes that 
surrounds the special circumstances, even though he highlights their existence. For 
example, Moreland confirms that the internal structure of agency  correlate with greater 
appropriations. 
Dempster and Wildavsky’s (1974) research incorporates a variety of environmental 
variables into models of incrementalism represents an extension and an improvement of 
earlier work. Environmental factors are coded as binary variables in their models, and this 
explains  elements of environment on budget process and budget outcome. Shull and Shaw 
(1999) found that competition between president and congress affect appropriation 
outcomes. Their results confirm that the partisan composition of Congress and the 
presidency, the status of president’s party, and division in Congress have impact on agency 
budget success. 
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Past research indicates that budget behavior concerning the general fund have been 
consistent, but agencies still embark of assertive strategy. Thompson (1987) mentioned  
that, there are cases when legislators appropriate more than governor 
recommendation and also in some cases legislators follow the lead of governor in their 
appropriation.. State political factors have been recognized to play part in gubernatorial 
and legislative appropriation.  Lack of resource and legislative professionalism have been 
also identified as to why state follow an incremental approach in budgeting (Thompson’s, 
1987; Shakansky, 1973). 
Strategy in the budgeting process is important. Axelrod (1995) mentioned that 
agencies use different strategies in their budget request. Leloup and Moreland (1978) used 
a more robust empirical analysis to conclude that agency strategies play a part in 
determining the budget success. He concluded that assertiveness is a perquisite for an 
agency attempting. Assertiveness is an important factor that distinguish between agency 
that receive large or small increase in appropriation. Sharkansky found a positive 
relationship between the governor’s recommendation and success in short-term and  budget 
expansion.  Shakansky concluded that governor’s recommendation is an important factor 
in agency budget outcome. 
Sharkansky (1969, 1968), found that agencies are more likely to have their budget 
recommendations altered by the legislature in states with a large number of elected 
executive branch officials. This fact is important because it may then control the power of 
the governor to some extent in these states. However, it is not known if the method for 
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selecting the head of an agency itself or some other characteristic of the state political 
culture influences the manner in which legislatures treat agency requests and gubernatorial  
recommendations. This issue could be explored by examining the budgetary 
experience of agencies within the same state which have their heads selected by different 
methods. 
There are questions and challenges to incrementalism approach when analyzing 
budgeting process. Incrementalism assumption is based on the economy being stable. 
Incrementalism theorist argued that it is a useful theoretical lens in that economic and 
policy environment as it could describe the steady agency growth; however overall, it was 
less effective in describing external factors that affect budgeting process and environment.  
Willoughby and Finn (1996) described and classified the budgeting behavior of 
legislative analysts from nine southern states and then compared their decision orientations 
with executive analysts from the same states, finding that budget decision-making followed 
patterns that reflected different budget cues. More specifically, they found five budget 
decision making types or orientations based on their research.  
Ripley et al., 1973 challenged the lncrementalism approach to budgetary policy-
making. This research assumes an opposite view of the incrementalism theorist who a that 
budgeting is not comprehensive but stable. Ripley et al. (1973) synthesized early 
theoretical works and developed a conceptual framework based on four major fields of 
research. suggests that policy-making is one method used by a government in responding 
to environmental events,  defining policy response in terms of three elements: a policy 
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statement, a policy action, and a policy result. A policy statement is defined by its content: 
an explicit articulation of the goals of subsequent government activity. The intent of the  
activity may change over time and the condition that elicited this statement of intent 
may also change over time. Policy actions  
are those activities or sets of activities articulated or implied by the policy  
statement. Necessarily, these actions are determined by the statement of intent. Both the 
statement of intent and the activities undertaken to implement the policy statement are 
influenced by intervening environmental and governmental conditions. The policy result, 
or policy outcome as it is sometimes called, is what happens in the environment and in the 
government as a result of governmental activity. The activities of the government are 
presumed to have an effect on the condition that originally prompted the activity. Whether 
a distinguishable impact was achieved with the desired consequences can, in principle, be 
discerned. 
March and Simon (1958) as well as Blau et al. (1966) suggested that hierarchical 
complexity may affect how the organizational mission is accomplished. Ripley et al. (1973) 
investigated the effects of relationship between  hierarchical complexity and 
appropriations, their study found that, appropriations increases when the complexity of an 
agency decreases.  Fenno (1966) also found that Congress is sensitive to administrative 
staff arrangements.  Blau (1970) suggest that the size of an organization affects how the 
organization is arranged and the larger the organization, the more differentiated the 
administration. The findings of Ripley et al. (1973) also  support Blau’s (1970) assumption 
that, as  the size of an agency increases the appropriations also increase. 
28 
2.4.1 Principal agent theory and budgeting 
Public budgeting involves relationships among the actors or the participants during 
the process, specifically among agency, governor and legislators. Bureau or agencies are 
the agents and legislature and the governor are the principals. In this relationship, the 
legislative arm enter an agreement  with the agents to serve the public, and the primary 
focus for all involved is the budget (Forrester, 2002). 
The Principal-Agent model has been used to describe the relationship among the 
activities of the congress, the presidency and the United States departments or agencies 
(Wood & Waterman 1994). According to Wood and Waterman (1994), information and 
hierarchical relationship are two factors affecting the relationship between agent and 
principals. In other words, those who make claims on governmental resources are agents 
and those who allocate and ration the resources are principals. In this relationship, the 
principal contracts with agents to provide services to the public, and the main focus for all 
those involved is the contract (i.e., the budget) itself (Khan & Hildreth 2002, p. 124). 
“From the principal-agent perspective, the information managed by both is focused 
on advancing their own self-interest or maximizing their own utilities. The information is  
exchanged so that both sets of participants might adapt to a dynamic, yet resource-
constrained environment” (Khan & Hildreth 2002, p. 124). A major limitation in the 
budgetary and political environment is the imperfect information provided by both the 
principals and agents or, worse, the asymmetric information held by either of them. Where 
there is an asymmetry of information, it is expected that the consequent budgetary solution 
will be suboptimal, with unexpected results. With insufficient or biased information, the  
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decision makers cannot estimate the effects of their decisions with a high degree of 
certainty. Asymmetry information create an imbalance of power between the agent and 
principal and this could make the agreement made to go awry. Budget success also depend 
on quality of information shared between the agency and legislative arm otherwise it will 
be dictated by political trade off . The Principal-Agent model can be used to enhance our 
understanding of the  relationships between actors in the budget decision making process. 
Applying the Principal-Agent theory and using it as a framework to explore the budgeting 
process may provide an additional lens for understanding the complexities of the budget 
process. 
2.4.2 The role of information in the budget process 
The use of an incremental budgeting process and the asymmetric information 
included in it are two primary challenges faced by policymakers interested in making 
evidence-based budget decisions. When agencies develop budget requests for decision 
makers, agencies could potentially exploit their relationship with other budget participants 
due to information asymmetry. One way to reduce this asymmetry in the budget process is 
for all participants to have a knowledgeable understanding of the process. The lack of 
information about which programs are effective and those providing clear benefits may 
result in decision makers asking for an across the board reduction (VanLandingham et al 
2016), leading to suboptimal budgeting decisions. 
I believe there is a need to understand budget justification and use evidence as a 
guide in budget development. Justification is required to distinguish knowledge from 
merely guessing about should be done; a justified budget is one supported by evidence and 
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with reasons that ensure tax payers’ dollars will be well spent. From an agency perspective, 
a well-developed justification is key to its budget request. According to VanLandingham et 
al. (2016), one of the issues with the budget rules and processes is that agencies are required 
to justify the amount of funding requested rather than the results their program hope to 
achieve. With regard to the budgeting process, decision makers can choose between line 
item, performance-based or zero-based budgeting as a guide for their decisions. 
Performance-based budgeting requires the agency to justify funds and establish 
performance metrics while zero-based budgeting does not use an incremental method, 
requiring agencies to defend their entire budget.  
Another key challenge in the budgeting process is the fact that those who are 
supposed to review and approve the budget generally have less information and knowledge 
of agency needs and the budgeting process in general. According to Rubin (1980), the 
complexity within the budget process affects the actors in receiving the necessary 
information to inform their decision. This lack of information inhibits the budget actors’ in 
making decision during budget process. Wildavsky (1968) also support other non 
incrementalist scholars that decision makers in the budget process have few resources. 
Much of the existing literature on government budgeting suggests the importance of 
incremental decision rules. Wildavsky et al. (1968) concluded in their research of federal 
budgeting that officials who review agency requests focus on the increment and not budget 
size. 
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2.4.3 Relationship between incrementalism budgeting and punctuated equilibrium 
“V. O. Key (1940) described budgeting as the process of deciding whether to 
allocate more resources to activity X than activity Y. As such, he considered budgets as a 
process for deciding who gets what and how much. In other words, public budgeting is a 
reflection of priorities and constraints—what gets put on the agenda and what does not 
(Khan & Hildreth 2002, p. 202)”. The question then becomes what has the potential to shift 
the priorities addressed on the agenda. Punctuation equilibrium theory attempts to explain 
how priorities might change on a government agenda. While this theory may not explain 
frequent small changes, it may be able to explain the infrequent large ones.  
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) developed the concept of punctuation equilibrium, 
stating the effect of incremental changes that occurs in budget process. The theory states 
that a policy will continue to be in a state a equilibrium until it is disturbed by external 
condition and later the policy will go back to original condition. The rational choice theorist 
believes that changes in budgeting occurs incrementally because of limited computational 
capability of decision-makers.  During a time of instability in the official agenda, there is 
a window of opportunity for creating substantial change, the explanation for why this 
theory is called punctuated equilibria (Jordan 2002). 
Informed by an internship with the South Carolina Department of Administration. 
, my research argues that incrementalism remains the standard approach to budgeting. This 
research remains focused on understanding and examining incremental changes as they are 
considered the common changes in budget activity. The intellectual origin of incremental 
decision-making is in the work of Lindblom (1959, 1979). Lindblom believes that rather  
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than evaluating all possible outcomes, decision-makers in actuality list only those 
which occur to them, relying heavily on their past experiences. Decision-makers select the 
first alternative that seems minimally acceptable, and analysis is limited. Many possible 
outcomes and alternative potential policies or decisions are not considered, and affected 
values are ignored.  
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) also found that incremental changes are present in 
budget process but other underlying factors affecting budget must be accounted and taken 
into consideration. Punctuated equilibrium acknowledges that this model includes both 
incremental and punctuated changes. True (1995) applied the punctuation equilibrium 
model focusing on controllable and uncontrollable aspect of national budgeting. True 
hypothesize that if the  effect of budget responsiveness is to policy change then, this effect 
should be noticeable in changing budget authority. The study finds that budget changes are 
associated with major interventions but the most influential factors affecting budget change 
is the domestic and political factors. The study argues that non incremental change could 
occur in the budgeting process due to changes in priority of what the government intends 
to do. True (1995) concludes that budget authority is a significant factor for associating 
policy shift and budget changes because budget authority explains policy changes more 
than expenditure.  
The benefit of applying punctuated equilibrium in relation to budgeting allow us to 
understand whether the effect of external shock causes policy to shift and what is the 
difference between policy shift and equilibrium state of economy. It is impotent to 
understand how radical change of events affects budget process and outcome. Applying  
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this lens to budgeting, these points in the equilibria process reveal a shift in 
spending priorities. The model of punctuation equilibrium is useful for understanding the 
state budgeting process; however, it is important to acknowledge that incrementalism also 
characterizes the budgeting process and recognizes the limitations of the cognitive capacity 
of decision makers.  
Theoretically, bounded rationality could also be used to explain why policy makers 
may prioritize incrementalism when reviewing budgets. The bounded rationality theory 
argues that humans have limited computational capacity for processing information. Due 
to the limited computational capacity of human being, the capability of the legislators to 
process all aspect of budget issues is limited. Bounded rationality recognized the 
imperfection and limited capability in human’s knowledge. The bounded rationality 
paradigm, first proposed by Simon (1957), acknowledges the limitations of processing 
information from human’s perspective (Simon 1972). 
The theory of bounded rationality argues that budget decision makers do not have 
complete information to make an informed decision. Even though when the information is 
present, sometimes it is not accurate and complete. Limited computational capability and 
lack of time are the factors that inhibit the lawmakers in analyzing all aspect of budgetary 
process completely.  Therefore, decision makers use cues and one of such is a concept 
called heuristics which helps in decision making. The bounded rationality paradigm is 
important because it emphasizes cognitive constraints and the use of decision heuristics to 
help mitigate them. 
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2.4.4 Revenue and expenditure as a component of budget 
At the most basic level, a budget is made up of revenues (taxes and fees) and 
expenditures; however, government budgets face the tension of having to balance the two. 
Budgeting rules across states impact the tension and/or constraints related to the budgeting 
process. “A budget is effectively a spending plan based on the expected revenue and the 
priorities for the quantity and quality of services to be provided or transferred to the public” 
(Ulbrich 2004, page 204). Therefore, all governments, both at the state and federal level, 
need to consider the revenue and expenditure side of budget. The budget development 
process involves three key elements: a revenue plan, an expenditure forecast and a 
procedure for dealing with the difference between revenue and expenditure.  
The federal government (and some states) find themselves with excessive of debt 
as their rules allow for this occurrence. The Congressional Budget Office predicts that the 
federal budget deficit will exceed $693 billion for the fiscal year 2019. (CBO The 
Economic Outlook for 2019). States have their own budgeting rules and processes, and in 
South Carolina the budget is legally required to balance, meaning it cannot be negative.  
The first component that drives the budget process is the revenue available in any 
year. The primary source of revenue for the Federal Government is income and social 
security taxes, while for state and local governments, it is sales and property tax, 
respectively. While the CBO provides revenue forecasts for the Federal Government, the 
Revenue for Fiscal Affairs (RFA) serves in this capacity for the State of South Carolina. 
Predictions from the CBO and the RFA impact the dialogue about the tax structure, new 
and expanded expenditure programs and the future of the Social Security program. In  
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addition, revenue forecasts play an important role in determining economic policy, 
although some critics have argued that revenue forecasts at the federal level have not been 
exceptionally accurate (Ulbrich 2003).  
The expenditure side of the budget addresses both ongoing and proposed new 
programs. Revenue forecasts are based on anticipated economic conditions, which are then 
incorporated into the decision-making process. All economic forecasts are applied to the 
existing tax base and analyzed according to income elasticity relationships. These forecasts 
also reflect any changes in the tax structure including both tax rates and expenditure. A key 
question that has not been explored is if surpluses and/or deficits continue, how will 
budgetary behavior and norms adjust? South Carolina’s call for a reduction of three percent 
(3%) of an agency’s total appropriation results in two possible outcomes: First, increased 
revenue could lead to increased state expenditures (one could argue that state or federal 
expenditure must be in line with  available revenue, and, therefore, expenditure must follow 
revenue); and second, as revenue decrease  and/or expenditures are reduced , budget 
deficits will shrink.  
Second component that drives the budget process is the changes in government 
expenditure that change the revenue: one could also argue that disturbances to the economy 
and other external conditions that affect budgeting lead to an increase in government 
spending and may or may not result in an increase in revenues (taxation). Simply put, an 
increase in government expenditure does not translate to an increase in revenue. 
Government budget deficits may have a significant impact on the economy as deficits can  
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result in a reduction in national savings and economic growth. It can be argued that 
a deficit reduction strategy could increase economic growth. 
2.5 Methodology 
The analytical approach used in this paper focused on applying time-series (or 
longitudinal) models to examine budgeting outcomes over time. Time -series models are 
suitable because of both the nature of the hypotheses and the methodological advantages 
of this approach. This study did  not assume that the variables affecting an agency remain 
stable over time, but rather that they vary systematically with such environmental 
conditions as social and economic conditions. Cross-sectional analysis is not appropriate 
for this type of data as it holds environmental variables constant as opposed to allowing for 
a dynamic modeling process over time. For this reason,  time-series analysis allows for a 
more robust examination of the effects of various environmental conditions on the 
budgeting process.   
  In addition to permitting a study of  environmental effects, time-series analysis can 
help to separate systematic error from random error in the prediction equations (Coleman, 
1968; Heise, 1970). It allows for measurement of the proper time lags between variables 
(Bohrnstedt, 1969) and provides information on the directionality of effects between 
variables (Bohrnstedt, 1969; Heise, 1970). According to Campbell and Stanley (1963),  a 
longitudinal design can be used as a quasi-experimental design, which is subject to fewer 
problems than a static group comparison. This advantage is especially important if one 
wants to study the results of policy actions when it is not possible to set up an experimental  
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design. Longitudinal information can also be used in relating historical analysis to 
quantitative studies.   
Time series analysis  (Panel data)  require that a number of measures  must be used 
to characterize normality, correlation and overall best model fit. This study used a number 
of diagnostic tests to test for these issues, and the time-fixed effects tests were examined 
for their significance.  The time-fixed effects test is a joint test to see if the dummies for all 
years are equal to 0 and if they are then, no time fixed effects are needed.  The Hausman 
test was used to test for the appropriateness of a fixed or random effects model. Testing for 
cross-sectional dependence/contemporaneous correlation was completed using the Pasaran 
cross-sectional dependence  (CD) test to  test whether the residuals are correlated across 
entities. Cross-sectional dependence can lead to bias in tests results (also called 
contemporaneous correlation), and, therefore, a critical examination of the residuals is 
necessary.  See the appendix for all diagnostic results.  
Finally, it is critical to determine the potential bias in model estimation and results.  
Models of this type often experience serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and auto 
correlation, all of which can  bias the estimated parameters.  Baltagi (2001) suggests the 
use of the FGLS model that is robust to auto correlation and cross-sectional to estimate the 
parameters of models similar to the one used in this research.   Finally, Baltagi (2001) 
argues that with cross-sectional, time series data, there is the possibility of serial correlation 
between error terms across the period of analysis. Since serial correlation is likely to bias 
the estimated parameters, a test for serial correlation was also performed.   
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While researchers can create a systematic sample for finite time segments (such as 
every year for a 20-year period), cyclic phenomena may introduce systematic bias in the 
sample. Events unique to the time segment sampled may also have a biasing effect. 
However, it is impossible to create a probability sample of the universe across time since 
much data are reported only annually and sometimes never. This situation, however, 
primarily affects the external validity of the study. In relation to the research reported here, 
this study cannot generalize about all U.S. state agencies for all time, but it can be used to 
draw inferences about the agencies under study for the period involved. 
Based on Sharkansky (1968), two indicators of gubernatorial and legislative 
influence over state agency budget requests are used in the analysis: short-term success and 
success in budget expansion. Short-term success is a measure of an agency's success in 
receiving approval from the legislature for a given fiscal year. Success in expansion 
measures an agency's success in receiving approval from the legislature for an increase in 
its current budget. Consistent with Sharkansky's (Sharkansky, I. 1968) methodology, this 
research  includesonly agencies with general fund appropriations of at least $500,000.  
After using the $500,000 selection criteria, other agencies were also dropped from 
the study because of  a lack of data for the entire period, 1990-2018, selected for the study. 
For theoretical interest and validation, agencies are classified into four different agency 
mission types: distributive, redistributive, market emulators,  and regulatory.  This provides 
for an additional theoretical framework to understand and compare the relationship 
between agency mission and budgeting processes.  
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This research defines budget success as the relationship between the amount of 
money an agency requests and the amount it receives through appropriations measured as 
a percentage. The data used were collected from the annual state appropriations document.    
This research examined both short-term success and expansion variables from the 
legislative and governor’s perspectives. 
This study uses an ordinary linear regression equation: This study uses an ordinary 
linear regression equation: 
𝑌1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑥 + 𝑏2𝑥2 + 𝑏3𝑥3 + 𝑏4𝑥4 + e 
𝑌2 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑥 + 𝑏2𝑥2 + 𝑏3𝑥3 + 𝑏4𝑥4 + e 
With the dependent variables defined as: 
a or Alpha: is a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0 
e: is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X 
Y1: Legislative appropriation as a percentage of the agency’s request (short-
term success) 
Y2: Legislative appropriation as a percentage of the agency’s expenditure 
(success in budget expansion) 
This research utilizes two dependent variables to model budget success from two 
distinct but important lenses. First, short term budget success can be simply measured by 
reviewing what an agency requests in total from the legislature and the determine what 
percentage of that request is actually appropriated. In this case, if an agency requests 
$1,000,000 and it is appropriated $500,000 but another agency with the same request 
received $800,000; we can assume that one agency has been more successful than the other.  
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On the other hand, the second dependent variable which is called success in budget 
expansion is simply measured by reviewing what an agency expenditure is in total and then 
determine what percentage of agency expenditure is actually appropriated. Thus, it simply 
measures the increment of growth (growth in agency expenditure) enjoyed by each unit. In 
this case, if an agency expenditure is $1,000,000 and it is appropriated $500,000 but 
another agency with the same expenditure received $800,000; we can assume that the 
former agency has enjoyed 50% increment of growth in expenditure and the later agency 
has enjoyed 80% increment of growth in expenditure. 
 
The independent variables for the analysis of agency budgets are 
X1: agency request plus current expenditure (budget size) 
X2: agency request as a percentage of current expenditures (agency 
acquisitiveness) 
X3: the governor’s recommendation for each agency as a percentage of agency 
request (short-term support) 
X4: the governor’s recommendation for each agency as a percentage of current 
agency expenditures (support for budget expansion) 
The model incorporates three basic components in the budget process: the agency 
as the initiator of requests; the governor as the first reviewer of the agency’s request who 
provides recommendations to the legislature; and the legislature as the authority that 
defines each agency's appropriation. The variables included in the first component ( 
agency) are budget size which is defined agency request for the coming budget period plus 
current expenditure and agency acquisitiveness which is defined as agency request for the  
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coming budget period as a percentage of current expenditures. In the second 
component, the variables included are governor short-term support which is defined as the 
governor's recommendation for each agency as a percentage of agency request and 
governor support for budget expansion which is defined as the governor's recommendation 
for each agency as a percentage of current agency expenditures. 
And lastly, in the third component, the variables included are legislative short-term 
success which is defined as the percentage of the agency's request for the coming budget 
period appropriated by the legislature and legislative success in budget expansion which is 
defined as the percentage of agency current expenditures appropriated by the legislature 
for the coming budget period. 
The model is dual in nature, with the first phase focusing on the percentage of an 
agency's request that is approved by the governor and appropriated by the legislature. As 
such phase one specifically models short-term budget success because it is concerned with 
agency success in the current legislative session. Given the focus on agency success in the 
current legislative session, these variables are identified as short-term budget success. The 
second phase focuses on the percentage of current expenditures that the governor 
recommends, and the legislature appropriates for the coming budget period. Phase two of 
this analysis models success in budget expansion because it is concerned with increases in 
budget over time. 
In the second part of this study thirty-six South Carolina state government agencies 
are used as units of analysis to determine whether a relationship exists between the 
internal/external structure of state agencies and their appropriations. It is anticipated that  
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agency similarities and differences may be masked in statistical analysis where 
agencies are combined. To address this concern, this research classifies agencies according 
to a well-defined topology as a control to determine if agencies with common 
characteristics behave in a similar manner. 
Agency Maturity: This indicator was selected to measure two of the dimensions of 
maturity mentioned earlier, agency age and size. Agency age is defined as the number of 
years since the agency's creation. Agency size is defined as the number of employees in an 
agency, specifically, the number of full-time employee (FTE) positions. Data for these 
variables originated from the South Carolina Department of Administration. There is 
considerable agreement that as agencies mature, they become more complex, stable, 
experienced, and better able to cope with their environment (Blau and Scott, 1962). The 
age of the agencies was considered important since it is hypothesized that older agencies 
resist the efforts of change-oriented personnel due to a traditional or status quo-oriented 
culture which emphasizes conservatism with regard to programs and practice (Downs, 
1967 and Ripley et al. 1973). The list of agencies are described in tables below. 
 
Table 2.1. List of More Mature Agencies by Age Category 
Age Category Agency Name 
More Mature WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 
More Mature WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL 
More Mature VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 
More Mature STATE LIBRARY 
More Mature SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND 
More Mature MUSEUM COMMISSION 
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More Mature FORESTRY COMMISSION 
More Mature EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION 
More Mature DEPT OF REVENUE 
More Mature DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON 
More Mature DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM 
More Mature DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH 
More Mature DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION 
More Mature DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
More Mature DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 
More Mature DEPT OF AGRICULTURE 
More Mature DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE 
More Mature DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
More Mature DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
More Mature DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY 
More Mature CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT 
More Mature COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS 
More Mature COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND 
More Mature ARTS COMMISSION 
 
Table 2.2. List of Less Mature Agencies by Age Category 
Age Category Agency Name 
Less Mature SOCIAL SERVICES 
Less Mature DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Less Mature DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Less Mature DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS 
Less Mature DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS 
Less Mature DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Less Mature ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED 
Less Mature SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM 
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Age Category Agency Name 
Less Mature HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS 
 
Table 2.3. List of Agencies by Acquisitiveness Category (Moderate Agencies) 
Agency Name  
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION moderate 
STATE LIBRARY moderate 
ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED moderate 
SOCIAL SERVICES moderate 
SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM moderate 
DEPT OF REVENUE moderate 
DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY moderate 
DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON moderate 
DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION moderate 
DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS moderate 
DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS moderate 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS moderate 
 
Table 2.4. List of Agencies by Acquisitiveness Category (Low) 
Agency Name  
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION low 
DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH low 
DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE low 
DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL low 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE low 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION low 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS low 
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY low 
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Agency Name  
CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT low 
 
Table 2.5. List of Agencies by Acquisitiveness Category (High) 
Agency Name  
SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND high 
MUSEUM COMMISSION high 
HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS high 
FORESTRY COMMISSION high 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION high 
DEPT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON high 
DEPT OF PARKS, RECREATION & TOURISM high 
DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES high 
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE high 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS high 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE high 
COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND high 
ARTS COMMISSION high 
 
Other researchers have demonstrated that small agencies tend to have more 
substantial changes in their year over year budgets possibly due to more aggressive 
behavior in the appropriations process (LeLoup, 1975 and Ripley et al. 1973). For this 
reason, a young/old typology was developed based on the age of the agency. Young 
agencies were operationalized as agencies in existence 25 years or less and old agencies as 
25 years and older as of 1990. Twenty-five years was selected as an appropriate cut-off 
based on previous research conducted by Ripley et al. (1975). 
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A second typology representing size was the creation of a dichotomous variable 
based on an agency’s total number of employees. Thus, agencies were separated into 
small/large agencies on the basis of whether the average number of employees for the years 
1990-2018 was above or below 500. Five hundred employees was selected as the threshold 
based on a similar approach used by Shull (1975b) in an examination of eight agencies in 
the federal government. 
The dimensions of agency type of interest in this study included the cabinet and the 
executive department. The types of agency spending, which are hypothesized to potentially 
impact agency budget outcomes, can also be categorized as Education, Conservation, 
Social Rehabilitation, Regulatory, Correctional, Health and Public Safety. 
Party Strength: Researchers assert that partisanship in society and the government 
is important for explaining public policy outcomes (Downs, 1957; Dye, l 966; Rossiter, 
1960; Campbell et al., 1960, Sundquist, (1968). There are a range of variables that can be 
used to measure partisanship, with this analysis using partisan strength in the electorate. 
Key (1966) demonstrated that voters make choices based on their individual policy 
preferences, while both Key (1966) and Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) found the 
number of votes for a party's candidate for President is related to voter acceptance or 
rejection of the policies proposed and/or pursued by the candidate’s party. 
The effect of the political environment on agency budgeting outcomes is another 
critical area for examination using an independent variable. Several variables were tested 
to control for the political environment: the governor’s party affiliation, the status of the 
governor’s party in the legislature, and the party in control of the legislature. Other 
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independent variables included per capita income, population, total state revenue, state 
total expenditure, and state total appropriation. 
Some research indicates that the effect of agency type and of agency head selection 
will also impact agency budgeting outcomes. The dimensions of agency head selection of 
interest in this study were: Governor appoints board which names the executive director 
for agency; Governor appoints board with legislative approval and board names the 
executive director for agency; Governor hires directors for fixed terms with Senate 
approval; Governor appoints agency director with Senate approval; Governor and 
legislators appoint board members who name executive director for the agency; Legislature 
elects judges and board members; Board membership ex officio and Governor hires 
director for a fixed term. These seven dimensions of methods of agency heads selection 
were further grouped (these were the two groups used in the analysis) into elected and 
appointed agencies. able to cope with their environment (Blau and Scott, 1962). 
The techniques used to answer each research question are described below: 
Research Question 1: What are the patterns of assertiveness/moderation in initial 
agency requests: Descriptive statistics (Table showing percentage changes in agency 
request) was used to show the distribution of the agency requests to the governor 
and legislature as a percentage change from the previous year's appropriation. 
Research Question 1a. To answer Research Question 1a, how does budget size affect 
the level of support from the governor and legislators? 
The impact of agency budget size was analyzed by first examining the correlation 
and regression coefficients between agency budget size and legislative appropriations. A  
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description or study of the nature of the relationship between variables is a 
regression analysis, while an investigation of the relative strength of such a relationship is 
a correlation analysis. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the 
short-term relationships between budget size and governor recommendation/ legislative 
appropriation for all categories of agency assertiveness. The second model analyzes the 
budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships between budget size and 
governor recommendation/both legislative appropriation for all categories of agency 
assertiveness. 
Research question 1b: How does agency assertiveness affect the level of support 
from the governor and legislators? 
The impact of agency assertiveness was analyzed by first examining the correlation 
and then the regression coefficients between agency assertiveness and governor 
recommendation/legislative appropriations. Two pairs of models were developed. The first 
model analyzes the short-term relationships between agency assertiveness and governor 
recommendation/ legislative appropriation for all categories of agency assertiveness. The 
second model analyzes the budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships 
between assertiveness and governor recommendation/both legislative appropriation for all 
categories of agency assertiveness (High, medium and low assertive agencies). 
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Primary Research Question 2. Is there a relationship between the governor's 
recommendations and the legislature's appropriations? 
2a: Does the legislature rely on the governor’s budget for appropriation? 
Research question 2a: The relationship between the governor's recommendations 
and the legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the correlation and 
then the regression coefficients between and governor recommendation and legislative 
appropriations. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the short-
term relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for all 
categories of agency assertiveness. The second model analyzes the budget expansion 
(success in budget expansion) relationships between 
governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for all categories of agency 
assertiveness (High, medium and low assertive agencies). 
2b: Is the relationship between the governor's recommendations and the 
legislature’s appropriations more direct than the relationship between the agency's 
request for an increment and the legislature's appropriation? 
Three separate regression models was were used to answer research question 2b. 
Model 1. Relationship between agency request and legislative appropriation: Y=a+b1x+e 
Y = Legislative Appropriation 
b= Agency request 
a or Alpha, a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0 
e is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X 
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Model 2. Relationship between agency request and Governor recommendation: 
Y=a+b1x+e 
 Y = Governor recommendation 
 b= Agency request 
 a or Alpha, a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0 
e is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X 
Model 3. Relationship between legislative appropriation and Governor recommendation: 
Y=a+b1x+e 
Y = Governor recommendation 
 b= Agency request 
 a or Alpha, a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0 
e is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X 
Primary Research Question 3: What are the structural and environmental factors 
affecting agency appropriation 
3a. How does an agency’s political environment affect agency outcomes? 
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the 
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients 
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for 
status of governor’s party and legislative control. Two pairs of models were developed. 
The first model analyzes the short-term relationships between governor recommendation 
and legislative appropriation for both status of governor’s party and legislative control. The 
second model analyzes the budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships  
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between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for status of 
governor’s party and legislative control. 
3b. How does agency type affect the level of support from the governor and the 
legislature? 
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the 
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients 
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for 
cabinet and executive departments. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model 
analyzes the short-term relationships between governor recommendation and legislative 
appropriation for both status of governor’s party and legislative control. The second model 
analyzes the budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships between 
governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for cabinet and executive 
departments. 
3c. How does the method of agency head selection affect agency appropriation? 
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the 
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients 
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for 
both elected and appointed agencies. The first model analyzes the (short-term success) 
relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for both 
elected and appointed agencies. The second model analyzes the (budget expansion) 
relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for both 
elected and appointed agencies. 
52 
3d. What are the determinants for agency appropriation? 
The determinants of agency appropriations was analyzed by examining the 
regression coefficients between legislative appropriation, Log Budget size, Log Request, 
Log Governor, Recommendation, Expenditure, Governors Party, Legislative Control, State 
total expenditure and State revenue 
3e. What is the effect of agency age on agency budget outcome? 
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the 
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients 
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while more and less 
mature agencies. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the short-
term relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for 
both elected and appointed agencies. The second model analyzes the budget expansion 
(success in budget expansion) relationships between governor recommendation and 
legislative appropriation for both more and less mature agencies. 
3f. What is the effect of agency size on agency budget outcome? 
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the 
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by examining the regression coefficients between 
and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for large 
and small agencies. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the 
short-term relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation 
for both for large and small agencies. The second model analyzes the budget expansion  
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(success in budget expansion) relationships between governor recommendation and 
legislative appropriation for both large and small agencies 
2.6 Results and Findings 
This section presents the research findings on the relationship among agencies’ 
budget requests, the governor’s support and legislative appropriations. This relationship 
was examined over a 28 years period from 1990 to 2018. The Incrementalism budget model 
was used to test data from the State of South Carolina and assess the implications for 
budgeting based on South Carolina’s s political characteristics, the style and strength of 
individual governors, and the traits of individual agencies. 
 
Table 2.6. The Descriptive Characteristics of the Agency (Aggregate Level) and 
Classification Model 
Variable Observation Mean 
Standard 
error Min Max 
Year 1,044 2004 8.3 1990 2018 
Appropriation 1,013 1.12 3.3 277289 2.98 
Expenditure 984 1.11 3.3 277289 2.8 
Request 801 2.5 1.01 -1.6 2.15 
Governor 
Recommendation 
914 1.15 3.5 0 2.9 
Agency Type 1,044 1.6 .47 1 2 
Spend Policy 
Area 
1,044 3.5 2.03 1 8 
Agency Name 1,044 18.3 10.39 1 36 
Personal Income 972 1.17 4.1 5.6 1.96 
Personal 
Income/Capital 
972 27148 7062.1 16018 39517 
Population 972 4263037 443676 3570404 5024369 
State Revenue 972 5.35 1.13 3.3 7.5 
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Variable Observation Mean 
Standard 
error Min Max 
State 
Expenditure 
828 5.5 9.44 3.9 7.64 
State 
Appropriation 
864 5.68 1.04 3.9 7.95 
Status of 
Governor’s Party 
1.,044 1.4 .49 1 2 
Legislative 
Control 
1,044 1.72 .44 1 2 
Governor Party 1,044 1.86 .34 1 2 
Age Category 870 1.2 .40 1 2 
Size Category 928 1.74 .43 1 2 
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Figure 2.1. Agencies by Total Appropriation from 1990–2018 
 
The raw appropriations values for the thirty-six agencies over time can be seen in 
Figure 2.1. This figure illustrates the wide variation in agency appropriation patterns over 
time. The agencies with the largest increase in appropriations are Education, Corrections 
and Health and Human Services, while the Commission on Human Affairs, Sea Grant  
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Consortium and Consumer Affairs Department received the smallest appropriations 
over time. Two of the three agencies, Corrections and Health and Human Services, with 
the largest appropriations are cabinet agencies, while Education, which is the agency with 
the largest appropriation, is an executive agency. Both cabinet agencies and the executive 
department include multiple agencies that are high acquisitive. All three agencies with the 
smallest total appropriation are executive department agencies. The Department of 
Corrections is the only large cabinet agency in the high acquisitive category, with most of 
the agencies in this category being small. The Department of Juvenile Justice is a large 
cabinet agency, but it is considered a low acquisitive agency, while public safety and social 
services are large cabinet agencies with moderate acquisitiveness. The Department of 
Commerce and the Department of Parks and Recreation are small cabinet agencies but are 
considered high acquisitive agencies. The Departments of Education, Mental Health and 
DHEC are large executive department agencies but are classified as low acquisitive 
agencies. 
Sharkansky (1968) argued that agencies act differently and follow different 
budgetary strategies to achieve their goals, with some following a strategy of assertiveness 
rather than moderation. His argument is contrary to what the incrementalism theory posits. 
Incrementalism theory argues that there is a stable pattern of requests and the general 
behavioral characteristic of an agency is to request moderately. Incrementalism provides 
relatively little information on the budgetary roles of the cabinet agencies and the executive 
department. Overall, this classification is important because it helps to describe the  
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assertive behavior that may be manifested by agencies during all phases of the 
budget process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Agency Appropriation by 
Acquisitiveness Categories 
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Figure 2.2 provides descriptive evidence that the budget success of an agency varies 
by agency acquisitiveness. Low acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of 
$73,098,863,128; moderately acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of 
$29,216,336,183, and high acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of 
$4,159,960,091s. Low acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of $73,098,863,128; 
moderately acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of $29,216,336,183, and high 
acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of $4,159,960,091. 
Agencies in the low acquisitive category ask for small increases over their requests. 
LeLoup (1978) confirmed that when agencies ask for small, non-incremental increases, 
Congress is likely to appropriate a higher proportion of their request in the Short-term, but 
in the Long-term the agencies are likely to end up with a smaller increase in total funding 
than they normally would have received had they not followed the traditional incremental 
strategy of moderation. 
 
Table 2.7. Agency Percentage Changes in the Budget Process 
Agency Name 
Avg. 
Acquisitiveness 
Avg. 
Governor 
Long-term 
Avg. 
Governor 
Short-term 
Avg. 
Legislative 
Long-term 
Avg. Legislative 
Short-term 
WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION 
COMMISSION 
0.340536447 0.993648604 31.55897394 0.994422131 34.07929967 
WILLOUGRAY 
OPPORTUNITY 
SCHOOL 
0.221474916 0.99991272 32.04451578 1.044393386 30.57797214 
VOCATIONAL 
REHABILITATION 
0.129123644 0.97647156 14.6128804 0.981732539 15.07059588 
STATE LIBRARY 0.352784091 0.978103481 9.649494314 1.047480096 9.6176611 
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Agency Name 
Avg. 
Acquisitiveness 
Avg. 
Governor 
Long-term 
Avg. 
Governor 
Short-term 
Avg. 
Legislative 
Long-term 
Avg. Legislative 
Short-term 
STBD FOR TECHNICAL 
& COMPREHENSIVE 
ED 
0.455345162 0.978017585 4.771818485 1.017409307 4.989297019 
SOCIAL SERVICES 0.24318124 1.05408718 6.980396565 1.020383481 7.0425796 
SEA GRANT 
CONSORTIUM 
0.342677646 0.953435039 7.958719386 1.008711183 7.159407957 
SCHOOL FOR THE 
DEAF AND THE BLIND 
0.448623448 0.958602061 38.4118277 1.021330346 34.89352023 
MUSEUM 
COMMISSION 
0.46353415 0.946911925 10.43120153 0.992810925 11.94041293 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
TUITION GRANTS 
0.313398509 1.029860058 11.14354757 1.0166491 13.74058427 
FORESTRY 
COMMISSION 
0.481258542 0.971292423 8.6037045 1.009404665 8.658649404 
DEPT OF REVENUE 0.310817476 0.970549144 22.46776208 1.029675648 22.97344975 
DEPT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY 
0.319833044 1.039016244 10.45851531 1.015395527 11.32640747 
DEPTOF PROBATION, 
PAROLE & PARDON 
0.281899436 1.104429392 6.654867095 1.0447943 6.236569136 
DEPTOF PARKS, 
RECREATION & 
TOURISM 
1.188612471 0.930524219 2.076900745 1.596739357 2.763825057 
DEPTOFNATURAL 
RESOURCES 
0.429479405 1.001638521 9.48333004 1.024026282 8.980884662 
DEPT OF MENTAL 
HEALTH 
0.153052967 0.96559853 8.878872286 1.014533625 9.836761864 
DEPTOFLABOR, 
LICENSING & 
REGULATION 
0.246776711 1.161469996 26.83479705 0.97861723 25.89307222 
DEPT OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 
0.110402052 0.949283117 6.209247335 1.046829243 8.59922685 
DEPT OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SVCS 
0.360406931 1.360495667 8.00345752 1.338889122 7.03474382 
DEPT OF HEALTH & 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONTROL 
0.13785056 0.961810352 13.38442033 1.018824411 13.91913504 
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Agency Name 
Avg. 
Acquisitiveness 
Avg. 
Governor 
Long-term 
Avg. 
Governor 
Short-term 
Avg. 
Legislative 
Long-term 
Avg. Legislative 
Short-term 
DEPT OF DISABILITIES 
& SPECIAL NEEDS 
0.114974168 1.001196917 13.66623573 1.046219796 13.94814418 
DEPT OF ALCOHOL & 
ALCOHOL & ANOTHER 
DRUG ABUSE SVCS 
0.371299192 0.952289456 8.566978363 1.006421025 10.66759622 
DEPT OF 
AGRICULTURE 
0.672858635 0.897015937 6.921784483 1.038347822 7.644918655 
DEPARTMENTOF 
INSURANCE 
0.077246243 0.856948877 26.56481057 1.009870207 28.39108488 
DEPARTMENTOF 
EDUCATION 
0.172802121 1.039287804 9.580392182 1.038531268 9.149605542 
DEPARTMENTOF 
CORRECTIONS 
0.1449001 1.006119927 17.82643289 1.033137496 17.14085424 
DEPARTMENTOF 
COMMERCE 
0.586665356 1.28438459 9.681878767 1.271201305 8.861915994 
DEPARTMENTOF 
ARCHIVES AND 
HISTORY 
0.199148119 0.959489174 18.77209925 0.989177536 18.58205167 
CONSUMERAFFAIRS 
DEPARTMENT 
0.194052632 0.970261332 21.53247277 1.004101104 8.083442718 
COMMISSION ON 
HUMAN AFFAIRS 
0.252556238 0.956868777 7.17911517 1.018301329 7.201939238 
COMMISSION ON 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
1.353329168 1.07907023 14.83410471 1.177312736 14.88218371 
COMMISSION FOR THE 
BLIND 
0.381051792 0.904092338 4.667791375 1.011202479 4.678837677 
CLEMSON 
UNIVERSITY—PUBLIC 
SERVICE ACTIVITIES 
0.273339072 0.927520946 9.193100288 1.003330493 9.638540636 
ARTS COMMISSION 0.5643986 0.97213699 64.08706628 1.008017739 46.69037198 
 
Table 2.2 provides the results of Research Question 1: What are the patterns of 
assertiveness/moderation in initial agency requests? The key research question focuses 
on how moderate South Carolina state agencies are in their agency budget requests. These 
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results highlight the percentage change in agency budget requests at each stage of the 
process. Table 2.7  shows the distribution of agency requests to the governor and legislature 
as a percentage change from the governor’s recommendation and the previous year’s 
appropriation, respectively. The results also reflect variation in agency requests, with the 
mean value of a 36 percent increase for all agencies’ requests. 
Overall, the pattern of requests has remained consistent; however, there are some 
interesting variations. For example, agencies request significantly increase on an average 
over the time period ranging from 7 to 56 percent. The average request is 7.9%, the 
maximum request is 25.71% and the minimum request is 1.785%. Governors also trim 
requests with substantial variation, ranging from 38.41% as a high to a low of 2.08%, on 
average, per year. Typically, legislatures do not appropriate the same amount the governor 
recommends, but they often come very close to the governor’s appropriation 
recommendation. For example, Legislative appropriation is on average .01% to 2.5% more 
than the governor’s recommendation; however, legislatures also cut a governor’s 
recommendation from .01% to 17 % of the time over the period studied here. In the short-
term budget, the difference between the governor’s recommendation and legislative 
appropriation is .052%, meaning that the legislature, on average over the time period, 
appropriates .052% more than the governor’s recommendation. In the long-term budget, 
the difference between the governor’s recommendation and legislative appropriation is 
.065% meaning that the governor recommends .065% more than legislative appropriation. 
Previous results report that a governor’s recommendation is the prerequisite for legislative 
appropriation. This research highlights a different set of possibilities for the relationship  
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between the governor and the legislature. Over the time period of this study, 1990-
2018, agencies apparently were more acquisitive than previous research suggests, with 
agencies requesting on average a 7 to 56 percent increase over current expenditures. 
Results support the idea that legislatures deviate from gubernatorial recommendations. In 
21 of the 36 agencies, the legislature appropriated a larger amount than the governor's 
recommendation. However, the results have not been tested to determine if the deviation is 
significant. 
The results in Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 provide evidence related to 
Research Questions 1a and 1b. To answer Research Question 1a, how does budget size 
affect the level of support from the governor and legislators? The results indicate that the 
larger the budget, the more likely the agency will receive support from the Governor and 
the Legislators. The model confirms Hypothesis 1 that for high acquisitive agencies, the 
relationships between the budget size of each agency’s request and the appropriations of 
the legislature for both long-term and short-term budget success is strong. For low 
acquisitive and moderate agencies, there are no statistically significant (see Tables 2.8 and 
2.9 for P. Values) term relationships between the budget size of each agency’s request and 
the appropriations of the legislature. This hypothesis assumes budget reviewers focus on 
the increments requested plus the size of request, which includes both new increments and 
the agency’s current base appropriation. This hypothesis supports the argument that budget 
analysts do not always focus on the increments requested but also take into consideration 
the size of the budget request in proportion to new requests and the agency’s base. Table 
2.8 and 2.9 presents the regression coefficients between agency budget size and the  
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governor’s long-term success and short-term support. These results indicate that the 
legislatures considers the budget size and increments of high acquisitive agencies in 
determining his budget appropriation. 
 
Table 2.8. Coefficient of Regression Between Measures of Short-term Support in the 
State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness Categories 
Assertiveness  
Categories  
Budget 
Increment  Budget Size 
Governor  
Short-term support 
Agency 
Assertiveness 
High -1.70E-08 4.05E-09 0.0144841 0.1420876 
 (0.001) (0.045) (0.000) (0.000) 
Moderate -4.73E-10 6.61E-12 0.7401357 -0.9934193 
 0.258 0.923 0.000 0.000 
Low -2.12E-10 1.33E-10 0.81 -0.4297997 
 0.490 0.319 0.000 0.000 
 
Table 2.9. Coefficient of Regression Between Measures of Long-term Support in the 
State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness Categories 
Assertiveness 
Categories 
Budget 
Request 
Increment Budget Size 
Governor 
Long-term Support 
Agency 
Assertiveness 
High -1.11E-08 3.34E-09 0.2518461 0.1470725 
 
0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 
Moderate 6.44E-11 2.44E-12 0.0582454 0.0300588 
 
0.69 0.927 0.005 0.554 
Low -2.38E-10 9.66E-11 0.2055995 0.1039421 
 
0.206 0.255 0.000 0.020 
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Table 2.10. Coefficient of Simple Correlation Between Measures of Short-term Support 
in The State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness 
Categories 
Assertiveness 
Categories 
Budget 
Request 
Increment  Budget Size 
Governor  
Short-term Support 
Agency 
Assertiveness 
High -0.6211 -0.3304 0.9809 -0.3615 
Moderate -0.229 -0.0856 0.9393 -0.7735 
Low -0.2267 -0.1134 0.9491 -0.7525 
 
Table 2.11. Coefficient of Simple Correlation Between Measures of Long-term Support 
in The State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness 
Categories 
Assertiveness 
Categories 
Budget 
Request 
Increment  Budget Size 
Governor  
Long-term Support 
Agency 
Assertiveness 
High 0.2837 0.1122 0.2648 0.7769 
Moderate 0.088 0.0782 0.1992 0.0483 
Low 0.092 0.0678 0.3396 0.1731 
 
Table 2.12. Coefficient of Simple Correlation Between Measures of Gubernatorial 
Support and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness Categories 
Correlation Coefficient between  
Gov Long-term Success and  
Correlation Coefficient between 
Gov Short-term Success and 
Agency 
Assertiveness 
Categories 
Budget 
Request 
Increment 
Budget 
Size 
Agency 
Assertiveness  
Budget 
Request 
Increment  
Budget 
Size 
Agency 
Assertiveness 
High 0.0760 0.0822 0.0054  -0.6169 -0.2677 -0.9891 
Moderate 0.0770 0.0397 -0.0614  -0.1968 -0.0898 -0.9418 
Low 0.1820 0.0276  0.0848  -0.1783 -0.1502 -0.9487 
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Research question 1b: How does agency assertiveness affect the level of support 
from the governor and legislators? 
The higher the level of Governor/legislative support, the more likely the agencies 
will get support from the Governor and Legislators. Tables 2.8 and 2.11 provide regression 
and correlation results for short-term budget success. These models indicate negative 
relationships among the percentage of the budget increment that an agency requests, the 
percentage of the request that the governor recommends, and legislative appropriation. 
These results confirm the incrementalism explanation that those agencies which seek the 
largest increments will suffer the greatest cuts to their requests, while those requesting little 
or no incremental change to their base will suffer few if any cuts to their requests. 
There is also evidence that successful budget expansion leads to positive 
relationships among the percentage increment that the agency requests and the percentage 
growth that the governor recommends, as well as the percentage growth of legislative 
appropriation. It is only by requesting budgetary growth that an agency receives an increase 
in its budget even though this increase is generally below the initial request. The 
Governor’s recommendation does not appear to support budget expansion in moderately 
acquisitive agencies. This result is true for other categories of assertiveness. The results 
confirm that agencies that request the largest incremental change in their budgets will 
receive the largest percentage growth over their current budget, while agencies requesting 
little or no incremental change will receive little to no growth in their budget. While this 
relationship may seem obvious, it is important confirmation of the “budgeting game” in 
practice through a research lens. 
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Research Question 2: Are there relationships between the governor’s 
recommendations and the legislature’s appropriations? 
The results in Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 confirm strong positive relationships 
between the measures of the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriations 
in the Short-term. These results provide evidence that the relationship between a governor’s 
recommendations and legislative appropriations impact agency support for expansion in 
different ways. 
Research Question 2a: Does the legislature rely on the governor’s budget for 
appropriation? 
As the level of governor support increases, the legislative appropriation tends to 
increase. This study provide further evidence of the reliance of the legislature on the 
recommendations of the executive in the Short-term. This relationship may be true because 
the legislator’s experience or staff assistance is limited and/or because he perceives that the 
executive should provide leadership in the budgetary process. 
The correlation (Tables 2.8 and 2.11) between governor and legislative 
appropriation was examined both in the short and Long-term. The results indicate a 
significant correlation between a Governor’s recommendation and legislative 
appropriation only in short-term support for agencies. This study found similar results for 
the correlates of governor and legislative approval of budget expansion. Based on these, 
this study finds support that a governor’s support appears to contribute to short-term agency 
budget success. Correlations between legislative and gubernatorial short-term support are 
significant across all agencies, but correlations between the governor’s and legislative’s  
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appropriation in the Long-term is significant only for 22 of the 36 agencies. Agency 
acquisitiveness and the governor’s short-term support is significant for 19 of the 36 
agencies. The magnitude of the correlations between legislative and gubernatorial short-
term support is greater, on average, than those between support in long/Short-term and 
acquisitiveness for most agencies. However, in terms of long-term budgeting support, the 
results from the model highlight the importance of agency acquisitiveness over 
gubernatorial support. 
Research question 2b: Are the relationships between the governor’s 
recommendations and the legislature’s appropriations more direct than the 
relationships between the agency’s request for an increment and the legislature’s 
appropriation? 
Are the relationships between the governor's recommendations and the legislature's 
appropriations more direct than the relationships between the agency's request for an 
increment and the legislature's appropriation? Tables in appendix 1, 2 and 3 lists the 
regression results related to Research Question 2b. These results show that 2 agencies were 
best described by Model I (Legislative dominance), 9 agencies by Model II (Gubernatorial 
independence), and 13 agencies by Model III (legislature and governor in combination). 
one might expect to find the majority of agencies be best described by Model 1 
emphasizing the importance of legislative independence due to the response by budget 
officials stating that South Carolina is a legislative dominant state. The findings of this 
analysis reveal that the relationships between the governor's recommendations and the 
legislature's appropriations more direct than the relationships between the agency's request  
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and the legislature's appropriation. This finding may be interpreted to support 
executive-legislative reliance which have been confirmed in by (Sharkansky, 1968). 
 
Table 2.13. Effect of Acquisitiveness Categories on Governor/Legislative Long-term and 
Short-term Support for Appropriation After Controlling for Partisanship 
Dependent Variable Column p-value 
Independent 
Variable Value 
Standard 
Error t-value 
Legislative Long-term majority 0.688502 Acquisitiveness 0.05096 0.127043 -0.40116 
Legislative Long-term minority < 0.0001 Acquisitiveness 0.68037 0.035449 19.1929 
Governor Long-term majority 0.884855 Acquisitiveness 0.01385 0.095605 0.144905 
Governor Long-term minority 0.88577 Acquisitiveness 0.00413 0.028723 0.143794 
Legislative Short-term majority 0.387956 Acquisitiveness 87.3111 101.03 -0.86421 
Legislative Short-term minority 0.0505868 Acquisitiveness 2.93221 1.49375 -1.96299 
Governor Short-term majority 0.512118 Acquisitiveness -60.658 92.4517 0.656104 
Governor Short-term minority 0.067739 Acquisitiveness 2.79402 1.52336 -1.83411 
 
Research Question 3a: How does the agency’s political environment affect agency 
outcomes? 
The findings in Table 2.13 provide a contradictory hypothesis to the idea that the 
governor’s recommendations have less influence over legislative appropriations if the 
governor’s legislative party constitutes the minority. Previous research conducted by 
Sharkansky (1969) has found that the most appropriate model and hypothesis is that 
legislatures generally adhere closely to the governor’s recommendations. However, 
controlling for partisanship was not included in earlier models; however, it has proven to 
be important. This study confirms the partisanship hypothesis that the relationship between 
the governor and legislative appropriations depend on the majority-minority status of the  
69 
governor’s party. The results in Table 2.14 confirm that the relationship between 
agency acquisitiveness and legislative/governor recommendation is significant when the 
status of the governor’s party is in the minority. Legislative support for expansion is also 
significant only when the status of the governor’s party is in the minority. “The partisanship 
hypothesis states that the governor’s recommendations will have less influence over 
legislative appropriations if the governors legislative party constitutes a minority. In 
instances where the legislative majority does not share the governor’s party affiliation, the 
legislature should regard the governor’s budget recommendations with some suspicion 
Sharkansky and Turnbull (1969). Since these legislatures already exhibit some 
independence, it can be predicted that they will not shift to a closer legislative-
gubernatorial relationship, when the governor’s party is a legislative minority” (Moncrief 
& Thompson 1980, p. 336). 
 
Table 2.14. Relationship Between Legislative / Governor Short-term and Long-term 
Support While Controlling for legislative Control and Status of Governor’s Party 
Panes 
Row Column 
Line 
p-value 
Coefficients 
Term Value 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Legislative 
Long-term 
majority, R < 0.0001 Governor 
Long-term 
0.365978 0.0425106 8.60911 < 0.0001 
Legislative 
Long-term 
majority, R 0.2597 Governor 
Short-term 
-8.01E-06 7.10E-06 -1.12867 0.2597 
Legislative 
Long-term 
minority, D < 0.0001 Governor 
Long-term 
0.943551 0.0214678 43.9519 < 0.0001 
Legislative 
Long-term 
minority, D 0.774133 Governor 
Short-term 
0.0003369 0.001172 -0.287481 0.774133 
Legislative 
Long-term 
minority, R 0.515139 Governor 
Long-term 
0.394823 0.605033 0.652564 0.515139 
Legislative 
Long-term 
minority, R 0.315779 Governor 
Short-term 
0.0200477 0.0198995 -1.00745 0.315779 
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Panes 
Row Column 
Line 
p-value 
Coefficients 
Term Value 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Legislative 
Short-term 
majority, R 0.970648 Governor 
Long-term 
-7.79203 211.639 0.0368176 0.970648 
Legislative 
Short-term 
majority, R < 0.0001 Governor 
Short-term 
0.858026 0.0003431 2500.84 < 0.0001 
Legislative 
Short-term 
minority, D 0.773779 Governor 
Long-term 
-1.59577 5.54195 -0.287944 0.773779 
Legislative 
Short-term 
minority, D < 0.0001 Governor 
Short-term 
1.00563 0.0084216 119.411 < 0.0001 
Legislative 
Short-term 
minority, R 0.6413 Governor 
Long-term 
-1.34333 2.876 -0.467085 0.6413 
Legislative 
Short-term 
minority, R < 0.0001 Governor 
Short-term 
0.933743 0.0149493 62.4608 < 0.0001 
 
Research question 3b: In a cabinet agency, the Governor appoints agency directors with 
Senate approval whereas in some executive departments, the Governor appoints a board 
which names the executive director for an agency. In addition, in other executive 
departments, the Governor appoints a board with legislative approval and the board 
names the executive director for the agency. 
The results in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 show that the majority-minority status of the 
governor’s party and the party with legislative control are important influences on the 
budget process. When the legislative control is in the hands of the Democrats and the status 
of the governor’s party is in the minority, a one unit increase in the governor’s budget 
recommendation increases agency appropriations by 1.00563 percentage point. Short-term 
and long-term success of agency appropriations are higher when legislative control is 
Democratic rather than Republican. While there is insufficient evidence to claim that state 
Democrats are spenders and Republicans are more conservative in their spending, the  
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results of the model indicate a relationship that provides some support for this idea. 
Most importantly, this study provides evidence suggesting that partisanship is an important 
consideration in the agency-gubernatorial-legislative budgetary relationship. Table 14 
further provides evidence for Research Questions 2a: (Does the legislator rely on the 
governor’s budget for appropriation) and 3: The effect of an agency’s political environment 
affects agency outcomes. This study finds that, in general, legislatures take a varied 
approach to whether they follow the governor’s lead: sometimes they do and sometimes 
they do not. 
 
Table 2.15. Legislative Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth 
Independent 
Variable Column p-value 
Coefficient 
Value 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency, 
Legislative Long-term 
< 0.0001 0.813446 0.072631 11.1997 < 0.0001 
Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency, 
Legislative Short-term 
0.323845 -2.05318 2.07675 -0.98866 0.323845 
Acquisitiveness Executive Department, 
Legislative Long-term 
0.873753 0.0057631 0.036252 0.158976 0.873753 
Acquisitiveness Executive Department, 
Legislative Short-term 
0.44485 -51.9797 67.9788 -0.76465 0.44485 
Governor 
Long-term 
Cabinet Agency, 
Legislative Long-term 
< 0.0001 0.702434 0.115187 6.09822 < 0.0001 
Governor 
Long-term 
Cabinet Agency, 
Legislative Short-term 
0.654042 -2.15475 4.80164 -0.44875 0.654042 
Governor 
Long-term 
Executive Department, 
Legislative Long-term 
< 0.0001 0.47987 0.039418 12.174 < 0.0001 
Governor 
Long-term 
Executive Department, 
Legislative Short-term 
0.952429 -16.2159 271.671 -0.05969 0.952429 
Governor 
Short-term 
Cabinet Agency, 
Legislative Long-term 
0.75589 -0.0006205 0.001994 -0.31126 0.75589 
Governor 
Short-term 
Cabinet Agency, 
Legislative Short-term 
< 0.0001 1.00461 0.007718 130.165 < 0.0001 
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Independent 
Variable Column p-value 
Coefficient 
Value 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
Governor 
Short-term 
Executive Department, 
Legislative Long-term 
0.247276 -7.98E-06 6.89E-06 -1.15847 0.247276 
Governor 
Short-term 
Executive Department, 
Legislative Short-term 
< 0.0001 0.858005 0.0003 2862.1 < 0.0001 
 
The results presented in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 support the hypothesis that 
gubernatorial recommendations rather than agency requests are the important determinants 
of legislative appropriations irrespective of the type of agency. A comparison of the relative 
effect on the dependent variable (legislative appropriations) of each of the independent 
variables (agency requests and gubernatorial recommendations) indicates the 
gubernatorial-legislative path is the more important one in the case of both types of 
agencies. Where agency heads are cabinet members, the gubernatorial-legislative path 
coefficient is 1.00461 and where the agency is an executive department, it is .85. Both are 
statistically significant. A comparison of the relative effect on the dependent variable of 
each of the independent variables in the case of legislative long-term support for 
appropriation as seen in Table 2.14 also indicates the gubernatorial-legislative path to be 
the more important for both types of agencies. Where the agency is cabinet level, the 
gubernatorial-legislative path coefficient is .70 and where the agency is an executive 
department, it is .47. Both are statistically significant. 
The agency-legislative coefficients are significant in the case of legislative long-
term support for cabinet agencies. These suggest that cabinet agencies may be somewhat 
more cooperative with legislators on budgetary matters than with the executive department.  
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The results in Table 2.14 show that the gubernatorial-legislative path is more 
important than the agency- legislative path. 
Research Question 3c: How does the method of agency head selection affect agency 
appropriation? 
Tables 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15 provide evidence that agencies with elected heads do not 
appear to fare any better than agencies with appointed heads in their ability to acquire 
funding from the Governor. Shakansky (1963) suggested that elected officials have 
privilege over appointed official budget process. However, it is particularly important to 
note that agencies with appointed heads appear do not fare better than those with elected 
heads in their ability to acquire funding from the legislature when they were unable to 
obtain from the governor. 
Table 2.16 provides no evidence to support a conclusion that cabinet agencies are 
more successful than executive department agencies in circumventing the governor and 
dealing directly with the legislature on budgetary matters 
 
Table 2.16. Governor’s Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth 
Independent 
Variable Dependent Variable p-value Coefficient 
Standard 
Error t-value 
Log Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency, Log 
Governor Short-term 
< 0.0001 -0.977989 0.0284565 -34.3678 
Log Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency, 
Log Governor Long-term 
0.220836 0.0320044 0.0260669 1.22778 
Log Acquisitiveness Executive Department, 
Log Governor Short-term 
< 0.0001 -1.00061 0.0078438 -127.567 
Log Acquisitiveness Executive Department, 
Log Governor Long-term 
0.962093 -0.0003571 0.0075091 -0.04755 
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Table 2.17. Governor’s Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth 
(Agencies with elected vs appointed heads) 
Elected Agencies 
Panes 
Row Column 
Line  
p-value 
Coefficients 
Term Value 
Standard 
Error t-value 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor 
Short-term 
< 0.0001 Log Acquisitiveness -1.01453 0.0478238 -21.2138 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor 
Long-term 
0.764303 Log Acquisitiveness -0.0145268 0.0478238 -0.30376 
Appointed Agencies 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor 
Short-term 
< 0.0001 Log Acquisitiveness -0.99086 0.0121406 -81.6151 
   
Intercept -0.0114485 0.0272247 -0.42052 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor 
Long-term 
0.251439 Log Acquisitiveness 0.0128796 0.0112188 1.14804  
 
 
Table 2.18. Legislative Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth 
(Agencies with elected vs appointed heads) 
Appointed Agency 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
Standard 
Error t-value 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative 
Long-term 
< 0.0001 Log 
Acquisitiveness 
0.0289423 0.0069988 4.13533 
   
intercept 0.0602018 0.015486 3.8875 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative 
Short-term 
< 0.0001 Log 
Acquisitiveness 
-0.985406 0.01182 -83.3676 
   
intercept 0.0579056 0.0261537 2.21405 
Elected Agency 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
Standard 
Error t-value 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative 
Long-term 
0.795425 Log 
Acquisitiveness 
0.0081549 0.0310358 0.262758 
   
intercept 0.0209648 0.056357 0.372001 
Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative 
Short-term 
< 0.0001 Log 
Acquisitiveness 
-0.991845 0.0310358 -31.9581 
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Research question 3d: What are the determinants of agency appropriation? 
Table 2.19 presents the results for the determinants of appropriation. Contrary to 
expectation, when total state revenues increase, legislative appropriations and 
gubernatorial recommendations for agencies also increase. This result is not significant. In 
addition, when agency expenditures increase, legislative appropriations and gubernatorial 
recommendations for agencies increase. This result is not significant. As expected, as 
agency budget size increases, legislative appropriations and gubernatorial 
recommendations for the agency increase. Also, as expected, when population increases, 
legislative appropriations and gubernatorial recommendations for the agency increase. As 
expected, when the governor is a Democrat or legislative control of the House is 
Democratic, the governor’s recommendation or legislative appropriation increases. As 
expected, when the governor’s party controls the house, the governor’s recommendations 
and the legislative appropriations increase. 
 
Table 2.19. Determinants of Agency Appropriation 
Independent variable Coefficient  p-value 
Log Budget size 0.444 0.000  
Log Request 0.026 0.000  
Log Governor Recommendation 0.28 0.000  
Expenditure 2.07 0.050  
Governors Party 0.89 0.000  
Legislative Control 0.86 0.003  
State total expenditure 1.44 0.018  
State revenue -1.19 0.078  
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The next two research questions examine the effect of agency age and size on 
appropriation. 
 
Table 2.20. Effect of Assertiveness Category/Size on Governor/Legislative Short- and 
Long-term Support for Agency 
Acquisitiveness 
Categories Size2 
Rank of 
Governor 
Long-term 
Rank of 
Governor 
Short-term 
Rank of 
Legislative 
Long-term 
Rank of 
Legislative 
Short-term 
High Small 7 4 7 5 
High moderate 2 1 2 1 
High Large 6 8 6 8 
Low Small 5 
 
5 4 
Low Large 1 2 1 2 
Moderate Small 4 6 4 3 
Moderate moderate 8 7 8 7 
Moderate Large 3 5 3 6 
 
 
Research Questions 3e and 3f: Effect of age and size on agency budget outcome. 
The results in Tables 2.20 and 2.21 indicate moderate size agencies that requested 
a large increase over previous years largely benefited from the governor’s short-term 
support while large agencies that requested high levels of appropriations benefited the least 
in terms of the governor’s short-term support. For long-term support of the governor, large 
agencies are likely to benefit the least, while moderately sized agencies that make modest 
requests are also likely to experience limited support from the governor for agency 
expansion. For both the legislative short-term and support for agency expansion, large 
agencies requesting minimal levels of appropriation benefit the most. The governor and the 
legislators respond to all acquisitiveness categories in their long-term support for agency  
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expansion. However, governors and legislators respond to small agencies 
differently in their short-term support. Older agencies that are moderate in size are more 
acquisitive than older agencies that are large and small in size, while younger agencies that 
are large in size are more acquisitive than moderate and small agencies. Further, large older 
agencies have higher total appropriations than their moderate and small counterparts. Large 
young cabinet agencies receive larger budget recommendations from the governor than 
large older agencies. However, in executive departments, large older agencies receive a 
bigger budget recommendation from the governor than moderate and small agencies that 
are older. 
 
Table 2.21. Effect of Agency Size and Age on Appropriation 
Age Categories Size2 Appropriation Acquisitiveness 
Older small 862,161,784 58.5786676 
Older moderate 2,113,960,091 77.1888801 
Older large 75,584,666,409 58.7333032 
younger small 262,171,118 9.2824798 
younger moderate 360,200,000 10.5599764 
younger large 22,672,000,000 20.5674399 
 
 
Table 2.22. Effect of Agency Request Level and Agency Size on Assertiveness and 
Long-term Support 
Request Level 
Categories  Size2 Acquisitiveness 
Sum of Governor 
Long-term 
High Small 14.9462009 43.4714658 
High Moderate 52.3815608 106.1818064 
High Large 26.8132592 71.0415496 
Low Small 23.1231637 95.627218 
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Low Moderate 11.550205 25.253603 
Low Large 34.5241601 161.668315 
 
When examining the maturity of agencies, those that are large in size have the 
largest total appropriation. More mature small agencies have the lowest total appropriation. 
These results strongly support the idea that appropriation varies significantly by the size 
and age of the agency. More mature small agencies are the most acquisitive but receive the 
least in terms of total appropriations. In terms of agency growth, more mature small 
agencies benefit from gubernatorial and legislative appropriation for both long- and short-
term support. This finding is contrary to the incremental budgeting assumption that the 
acquisitiveness agency suffers budget cuts in the Short-term but benefits in the long term. 
Given this discrepancy, this research moves the literature forward by providing more depth 
to our understanding of the variation in budgeting approaches and relationships. 
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Figure 2.3. Effect of 
Agency Size and Age on 
Appropriation 
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Table 2.23. A Linear Trend Model Computed for a More Mature Agency Using 
Appropriation Given Budget Size and Request 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent  
Variable    
Row Term 
Coefficients 
Value 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
App Request 4.57644 0.312596 14.6401 < 0.0001 
App Mag Budget size -9.34E+07 3.90E+07 -2.3952 0.016986 
 
 
Table 2.24. A Linear Trend Model Computed for a Less Mature Agency Using 
Appropriation Given Budget Size and Request 
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficients 
Term 
Coefficients 
Value 
Standard 
Error t-value p-value 
App Request Request 0.574581 0.214281 2.68144 0.008842 
App Mag Budget 
size 
Mag Budget 
size 
-4.50E+07 3.44E+07 -1.30827 0.19324 
 
 
Tables 2.23 and 2.24 above present the results for Research Question 8: The effect 
of agency age on budget outcome. As agencies become older, they get richer in terms of 
both appropriations and expenditures, a finding that is expected. The simple interpretation 
is that agencies generally see an increase in budgets over time. In addition, the range of 
agency actions may also grow with age. During the period of this study, total state 
appropriations were gradually growing. 
Considering only age, as agencies get older, they also get smaller in terms of overall 
budget size, supporting the idea that as agencies age, their activities may decrease because 
of decreasing budget size. The less mature an agency is, the less likely there will be changes 
in its appropriation and when there are, they are generally increasing in budget size. In 
contrast, the more mature an agency is the more likely the changes in its appropriations  
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reflect a decline in budgetary activity. As agencies age, the magnitude of change in 
their appropriations decreases. 
This finding supports the notion that age brings relative budget stability to an 
agency and a more mature agency’s requests are a better predictor of appropriation than 
budget size. Additionally, as Democratic strength in the legislative branch increases, 
legislatures respond to requests from large agencies with large budgets more strongly than 
the governor’s recommendation. However, legislatures support the governor’s 
recommendation for moderately sized, large budget agencies. A one unit increase in the 
requests from small agencies with large budgets leads to a higher appropriation than from 
large agencies with a large budget. In comparison, small, large budget agencies receive 
relatively more appropriations than large agencies with large budgets. 
Large budget, small agencies have higher appropriation growth under Democratic 
legislatures, perhaps because some agencies are ignored when Republican legislative 
strength is relatively high and vice versa when Democratic strength is relatively high. The 
implication of this analysis is that there are agency orientations that are more Democratic 
or Republican and the success of their appropriation request depends on the distribution of 
partisan strength. If this hypothesis holds, it gives merit to the idea that there are very real 
and meaningful policy differences between the parties at least as it applies to budget 
appropriations. 
Agencies with large existing budgets experience a decreasing rate of change in 
appropriations, while agencies with smaller budges experience an increasing rate of change 
in appropriations. Moreover, large budget agencies also have a higher magnitude of 
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declining appropriations compared to low budget agencies. At a theoretical level, these 
results provide evidence that a simple incrementalism view of appropriations (that is, one 
year’s appropriations can be almost totally explained by the previous year’s appropriations) 
is not significantly explanatory; other factors can and do combine to impact agency 
appropriations. In addition, agency appropriations vary significantly from agency to 
agency. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The analysis provides new perspectives on the South Carolina budgeting process. 
Agencies do act differently in making their request to the governor and legislatures and 
each agency follow their strategy based on the mission, size and type of the agency. The 
findings suggest legislature do increase agency fund that are reduced in the governor’s 
recommendation. In most cases of support for long-term budget growth, the legislature 
appears to be the most crucial actor. The classification in this study is important because it 
helps to describe the assertive behavior that may be manifested by agencies during all 
phases of the budget process. 
Overall the pattern of requests each year, ranges from 7 to 56 percent. Governors 
also trim requests with substantial variation, ranging from 38.41 to 2.08 percent on average 
per year, and legislatures trim requests (ranging from 38.41 to 2.08 percent on average per 
year) most of the time. Typically, legislatures do not appropriate the same amount the 
governor recommends, but often they appropriate approximately what the governor 
recommends. 
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The governor’s recommendation does not appear to support the idea of budget 
expansion in moderately acquisitive agencies. This result is also true for other categories 
of assertiveness. The results confirm that agencies that request the largest incremental 
change in the budget will receive the largest percentage growth over their current budget, 
while agencies requesting little or no incremental change will receive little to no growth in 
their budget. While this relationship may seem obvious, it is important confirmation of the 
“budgeting game” in practice through a research lens. 
Agency acquisitiveness and the governor’s short-term support is significant in 19 
of the 36 agencies studied here. The magnitude of the correlations between the legislative 
and gubernatorial short-term support is greater, on average, than those between support in 
long/Short-term and acquisitiveness in most agencies. However, in terms of long-term 
budgeting support, the results from the model highlight the importance of agency 
acquisitiveness over gubernatorial support. 
The agency-legislative coefficients are significant in the case of legislative long-
term support for cabinet agencies, suggesting that these agencies may be somewhat more 
cooperative with legislators on budgetary matters than with the executive branch. The 
results suggest that the gubernatorial- legislative path is more important than the agency- 
legislative path. 
This study provides no evidence to support that cabinet agencies are more 
successful than executive department agencies in circumventing the governor and dealing 
directly with the legislature on budgetary matters. 
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In South Carolina, strong gubernatorial appointive power is found in conjunction 
with weak gubernatorial budget power. The principal feature which makes the South 
Carolina governor’s budget powers weak is that he does not have sole responsibility for 
preparing the budget. Legislative budget control has also been enhanced in South Carolina 
by the establishment of the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA), which prepares the budget. 
South Carolina legislators have information provided by the RFA and agency budgets are 
reviewed by RFA staff. As a result, the legislators are believed to be better informed about 
agency requests and are, therefore, in a stronger position to influence the budgetary success 
achieved by state agencies. The Board of Economic Advisors (BEA), which is part of the 
RFA which is controlled by legislature, provides estimates of the Net New Revenue 
available for the upcoming fiscal year to the Executive Budget Office. The BEA sends 
updated information to the Governor’s Office and the Executive Budget Office via a memo. 
One agency director who was interviewed said that the “legislative arm in South 
Carolina has greater control over the budget process than the Governor’s Office.” The 
Governor’s Office makes recommendations, but the legislators approve the final budget. 
The governor’s recommendations are published in the Executive Budget Book. 
Other factors that challenge the incremental perspective on budgeting have been 
suggested. However, they are scattered throughout the literature on policy and budgeting 
and have not been systematically integrated into a potentially competing paradigm. Further 
research could use the categories of variables (Agency categories, Spending policy 
categories, Agency head appointment categories) in this research to test scenarios of state 
budget in other states. For theoretical interest, agencies should be chosen to include four 
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different agency missions: distributive, redistributive, Market emulators and regulatory. 
This allows us to discuss and compare the four agency missions as separate and distinct. 
Limitations of this research also includes the confinement of the study to a sample 
consisting of a single state with 36 agencies and a span of budget years from 1990 to 2018. 
Future research should include more agencies and increase the time period to cover periods 
when legislative control of the house includes both democrat and republican. 
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Chapter Three: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
AGENCY BUDGET STRATEGIES AND SUCCESS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This and other research show that agency budget requests are a function of the 
orientation of the agency. However, agency budget requesting behavior is also constrained 
by numerous external factors. As an example, requests for large budget increases pays off 
but not all agencies are free to make these requests. Agency requesting for large increase 
is a function of several factors: Presidential Support/Governor support, legislative 
Congressional Support. support/, the values, attitudes, and orientation of agency 
administrators, the extent of external support for the agency and its programs, economic 
conditions and the environmental constraints (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). 
Whicker et al, (2002) mentioned  “three factors that have not been examined, these 
factors are “agency mission, benefit/cost structure, and public attitudes. Each of these three 
factors—agency mission, benefit/cost structure, and public attitudes —either directly or 
indirectly impacts agency budget strategy. Agency mission defines benefit/cost structures 
for the organization, which, in turn, impacts public support for the agency and its programs. 
Public support then impacts agency budget strategies (Khan and Hildreth 2002)”. 
According to Wildavsky, Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. This notion 
about budget assumes there is stability across the budget process. The incremental theory 
of budgeting have been challenged in  terms of analytical and interpretive choices. As this 
theory assumes that the stages of appropriation are stable, LeLoup and Moreland (1978) 
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revealed that there is a variation in stages of appropriation and agencies have several 
strategies in requesting for appropriation.  
The main objective of this research study is to explore the relationship between 
agency officials, governor’s recommendation and legislative appropriation. This success 
could potentially be achieved through understanding agency/governor relationship and the 
factors that contribute to the success of that relationship. This chapter aims to understand 
the to agency budget success from administrator’s perspective, to understand the financial 
problem in state budget: what are the resource constraints, to understand how public 
support help agencies in their budget success and lastly to understand the strategic 
problems in state budget: who has power and how do the use it to achieve their purpose.  
While analysts have traditionally assumed that budget success is not one-
dimensional, they have not considered whether their measures of it are relevant in the “real 
world” of state budgeting. Two measures of budget success have been used, jointly or 
individually. Following the lead of Sharkansky (1968), two indicators of gubernatorial and 
legislative influence over state agency budget requests are used in the analysis: short-term 
success and success in budget expansion. Short-term success is a measure of an agency’s 
success in receiving approval from the legislature in a given fiscal year. Success in 
expansion measures an agency’s success in receiving approval from the legislature for an 
increase in its current budget. Based on these measures of budget success, we can then infer 
what outcomes agency budget officials seek to achieve. Doing so could make the study of 
state budgeting more relevant for practitioners as well provide suggestions for facilitating 
their success in the budget process. 
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Bureaucrats tend to maximize their  activities and agency programs. Tullock further 
contends that it is a rule of thumb for bureaucrats to find possibilities to expand program 
and activities of the agency. This is not an unfair assessment because every bureaucrat will 
benefit in terms of power, influence, and public respect when there is expansion. Tullock 
cautioned that, the proposition is not true of all bureaucrats and it is only confined to 
modern day bureaucrats. One strategy mentioned by Tullock to in order to improve the size 
of bureaucracy is to do a good job and for public to desire the interest to want more from 
the government.  Niskanen (1973),  also support this in his budget maximizing model that 
agency official will attempt to increaser their budget size  in order to have more influence 
thus increasing its salary and prestige. Legislators do demand that agency to provide 
services and agency also seek budget to supply service to the public. The more services 
supplied, the more the agency expands. Size of the agency and scope of agency work 
contribute to agency survival.  
The development of agency budgets is also impacted by various institutional actors. 
Moreover, understanding how agencies interact with the legislative environment and at 
what stage agencies exert the most influence over the budget process adds clarity to the 
nature of the policy process. In addition, we might consider what political conditions 
influence agency program expansion. These environmental factors, which are usually 
outside the organization, also affect the organization and its decisions as agencies within 
the same or different policy arenas compete with one another for limited resources; for 
example, the higher education budget competes with Medicaid and other social welfare 
agencies. Multiple factors or forces have been identified as being involved in shaping 
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public policies, one example being how internal administrative conditions affect the 
increase or reduction of an agency's budget and, presumably, its activities.  While the 
research reported here cannot address all these questions, it will examine a number of these 
issues to improve our understanding of the complicated factors that influence agency 
budget priorities, goal setting and processes.   
In defining agency budget success and discussing their measures, agency budget 
officials provided useful insights into the strengths and limitations of specific measures of 
budget success and, in some cases, the tactics used to achieve it. Agency budget success is 
an important concept because it deals with what administrative officials want to accomplish 
during the budget process and provides insights into their budget roles. 
Agencies use different approach in presenting their budget request to governor and 
legislators. The recognition and pattern of differences in  gubernatorial recommendation 
provides evidence that some agencies are more aggressive in their request than others. 
There is evidence that agencies do appeal to legislatures when governor cut their request. 
In some cases, legislatures do honor appeals made by agencies when their request are cut 
by governors. 
Agencies involved in the budgetary process are political actors operating in a given 
political environment. While some aspects of the environment are uniform for all agencies, 
many are unique to each agency. For example, some operate in a more supportive executive 
environment than others, which is, in part, influenced by political party within state 
legislatures. Previous research on budgeting at the state and federal levels has found that 
understanding agency budget requests throughout the different stages in the budgeting  
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process is important (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). As a result, the initial focus of 
this research centers on budget strategy throughout the entire budget process, specifically 
the links between the goals of the agencies and their perceptions of the actions that will be 
effective in obtaining the required funding in their political environment (Wildavsky 1968). 
The chapter  employs a qualitative approach to assess the link between agency 
mission, budget strategy and budget success. In defining agency budget success and 
discussing their definitions, agency budget officials provide useful insights into the 
strengths and limitations of specific measures of budget success and, in some cases, the 
tactics used in achieving it. Using a qualitative approach, this chapter aims to explore 
Agency budget success from an administrator’s perspective, the primary resource 
constraints, how public support helps agencies with budget success, and who has power 
with the state budget and how do they use it to achieve their ends?  
This  chapter  attempts to address ongoing budgeting questions through several 
lenses. Its results will enable future state level researchers and practitioners gain insight 
into how agency characteristics may play a role in the success and/or failure of the 
budgeting process. The budget policy research area has been dominated by other lines of 
inquiry, and this dissertation seeks to expand that with a focus on the agency and legislative 
processes being employed to arrive at budget policy. 
The study reported here extends this research using data obtained for 18 budget 
officials ( in 15 state  agencies) to explore fiscally dependent agencies and how mission 
and strategy affect budget relations between an agency, governor and state legislature.  
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3.2 Agency Mission: Inductive Theory 
The mission of an agency determines the primary focus of the agency which is 
associated with a unique cost structure. The cost structure of agency may be concentrated 
or disperse (Whicker et al. 2002).  In addition, the mission defines the agency’s policies. 
Lowi (1964) classified  policies into three : distributive, redistributive, and regulatory. 
Whicker et al. (2002)  applies Lowi’s (1964) policy typologies to develop a policy  
classification of public agencies of distributive, redistributive, and regulatory and adds a 
fourth, market emulators. These classifications are defined below:  
Distributive Policy Agency: These agencies provide government service widely 
used by the state, for example, general public education, broad health care focused on 
primarily on disease control, defense and transportation. This type of policy applies 
economic incentive to reward some group and deny other groups. 
Redistributive Policy Agency: These types of policies  the transfer of payment and 
service delivery from one segment of population to the other. hat shifts income from one 
segment to another, usually providing income for the less fortunate. Examples include 
welfare, social services and health care targeted for low income populations.  
Regulatory Policy Agency: These agencies use positive incentives such as tax relief 
and negative incentives such as fines to modify the behavior of regulated industries, 
examples being DHEC and financial regulation institutions. 
Market emulators: Whicker et al. (2002)  added another type of agency called 
market emulators. These agencies exhibit the characteristics of private industries. “These 
agencies produce marketable goods with clearly identifiable unit costs that can be sold to  
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individuals in a market exchange,” for example parks, recreational museums, and 
institutions of higher education.  
3.3 Benefit, Cost Structure and Public Support 
Concentrated benefits means that the policy is particularly for certain group or 
rather  the benefits accrue to just a few actors. These actors may be low income or wealthy 
class of the population.  The dispersed costs, on the other hand, means that the policy is 
financed by taxpayer’s money.  
The benefit, cost structure and public support are influenced by the type of agency  
(Whicker et al. 2002)  Because distributive agencies face policy that the benefits that are  
dispersed and costs are borne by a large segment of the population. On the other hand, 
redistributive agencies face policies that the benefits  are spread among certain segment of 
the population and  costs are borne by large segment of the population . Regulatory 
agencies faced dispersed benefits and concentrated cost. The benefits of programs 
instituted by regulatory agencies are enjoyed by all segment of the population while cost 
are borne by small segment of population. Market emulators have concentrated benefits 
and costs whereby the same segment of the population bears the benefit and cost.  
3.4 Methodology 
The problem addressed in this study was to identify the factors affecting budget 
strategies and the success of budget officials in South Carolina state agencies. To explore 
this issue, the factors affecting the strategies and success of budget officials were the focus 
of this study. The findings of this study will provide an understanding of the behaviors of  
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budget officials in the budget process, for example, we will be able to answer the 
question of what administrative officials want to accomplish during the budget process and 
provide insights into their budget roles. 
This section begins with an overview of the research design and the selection 
criteria used in this dissertation. 
3.4.1 Research design 
This chapter qualitatively identify the factors affecting the strategies of budget 
officials. More specifically, it addressed the need to focus on understanding budget 
strategy, budget request, and budget success in addition to improving the budgeting 
process, the gaps in the literature identified in Chapter 2. Examining these factors could 
potentially result in an improved budget process and its outcomes. Interview was conducted 
and data were analyzed for budget officials in the state of South Carolina. The questions 
for the interview were based on variables that were thought to impact budget strategies. 
The following questions were posed to agency budget officials. 
Question 1: How would you describe agency budget success? 
1a. Is the primary source of your funding state revenues? 
Question 2: Describe the importance of maintaining a good relationship with 
legislators? 
2a. Do you feel comfortable discussing your needs with the legislators? 
Question 3: Does your agency have a strategy for recessionary budget environments? 
3a. How do you protect yourself from deep cuts that may threaten the agency? 
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Question 4: Describe the importance of maintaining a good relationship with the 
governor? 
Question 5: Who are your primary beneficiaries? 
5a. How does their support help in your budget success? 
5b. Do you perceive hostility from other non-beneficiary groups? 
Question 6: What are the most important variables to consider when your agency is 
preparing its budget? 
Question 7: Are there specific groups that resist or block the growth of your programs? 
7a. How do you overcome resistance to funding? 
 
The data used for this research were obtained from two sources, budget data from 
the South Carolina Governor’s Budget Report, FY 1990-2018, and interviews conducted 
with key budget actors, specifically agency budget officials, the director of the Executive 
Budget Office (EBO)and E.B.O budget analysts. Budget officials from 15 agencies in 
South Carolina agreed to be interviewed. The interview format consisted of open-ended 
questions designed to produce non-structured responses; agency officers and budget 
analysts were asked similar but distinct questions. 
Addition to the recording device, notes were also captured during the session. Each 
of the budget officials was assured their responses would be kept confidential; My 
dissertation chair, Dr. Lori, assisted in conducting interviews with the first 3 budget 
officers, and I conducted the remaining interviews myself between March 2018 and 
September 2018. Interviews lasted a maximum of 60 minutes, with the average being 50 
minutes. 
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Although the agencies used in this study varied, the issues regarding problems with 
budgets were similar but a qualitative methodology was suitable  for this research exploring 
and comparing the potential factors affecting budget strategy and budget success. The 
primary limitation of this qualitative study is the small number of agencies from which to 
draw conclusions about distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policy areas. The 15 
agencies alone cannot explain the entire universe of factors explaining differences in 
factors determining appropriation for state agencies. Thus, an important limitation is that 
the findings from the qualitative study may not be fully generalizable across agencies in 
other state states. The list of agencies interview are in the table 3.1  below. 
 
Table 3.1. List of Agencies Interviewed 
Agency Policy Area 
Number of 
People 
Interviewed 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Regulatory 2 
DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE  Regulatory 1 
AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT Market Oriented /Distributive 1 
PARKS RECREATION & TOURISM Market Oriented  1 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE  Regulatory 1 
DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION Distributive  2 
STATE LIBRARY Distributive  1 
DEPT OF HEAL TH & HUMAN SERVICE Distributive/Redistributive 1 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL Regulatory 1 
DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH  Distributive/Redistributive 1 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY Regulatory 1 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES Redistributive 2 
EDUCATION OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE Regulatory 1 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT Regulatory 1 
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Agency Policy Area 
Number of 
People 
Interviewed 
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND 
HISTORY Distributive  1 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Based on the information obtained from the responses to the interview questions, I 
drew conclusions and made recommendations. To ensure their accuracy, I took notes during 
the process and recorded the interviews if the participants agreed. If they did not, the 
interview occurred but was not recorded. 
3.6 Results and Findings 
3.6.1 How do budget officials define agency budget success? 
Some officials responded that increase in appropriations does not always mean 
budget success. Increase in appropriation could be as a result of legislative mandate, capital 
project, or agency restructuring. In these cases, a large increase was not viewed as a 
success. Budget success also means obtaining short/long term support both from governor 
and legislators or secure appropriation more than the current operating levels. One 
respondent defined success as meeting the strategic goals of the agencies. 
Some officials responded that “Success is considered if recommendation for a 
certain program gets funded. Success is regarded as when more agency recommendations 
receive funding or attention. Success is drawing attention to certain issues or able to make 
changes to proviso.” Success could also be defined when budget changes that need to be 
made are made. For example, budget changes that would positively improve student 
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outcome are the most important. Other respondents defined success as being given 
maintenance of current operations budgets with flexibility and no holdback of funds during 
the year. 
Agency budget success includes flexibility in the use of appropriations and 
obtaining appropriation authority; more specifically, to the respondents flexibility includes 
(1) avoiding restrictive language in the appropriations act; (2) appropriation authority 
allowing the agency to carry forward unexpended or unencumbered appropriations into the 
following year; or (3) having open-ended authority to write grants and use the funds 
secured from the grants without having state funds cut. 
The majority of the respondents defined budget success as the following: 
▪ To some department officials, budget success means the ability to secure funds 
quickly in an emergency situation. 
▪ Budget success is the ability to obtain adequate funding in the long and short 
term. 
▪ Budget success is the ability to secure recurring funds. 
▪ Success is defined as the overall response, I. e. if other participants in the budget 
process agreed to all funding requested. Also, success means if the strategic plan 
goals is met. 
▪ Budget success is being able to secure the resources needed to carry out the 
mission and objectives of your agency 
Budget officials mentioned that the “percentage increase in appropriations depends 
too much on the fiscal condition of state funds and revenue increases. Since these factors 
are beyond the control of the agency officials, their success should not be judged on how 
large a percent increase in appropriations they were able to obtain for their agency.” 
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Obtaining an increase in appropriations may depend on other factors partially or entirely 
beyond the control of an agency, such as whether its workload is increasing or decreasing 
or whether there is a court order mandating a program change. 
Some agency directors, according to the respondents, were only trying to get 
enough of an increase to continue existing programs at their current level of operations 
with very little program improvement, for example the Department of Insurance, while 
others are seeking program expansion.  
3.6.2 What is the relationship between agency, governor and legislators? 
Governor Support: Respondents from the Department of Mental Health and 
Education Oversight Committee mentioned that having an advocate in the governor’s and 
executive budget offices is invaluable for an agency that desires to expand its activities, 
mentioning specifically that general support may be expressed by the governor in his public 
statements, news conferences, and State of the State Address, as well as during the 
budgetary process. One budget official responded that obtaining support from the governor 
provides an avenue for program expansion, implying that budget officials are not 
concerned about higher appropriation alone. This finding is consistent with Abney and 
Lauth’s (1989) results from their survey of state executive budget officers. 
The disadvantage of a strong relationship with the governor may mean that his or 
her support could increase the level of assertiveness of an agency in the budgetary process. 
One respondent, a member of the Education Oversight Committee, mentioned that the 
legislature is the driver for some agencies, adding that the impact of a relationship with the 
governor depends on if the he or she is popular. This respondent emphasized the importance  
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of being part of the conversation. Respondent says that, it does not matter if an 
agency is executive department or cabinet agency, meeting with the governor to discuss 
recommendation is important. It takes effort, time and persistence. Agency director needs 
to be proactive. “It’s a poor excuse to say you don’t know how to get to the Governor”. 
Thus. agency directors need to meet with a dedicated member in the governor’s office who 
carries the message. 
Another respondent from the Juvenile Justice Department mentioned that 
maintaining a good relationship with the governor and the executive budget staff depends 
on the type of agency. For a cabinet agency, its relationship with the governor is more 
critical than for an executive agency. For executive departments, on the other hand, the 
relationship with the legislature is more critical. 
3.6.3 Relations with the legislature 
Maintaining a good relationship with the legislature and its budget staff was 
important to most of the agency budget officers interviewed. The key to good legislative 
relations, according to many of the respondents, was the credibility of the agency director. 
One official responded that “always asking for what is needed will help to maintain 
credibility”. Respondent further mentioned that the “ability to persuade the appropriation 
committee and secure funding for the agency means success.” To maintain a good 
relationship with budget officials, honesty is crucial, according to one respondent. Further, 
officials responded that the attitude “the sky is falling” should be avoided with legislators. 
Once a legislator realizes that the dire consequences predicted did not occur after the 
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agency request was refused, its credibility could be at stake because of the realization that 
the consequences were exaggerated. 
The job of agency officials is to sell their budgets to the appropriations committee 
and legislature. Therefore, it is important to convince them that every item requested is 
absolutely necessary. For example, when the budget official from the Education Oversight 
Committee, was asked about inflating the budget, he responded only items needed for 
operation are requested and he “will not add an item above the amount needed to maintain 
the current level of operations unless this item is essential.” 
Legislative Support: Budget officials mentioned that agencies work hard to build 
supportive coalitions in the legislative branch and to maintain good relationships with their 
authorizing committees and appropriations sub-committees. Knowing they have support 
from the legislature makes agencies feel secure in asking for increases. One respondent 
from the Department of Juvenile Justice emphasized the importance of the relationship 
with the legislators, mentioning that they are important stakeholders and must be given 
priority. Another respondent described his agency’s relationship with the legislature as 
“crucial because some interest group who are not beneficiary of the agency may want to 
get rid of an agency program,” adding “ their agency provided accountability service for 
the legislator and governor and some interest group don’t like to be accountable” Overall, 
all respondents except for the budget official from the Mental Health Department agreed 
that South Carolina is a legislative dominant state. 
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3.6.4 Why do legislators deviate from governor’s recommendations? 
Wildavsky (1969) mentioned that the financial policy of the governor is the most 
important variable since it determines the extent to which he is able to use his formal 
powers and relative position vis-a- vis the legislature and administration. This ability 
depends on the course of action he chooses to pursue, his formal powers, the structure of 
his administration and the party composition in the legislature. Budget officials responded 
that, prior to the creation of the Executive Budget Office in 2013, the governor’s control 
of the budget process was minimal. However, the establishment of the Executive Budget 
Office empowered the governor to review departmental estimates, to propose a plan of item 
vetoes and to control expenditure. The South Carolina governor has line item veto which 
allows him or her to increase or reduce a specific item without having to reject an entire 
appropriation. Party composition is a strong determinant whether this veto is overturned; 
if the governor’s party is in the minority, there is a high probability that the item veto will 
be overturned. Based on the literature, Sharkansky (1968) concluded that agencies must 
secure the consent of the governor to obtain the funding requested. Without it, the 
probability of achieving budget success low. 
According to Wildavsky’s theory of the budget process, a limited tenure imposes 
additional restrictions on the governor’s power. For example, a governor with only one 
term in office has not had sufficient time to acquaint himself with the budget, to determine 
the way he wants to direct it and to convince the administration and legislators to 
implement his proposal. Further a governor with limited tenure is not likely to initiate, for 
example, a tax hike because he would not be able to reap the benefits. His term would have  
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before the additional revenue was realized to allow for an increase in spending. 
When asked about the impact of a governor’s tenure on budget requests, one budget official 
responded that politics is part of the budget process. 
When revenue grows faster than expenditures, the governor’s options expand, 
meaning he has more possibilities to choose from: He may become an advocate of lower 
taxation, or he may join the rank of those arguing for an expansion of state services. One 
budget official responded that the governors who know how to use social media are the 
ones successful in the 21st century. This respondent added that a “governor should have 
goals. A clear goal will make a governor. A governor who can articulate their goals. A 
governor has a good plan. A governor who knows how to relate X and Y.” 
One budget official responded that status of governor’s party in the legislature has 
no impact, stating that the difference between Democrats and Republicans is small. This 
respondent further added that both parties are fighting for the growth and development of 
the state. Most respondent agreed that the success of the governor who wants to increase 
spending is less certain since it depends on legislative approval. Shakansky (1976) 
emphasized that the governor’s formal power is crucial in the budget process. The results 
from the study reported here found that the governor cannot rely on his personal power 
alone because he does not have the authority to appropriate. Future studies should explore 
if the governor faces resistance from the opposition party when his party does not control 
the legislature and if when the governor’s party controls the legislature and there is a high 
level of party discipline, his chance of success is high. 
103 
The principal feature which makes the South Carolina governor’s budget powers 
weak is that the Governor does not have the sole responsibility for preparing the budget. 
Legislative budget control has also been enhanced in South Carolina by the establishment 
of budget preparation by Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA). One explanation for why South 
Carolina is a legislative dominant state could be that South Carolina legislators have 
information provided by RFA and agency budget is reviewed by RFA staff. As a result, the 
Legislators are believed to be better informed about agency requests and therefore in a 
stronger position to influence the degree of budgetary success achieved by state agencies. 
3.6.5 Financial problems in state budgets: What are the resource constraints? 
Economic conditions and the governor’s decisions on overall budget totals may 
mean a surplus or a deficit year. These factors are formally communicated to the agencies 
through the EBO guidelines for preparing their requests. Budget officials responded that 
the factors affecting appropriation are informally communicated in a variety of ways and 
agencies usually have a good idea of what is expected of them. Some budget officials 
mentioned that the needs of the agency may necessitate that it ignores formal and informal 
guidelines if it believes it can make a strong case for its requests. There two types of budget 
syndromes: one, revenue grows faster than expenditures, and a surplus is accumulated, 
meaning budget officers are less concerned about cutting requests and finding money to 
fund spending than deciding whether to spend extra monies and if so, how and where. In 
the second, spending outstrips revenue, and little is left at the budget officer’s discretion. 
In this situation, the budgetary process revolves around revenue rather that expenditure, 
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and budget officers are concerned with curbing spending and with finding resources to fund 
current programs. 
Budget officials responded that the most important variable determining the 
behavior of participants is the adequacy of revenues. Spending agencies will have nothing 
to gain or lose internally; hence, their strategies will be directed toward sources outside 
state government. The legislature, though advocating higher spending, will engage in 
constant disputes with the governor over revenues. When money comes in faster than it 
goes out, as often happens, more options become available. The governor stands to gain 
the most in this situation since he can use his formal powers effectively either to initiate or 
to prevent additional spending. 
The spending agencies and the legislature can and will probably advocate higher 
spending; however, implementation depends on the governor’s consent. Again, the 
conservative saving-oriented governor has the last word. The development of strategies 
becomes important for spending agencies since there is something at stake in the budgetary 
process. Most of their efforts will be directed toward the governor for though only the 
legislature can appropriate monies, appropriation without gubernatorial support has little 
material value. As one budget official explains, “budget development involves revenue 
plan, expenditure forecast and a procedure for dealing with the gaps that exist between 
revenue and expenditure.” 
The Official from the Executive Budget Office reported that the first element in 
developing a budget is to determine how much revenue will be available. The primary 
source of revenue for a state is sales tax and for a local government is property tax. The 
105 
predictions from the Revenue and fiscal affairs does not only affect the current budget but 
also the dialogue about the tax structure, new and expanded expenditure program and 
future of social security program. Revenue forecast plays an important role in making 
economic policy. 
There are two scenarios that budget official gave to explain the relationship between 
revenue and expenditure. First, raising revenue could lead to increased expenditures: one 
could argue (even though this is not always the case but there are situations when this 
argument may be applicable) that expenditure must follow revenue. Thus, if revenue is 
raised, then government increases spending. Hence, cutting revenue can reduce budget 
deficits. Equally as important as this, the state’s financial condition determines who is the 
central figure in the state. It can be argued that a state surplus increases the governor’s 
power because of the perception that this is a political win on the governor’s part. When 
the budget is not balanced, the governor has the incentive to do nothing because all options 
are perceived as unpopular. A deficit means the governor must balance the budget either 
by raising taxes or cutting spending, neither of which is likely to satisfy the public. 
More important than other considerations, the financial condition determines who 
is the central figure. A surplus increases the governor’s power because he wins the 
initiative. When the budget is not balanced, the governor has the incentive to do nothing 
because all options open to him are unpopular. A deficit means the governor must balance 
the budget either by raising taxes or cutting spending, neither of which is likely to satisfy 
the public. Over appropriation is also possible and frequently practiced. Agency budget 
officials mentioned that there are instances where they are appropriated more than what 
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they requested. Over appropriation can also result because of actions by the legislature 
because the governor bears the burden of balancing the budget. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Budget official reported that gaining support from the governor provides an avenue 
for program expansion, implying that budget officials are not just concerned about higher 
appropriation alone. The disadvantage of a strong relationship with the governor may mean 
his support for an agency could increase the level of assertiveness of an agency in the 
budgetary process. This finding is consistent with Abney and Lauth’s (1989) results from 
their survey of state executive budget officers. 
According to Wildasky’s theory of the budget process, a limited tenure imposes 
additional restrictions on the governor’s power. For example, a governor with only one 
term in office has not had sufficient time to acquaint himself with the budget, to determine 
the way he wants to direct it and to convince the administration and legislators to 
implement his proposal. Further a governor with limited tenure is not likely to initiate, for 
example, a tax hike because he would not be able to reap the benefits. His term would have 
ended before the additional revenue was realized to allow for an increase in spending. 
When asked about the impact of a governor’s tenure on budget requests, one budget official 
responded that politics is part of the budget process. 
When revenue grows faster than expenditures, the governor’s options expand, 
meaning he has more possibilities to choose from: He may become an advocate of lower 
taxation, or he may join the rank of those arguing for an expansion of state services. One 
budget official responded that the governors who know how to use social media are the  
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ones successful in the 21st century. This respondent added that a “governor should 
have goals. A clear goal will make a good governor. A governor who can articulate their 
goals. A governor has a good plan. A governor who knows how to relate X and Y.” 
Legislative budget control has also been enhanced in South Carolina by the 
establishment of budget preparation responsibility from the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
(RFA) Agency. South Carolina legislators have information provided by RFA and agency 
budgets are reviewed by RFA staff. As a result, the Legislators are arguably more informed 
about agency requests and therefore in a stronger position to influence the degree of 
budgetary success achieved by state agencies. 
Future research could use the variables and classifications identified in this research 
to test scenarios of state budgets in other states. For example, the assertiveness categories 
and agency typologies developed in this study are important because they help to describe  
the assertive behavior that may be manifested by agencies during all stages of the budget 
process. Future research could extend the findings from this research with more in-depth 
analyses from individual states or comparisons of states. Such analyses should assess the 
impact of partisan conflict, election outcome and year, the soft skills of governors, and the 
nature of executive-legislative relations in budget matters.  
Future research could also examine how state spending on Medicaid or other areas, 
like Corrections, impact the budget success of other agencies and programs. Research on 
the nature of agency budget tradeoffs will allow researchers to examine if agency success 
with long- or short-term budget expansion is associated with resource competition. 
Similarly, an examination of whether elected agency officials budget requests are more  
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likely to receive approval that non-elected officials is important for future scholars. 
In conclusion, there are many avenues for future research that could provide scholars with 
a stronger understanding of public budgeting processes but also about broader policy and 
political relationships across states. 
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Chapter Four: FACTORS AFFECTING HIGHER 
EDUCATION BUDGET 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Economic hardships and political factors have been found to describe the  decline 
in state spending for higher education. In addition, the changing relationship between states 
and public higher education  have also led to decline in support for higher education.  
Above all, the economy is a key determinant of state spending for  higher education (Weerts 
& Ronca 2006).   
The use of  financial aid programs has been suggested to be a key tool in  addressing 
the issues of education affordability, access, and equity and college completion. A 
promising financial aid program in place will assure prospective student that going to 
college is an option that is available and certain. Financial aid program should be designed 
in such a way that would increase awareness of prospective student (Laderman & Carlson, 
2018). Recently among researchers,  there have been a significant amount of attention on 
decline in  state higher education appropriation 
State and federal government do assist higher education by providing subsides in 
form of student aid. Higher education have the privilege to increase tuition and these have 
made it easy for lawmakers to cut higher education budget when they are faced with other 
state competing factors. The budget literature argues that understanding budget 
competition is of critical importance for understanding state higher education 
appropriations. State spending on higher education have not expanded compared to other 
areas of state investment such as Medicaid. (Weerts, & Ronca, 2006). Reserchers have also  
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suggested that one of the reasons that higher education appropriation shrinks could 
be as a result of budget trade offs by state lawmakers (Tandberg, 2010; Koshal, & Koshal 
2000). Public institutions do have other means of generation income when faced with 
reduction in their appropriation. This makes higher education as an attractive target for 
budget cut because of its ability to source revenue through other means.  
Volatility in state spending for higher education has been found to exhibit the 
characteristics of balance wheel model. Higher education funding is reduced compared to 
other state spending categories when the condition of state economy is unfavorable but 
receives more funding when budgeting environment is favorable (Delaney and Doyle 
2007). Furthermore, their study controlled for economic, political, and higher education  
factors and still found evidence of “balance wheel functional form of funding for higher 
education”.   
Rizzo (2006) “emphasized that public universities are accustomed to their state 
funding being at the mercy of economic cycles. In bad budget times, higher education 
typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the full expectation 
that it will be compensated during a recovery” (Rizzo 2006, p.1).  (Rizzo) 2006 further  
emphasized  that, in relative terms, higher education funding has not fluctuated with the 
business cycle. In summary the result of Rizzo work showed that, after controlling for  
political, economic, demographic, and higher education infrastructure, volatility in 
budgeting for higher education still shows pattern of —the balance wheel 
Overall, Increase in K 12 expenditure has affected funding for higher education. 
Higher education effort to increase has resulted in funding cut by most states. Budget  
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reduction, increase in student enrolment, and other state political support have 
impacted the ability of higher education to provide quality and equitable education  
 Hovey (1999) “addresses the future financing of higher education, focusing 
primarily on the states and presenting state-by-state data on important trends” (Hovey 
1999, p.1).  He assesses the health state’s revenue and expenditure in the context of other 
state competing priorities and how these priorities affect funding for higher education.   
Hovey finds that most states expenditure will grow more than revenue which will lead to 
funding cut for higher education. However, during favorable budget environment, 
lawmakers  have been in support of funding major changes in higher education request.  
The environmental factors affecting state budget process for higher education 
includes economic, political, and demographic factors. These factors explains, the variation  
in states appropriation for higher education among the states, but the factors did not explain 
all the differences that occur in state appropriation for higher education among states 
(Glenny 1979).  The main actors in the budget process are the governors, agencies, 
legislatures and higher education climate.  Research suggests that the internal and external 
factors of budget actors best describe the strategy and  behavior of budget reviewers over 
a certain period (Ryu et al. 2008). More specifically, institutional actors, institutional rules, 
and the personal characteristics of an actor can influence the budget outcome or the process 
itself (Ryu et al. 2008). Gleny (1972) has referred these actors to be the "anonymous leaders 
of higher education".  
This paper investigates the state’s higher education appropriation in detail, 
comparing its levels to both the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriation  
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levels by examining the economic, political, demographic, higher institution 
environment cultural and fiscal factors. More specifically, it begins with two basic 
questions: 1) Why is there variation in public higher education funding in South Carolina 
and 2) How does spending for higher education relate to state level budget expenditures? 
Budget literature argues that examining budget competition is important for understanding 
the tradeoffs in state higher education appropriation. The variations in legislator and 
governor support have implications for tuition, low income students, and  public higher 
education standards. As such, this research will examine the dynamics of budget 
competition to provide insight into the variations in state spending for research and public 
institution in the state of South Carolina. 
 
Table 4.1. State Fiscal Support for Higher Education 
State FY14 FY17 FY18 FY19 
Alabama 1,444,764,352 1,557,047,574 1,588,026,154 1,645,894,944 
Alaska 399,052,668 352,480,709 343,870,898 343,486,475 
Arizona 897,579,300 860,387,400 875,132,900 902,095,800 
Arkansas 1,001,496,233 974,615,738 978,568,798 1,012,705,646 
California 10,765,415,955 13,562,573,000 14,489,452,000 15,439,058,000 
Colorado 677,086,916 866,808,182 887,037,491 993,825,292 
Connecticut 1,026,156,341 1,152,055,154 1,071,282,616 1,115,487,119 
Delaware 227,606,200 234,722,700 237,069,500 237,443,800 
Florida 3,925,291,451 4,537,335,070 5,037,744,203 5,323,619,860 
Georgia 2,790,040,144 3,210,406,736 3,443,626,402 3,622,236,182 
Hawaii 530,388,306 667,478,019 716,718,368 777,647,851 
Idaho 374,642,100 460,323,000 478,997,900 502,954,900 
Illinois 4,295,926,531 4,535,178,335 4,129,826,231 4,315,738,835 
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State FY14 FY17 FY18 FY19 
Indiana 1,663,061,249 1,745,379,182 1,773,727,687 1,779,141,830 
Iowa 823,333,019 829,402,839 804,642,010 815,518,230 
Kansas 771,121,325 769,175,109 772,091,220 801,527,217 
Kentucky 1,194,587,857 1,170,767,200 1,173,159,100 1,144,995,600 
Louisiana 1,125,250,832 1,083,387,063 1,159,690,661 1,163,071,254 
Maine 271,864,121 299,740,529 302,551,904 305,883,736 
Maryland 1,721,006,820 1,983,512,996 1,997,863,397 2,066,976,438 
Massachusetts 1,342,072,529 1,544,319,564 1,564,337,918 1,606,272,299 
Michigan 1,669,524,700 1,877,039,600 1,917,024,500 1,954,421,700 
Minnesota 1,394,503,000 1,543,313,000 1,653,249,000 1,630,558,000 
Mississippi 973,846,876 1,013,678,408 900,155,014 904,710,576 
Missouri 954,236,519 1,011,797,327 988,536,584 998,983,910 
Montana 226,961,354 252,366,788 243,920,115 244,454,061 
Nebraska 688,183,035 753,553,849 745,710,158 762,533,014 
Nevada 485,640,591 570,958,220 622,021,005 655,333,247 
New Hampshire 109,000,000 125,200,059 127,935,617 128,543,198 
New Jersey 1,990,469,000 2,083,569,000 2,065,933,000 2,155,024,000 
New Mexico 856,215,012 854,808,000 836,246,000 855,931,200 
New York 5,306,812,959 5,735,095,034 5,918,513,522 6,045,266,911 
North Carolina 3,617,627,709 3,982,126,724 4,086,567,077 4,283,647,083 
North Dakota 409,693,640 419,650,340 358,491,256 358,491,256 
Ohio 2,104,931,061 2,303,647,976 2,300,904,761 2,299,505,863 
Oklahoma 1,053,566,920 863,204,515 824,226,487 832,707,167 
Oregon 631,121,950 816,722,620 851,699,382 884,722,988 
Pennsylvania 1,644,692,000 1,693,108,000 1,713,363,000 1,756,295,000 
Rhode Island 167,567,862 188,739,813 199,553,587 208,435,318 
South Carolina 909,110,205 1,094,964,380 1,097,979,545 1,057,670,049 
South Dakota 207,837,626 238,612,300 234,058,232 238,879,017 
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State FY14 FY17 FY18 FY19 
Tennessee 1,587,786,604 1,732,289,377 1,844,857,699 1,923,836,726 
Texas 6,948,653,093 7,614,429,799 7,493,114,733 7,577,802,811 
Utah 798,346,200 978,663,600 1,025,936,100 1,113,971,200 
Vermont 92,686,200 93,158,125 95,533,067 95,494,089 
Virginia 1,780,468,378 2,051,845,077 2,013,572,522 2,120,330,179 
Washington 1,570,807,000 1,878,116,000 1,906,810,000 2,037,367,000 
West Virginia 516,276,320 484,109,151 470,910,031 489,388,995 
Wisconsin 1,114,018,800 1,473,947,300 1,509,157,200 1,573,280,133 
Wyoming 352,669,707 382,164,128 373,759,707 384,799,235 
Total, 50 states 77,430,998,570 86,507,974,609 88,245,156,259 91,487,965,234 
Source: Grapevine Data 2020 
 
 
The aim of this study is to address the limitations in the above literature by focusing 
on a single state, South Carolina in this case, and exploring the variation across research 
universities and regional comprehensive institutions by using a time-series, or longitudinal 
analysis. This is  a methodology suitable  for this research because of both the nature of the 
hypotheses and the methodological advantages of this approach. This study analyzes a 28-
year, time-series panel of budget data from 1990 to 2018. The data consists Total state 
revenue (in thousands), Total state expenditure (in thousands), Higher-education 
appropriations, Primary- and secondary-education expenditure (in thousands) and FTE 
Enrollment (Full-time enrollment).  
The variations in legislator and governor support, and budget competition factors 
for higher education appropriations, have implications for the cost and quality of  higher 
education, along with accessibility issues for lower-income Americans (Weerts, & Ronca,  
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2006). This research will address this limitation by examining some of the potential 
differences of other states’ spending priorities.  to help understand  variations in state 
spending for higher education using data from South Carolina. 
4.2 Research Questions 
The literature outlined previously provides the beginning for understanding the 
factors that affect appropriations for higher education in the state of South Carolina. The 
methodology used in this study was designed to identify which of these factors are most 
influential factors in explaining the differences in support for  research and public four-
year institution  in the state of South Carolina between 1990 and 2018. Utilizing descriptive 
statistics this study examined higher education appropriation, finding variations within and 
across these years for different higher education sectors. In addition, there are variations in 
the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriations, and there is an overall 
decline in South Carolina higher education appropriations.  
This study will examine the differences in state funding of merit/need-based 
scholarship, and higher education allocations for the period 1990 to 2018. Further, it will 
investigate if there is budget competition between spending on merit/need-based funding 
and appropriation.  Several factors have been found to  explain the nationwide decline in 
state support for public colleges and universities. Some of these factors have been grouped 
into political, economic, and demographic factors, each playing a role in state 
appropriation.  
Based on the factors identified from a study of the literature, fiscal (budget) 
competition for state higher education budgets is a factor deserving additional examination  
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in the research. A better understanding of the differences in higher education 
funding and other state spending priorities will increase our understanding of the variations 
in state funding for higher education. Additionally, the variations in legislative and 
gubernatorial support for higher education appropriation impact tuition, accessibility to 
disadvantaged Americans, and the quality of public higher education. While descriptive 
statistics show both variation and a decline in state support for higher education, the reasons 
and the potential causes for variations within and across years are much less understood; 
investigating these is the focus of this research. 
More specifically, the research questions are as follows: 
Primary Research Question 1: How does state spending on Medicaid and other areas 
(K-12 Education, Corrections, Public Safety and Human and Health Services) of state 
spending affect higher education funding? 
1A. Is an increase in state spending on Medicaid and other areas negatively 
associated with state funding of higher education? 
Primary Research Question 2: What explains variation in state funding for higher 
education in a state? 
2A. Are differences in state funding for higher education in a state explained 
by competing factors in the state budget? 
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Primary Research Question 3: What are the budget determinants for merit-based and 
need-based scholarships? 
4.3 Literature Review 
Rational decision-making  theory assume that human beings use cues such as 
heuristics to aid their calculations when choosing between effective choices that will attain 
efficient outcome (Ghanti, 2019). These individuals make decisions based on available 
information to maximize their advantage and achieve a reasonable outcome. Economic 
scholars believe  that the elements of rational choice theory can be used to solve policy 
problems. However, behavioral economist argue against rational theory that due to limited 
computational capacity, human beings are unable to entirely make absolute decision when 
they are faced with certain problems. Bounded rationality theory argues that the best 
decisions are made when alternative choices are evaluated (Cyert & March 1963).  
Rational decision-making is appropriate for analyzing determinants of state 
appropriations for higher education because of empirical predictions from various choice 
of problems (objectives and constraints) that the lawmakers face when making decision on 
expenditure and revenue. The choice to appropriate fund for higher education depends on 
various factors such as economic, political and social factors. Weerts (2008) made it clear 
that state culture and political factors are important factors in explaining and describing 
state spending for research institution. The environmental factors affecting state budget 
process for higher education includes  political, economic, and demographic factors.  These 
factors explains, the variation  in states appropriation for higher education among the states, 
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but the factors did not explain all the differences that occur in state appropriation for higher 
education among states. 
Dar (2012) studied the political patterns of higher education policy. The result 
provide evidence that  is consistent with report of other scholars that politics play a major 
factor in funding of higher education. Due to multidimensional variables and  the nature of 
higher  education policy, the manner in which politics play role is conditional. Furthermore, 
Dar concluded that state spending in other priority areas competes with higher education 
appropriation.  
Tandberg ( 2010, 2009) also reveal that the environmental factors affecting state 
spending for higher education includes:  political, economic and demographic factors. The 
legislature and governor are the ultimate players in the budget creation process  and these 
actors determine appropriation for higher education. The  variations in constitutional power 
among states does not allow researchers to make general assumption about the power of 
governors across  states.  However, (Weerts & Ronca, 2006) argues that the governor's role 
in higher education has become extremely important in the last two decades.  
The political culture of state has been found to affect budget actors in the budgeting 
process. Relationship have also been found between state’s residence value for education 
and how the lawmakers value education.  McLendon  et al.  (2009)examined the nature of 
political factors affecting funding for higher education. Their analysis emphasized that  
political influences play a critical role in higher education budget. Political factors include 
gubernatorial influence, legislative influence, and the influence of various interest groups  
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and citizens. The analysis concluded that legislative professionalism is related to 
funding higher education. The higher the greater analytical ability the state acquire, the 
more the legislature will invest in higher education.  
Several studies have examined the impact of scholarships and other types of 
financial aid on the relationship to state appropriations.(Dynarsk et. al 2000). Dynarski and 
Cornwell (2000), Mustard and Sridhar (2001) found that the HOPE scholarship program 
increased enrollment rates, while other studies have examined the effect of the Georgia 
HOPE scholarship on high school achievement (Henry and Rubenstein 2000. 
To provide a better understanding of how economic factors affect higher  education 
funding. Economic variables impacting education funding include fiscal condition of state, 
taxes, state revenue and expenditure. In a study conducted by Delaney and Doyle (2011), 
changes in state per capita personal income were found to be  positively associated with 
changes in state appropriation for higher education. The study also included in state GDP 
to reflect the overall size of the economy, but no significant relationships were found 
between changes in state GDP and changes in state appropriations for higher education in 
any of the model.  
There have been mixed findings on the influence of per capita income on state 
appropriations for higher education. The difference occurs in the type of independent 
variable that is used to predict appropriation for higher education. For example, Fabricant  
(1952) found that per capita income within a state was the main determinant of the level of 
the state government's expenditures while Coughlin and Erekson (1986) found that per  
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capita income within a state had no significant effect on state aid per student at 
major research institutions. 
Titus (2009) study the relationship between tuition and appropriation in community 
colleges and public four-year university. The result concluded that changes in tuition at 
community college  and public four-year institution influenced each other.  The findings of 
Titus study also reveal a relationship between tuition and decline in education assistance  
at public four-year colleges and universities. A delay in response of policy makers to 
respond to education policy could mean increase in tuition public universities. Deming and 
Walters (2017)  study also found that state appropriations for education is related to tuition 
rates.   
Tuition policies and student financial aid programs have been used as a tool to 
address the issue of higher education affordability. (Titus 2009)research have shown that 
there is a relationship between increase in number of scholarships awarded a degree 
completion rate. Availability of scholarship programs means the out of pocket expenses by 
folks who come from low income households would be reduced. Reduction in tuition could 
encourage more low income to attend college and at the same time complete their degree 
on time.  Other studies(Perna & Titus, 2004; Titus, 2006 )   suggest that state need-based 
aid graduation from four-year colleges positively influences enrollment in private higher 
education institutions. In contrast, Rizzo (2006)   study revealed that,  non-need financial 
aid is positively related to per capita higher education appropriations.  
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Tandberg (2009) provide evidence of the critical role  of politics play on state fiscal 
policy in relation  to higher education. The study indicates  that lobbying matters and it 
provide a great benefit for higher education if they can exert more effort. Tandberg study 
also reveals that the higher education appropriations process is related  to politics or other 
budgetary forces. Tandberg further cleared that  higher education is  susceptible to political 
influences. Furthermore, the study suggest that there is implication of higher education 
choosing to be (rewarded) or not involved (loose) in  state political and budgetary 
processes. 
Levy and Zumeta (2011) found evidence to support the  relationship that exist 
between state funding for higher education and economic factors. The decline in economy 
has been found to exert pressure on other state spending areas such as Medicaid and public 
safety (Levy and Zumeta 2011).   Heck et al. (2014) and Toutkoushian et al. (1998) found  
a relationship to exist between  decrease in unemployment rates and higher spending on 
higher education. In contrast, (McLendon et al. 2009; Tandberg 2010) found a negative 
relationship between  increase in unemployment rate and higher education funding. 
Delaney (2011), suggest that  the health of state economy explains the level of 
support for higher education. educational attainment levels. Layzell & Lyddon (1990) 
suggest that  higher  unemployment growth in a state or decreases in state tax revenue 
explains why lawmakers use reduction in higher education funding as a trade off when 
state is experiencing budget deficit.   
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Higher education research  scholars who focus on Higher education  finance and 
budget processes explore a range of critical questions within the broader policy 
environment. For example, how lawmakers formulates policy priorities for higher 
education  and what factors influence these decisions are critical elements for 
understanding budgeting decisions for higher education. The development of education 
budgets is also impacted by various institutional actors. 
Moreover, understanding how higher education  interact with the legislative 
environment and at what stage agencies exert the most influence over the budget process 
adds clarity to the nature of the policy process. In addition, we might consider what political 
conditions influence expansion of higher education appropriation. These environmental 
factors, which are usually outside the higher education environment , also affect post 
secondary schools and its decisions as universities within the same or different policy 
arenas compete with one another for limited resources; for example, the higher education 
budget competes with Medicaid and other social welfare agencies.  
Multiple factors or forces have been identified as being involved in shaping public 
policies, one example being how internal administrative conditions affect the increase or 
reduction of higher education budget and, presumably, its activities. While the research 
reported here cannot address all these questions, it will examine a number of these issues 
to improve our understanding of the complicated factors that influence higher education 
budget priorities, goal setting and processes.  
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Recently, several factors have contributed to affect state budget process and 
decisions made by legislatures.  Specifically, Thurmaier & Willoughby (2001) recognized 
that sudden change in population growth and market volatility have increasingly burdened 
decision makers in state government . The federal government’s abdication of program 
responsibility to the state has led to the implementation of a wide range of policies by the 
latter. Increase in state expenditure as a result of Medicaid program mandated by federal 
government have let state to use strategies to balance the condition of state finance. One of 
such strategy is called the balance wheel where by state spending such as education will be 
reduced when state experience fiscal deficit and vice versa.   
The changes in budget environment in the 1960s and 1990s has made the budget 
strategies and approach used by agencies in the state and federal to change as well. Budget 
actors have experienced some difficulties in the budget process. Can this be true for higher 
education institutions?  Rubin (1968) suggests that the internal and external factors 
affecting budget environments have placed a great effect on budgetary decision-making, 
an analysis that appears to valid when considering the when considering the whole 
endowment in which budget decision is made Lowery et al (1983).  
During the budget process, a state develop plans on which priorities they need to 
allocate  taxpayers money. Thus, the process used to develop the state budget has important 
implications on the outcome, with the mandates of and restrictions on the various players 
influencing each state’s ability to address policy and funding objectives within the budget. 
As the budget process in each state highlights key issues, it demonstrates the diversity in 
state budgeting practices (NASBO, 2008). In addition, while allocating limited resources  
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among competing interests is inherently difficult, these decisions are also vitally 
important to the fiscal health and future sustainability of individual communities within the 
state. However, most of the members of community pay little attention to the budget. 
Addressing this issue by studying the impact of the budget process on a community will 
assist policymakers in effective allocation of resources. Further, public officials’ awareness 
have been increased with issues associated with budgetary recommendation and 
appropriation. Despite these challenges, there is little research about the state budgetary 
process that focuses on decision makers below the level of higher education authorities. 
Tandberg (2009) found a relationship between education and non education interest group 
and funding for higher education appropriation. Tandberg (2009) concluded that higher 
education interest group increase funding while non higher education interest group 
decrease funding for higher education. In another study, Tandberg (2013) concluded that 
state higher education may want to increase their effort in lobbying as this pays off in the 
end. 
Beginning in the 1990s, states began pushing for stronger governance of their 
systems of higher education. The governance structure has continued to evolve due to 
response to public interest such as improving higher education infrastructure and 
educational equity ( Fulton 2019). Higher  education governance structure have been found 
to be a critical factor in increasing funding for higher education.  The legal structure of 
higher education governance is different for each state. Some have systemwide co 
ordinating or governing board and others may also have a statewide administrative agency.  
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There are twenty states  with single Statewide Coordinating Board/ Agency while 
states with Single, Statewide Governing Board includes eight (Fulton, 2019). States 
established the legal authority of higher education boards and agencies through 
constitution, state statutes. provisions; and, in a limited number of cases, charters or 
executive orders (Fulton, 2019). In  a review conducted by Education Commission of the 
States (2019), they found that the majority of higher education boards are established 
through state statutes. There are thirty-six states which South Carolina that established the 
legal authority of higher education boards and agencies through statutory authority. 
  There is an evidence that consolidated governing board and lobbying the 
legislature is positively related. Tandberg (2013) studied the conditioning role of state 
higher education governance structures. While controlling for legislative control and 
professionalism, the result of Tandberg analysis reveal a positive relationship between 
larger concentration of higher education interest groups and  general fund appropriations.  
McLendon (2014) found that state funding for higher education, depends in part   
on the degree of centralization  that may be present in the state. McLendon found a negative 
relationship between a highly centralized governance structure  and increase in higher 
education appropriation and decrease in spending on merit-based aid programs In another 
study, McLendon (2006) found that states without consolidated governing boards were 
more likely to adopt performance-funding policies, whereas states with consolidated 
boards were more likely to adopt performance-budgeting policies. Performance-based 
funding is a  way of  allocating funds for  state’s higher education which is based on 
performance measures such as number of  degrees awarded and  percentage of students  
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that completes their degree  instead of using  enrollment as the only indicator of 
allocating funds while performance budget is a tool to allocate funding based on  functions, 
activities  purposes and objectives where the costs involved are indicated.  
In another study, Lowry (2001) also mentioned that the dynamics of the variation 
in higher education funding cut could be explained by the presence of  higher education 
governance structure. Lowry concluded that governance structure affect the behavior of 
budget official in universities.  Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2003) and McLendon et al. (2001) 
studied the relationship between higher education policy and  governance structure but 
there appears to be a  mixed result. McLendon et al. (2001) found that political factors 
influence higher education appropriation more than governance structure. In contrast 
Nicholson-Crotty et al. ( 2003) found that governance structure matters and it mediates the 
relationship between higher education funding and political factors. Even with mixed 
results, state legislatures and governors often have the power to coordinate affairs of  any 
higher education boards since they often appoint board membership. As such, these boards 
cannot be separated from the influence of state politics 
In response to rising tuition costs and in light of the continuing decrease in 
budgetary support from the state, South Carolina offers three scholarships and one grant 
for its in-state students. These are described below.  The information below was derived 
from (SC Commission on Higher Education Statistical Abstract 2018).   
The LIFE Scholarship Program is a merit-based scholarship established in 1998. 
This scholarship is awarded annually to eligible students attending two- and four-year 
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institutions in the state. Scholarship funds are awarded half in the fall term and half in the 
spring and must be applied toward the cost of attendance (SC Commission on Higher 
Education Statistical Abstract 2018).   Eligible institutions include: Four-Year Public 
Senior Institutions, Two-Year USC Regional Campuses, Four-Year Independent Senior 
Institutions and Two-Year Independent Institution 
The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship is a merit-based program established in 1988 
to recognize the most academically talented high school seniors and encourage these 
students to attend college in the State.  The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship Program is 
administered by the South Carolina  Commission on Higher Education.  Palmetto Fellows 
may receive up to $6,700 their freshman year and up to $7,500 for their sophomore, junior 
and senior years.  Half of the scholarship is awarded in the fall term and half in the spring 
term.  The Scholarship must be applied directly toward the cost of attendance, less any 
other gift aid received. Assuming continued eligibility, Palmetto Fellows may receive 
scholarship funding for a maximum of eight full‑time terms of study toward their first 
bachelor’s degree at an eligible four-year institution in South Carolina. 
The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship Enhancement was established in 2007 to 
increase the number of students who major in mathematics and science in South Carolina.  
Eligible students may receive up to $10,000 (combined funds from the Palmetto Fellows 
Scholarship and the Scholarship Enhancement) per year beginning with their 
second/sophomore year of college enrollment.  Students may receive Enhancement 
funding for a maximum of six full-time terms of study toward their first bachelor's degree 
at an eligible four-year institution (Public and independent) in South Carolina. 
128 
The SC HOPE Scholarship is a merit-based scholarship program established under 
the 2001 South Carolina Education Lottery Act and implemented in Fall 2002. The 
scholarship was created to provide funding for students attending an eligible four-year 
institution in South Carolina who did not qualify for the LIFE or Palmetto Fellows 
Scholarships. Students may receive up to $2,500 plus a $300 book allowance (total award 
not to exceed $2,800) for the first two consecutive terms of college enrollment. Scholarship 
funds are applied toward the cost of attendance. To qualify, first-time entering freshman 
must have earned a minimum 3.0 cumulative GPA based on the South Carolina Uniform 
Grading Policy (UGP) at time of high school graduation. Funding for this program is 
dependent upon lottery proceeds. South Carolina HOPE Scholarship recipients cannot be 
recipients of the LIFE Scholarship, Palmetto Fellows Scholarship, or Lottery Tuition 
Assistance in the same academic year (SC Commission on Higher Education Statistical 
Abstract 2018).  
In addition to these,  South Carolina offers a Need-based Grant to eligible degree-
seeking students attending public institutions.  These students may receive up to $2,500 
annually if enrolled full-time and up to $1,250 annually if enrolled part-time for up to two 
academic terms each academic year, awarded in any combination of fall, spring, or summer 
terms. The Need-based Grant is an annual award that must be applied toward the cost of 
attendance and disbursed half in the first semester and half in the second semester (SC 
Commission on Higher Education Statistical Abstract 2018). 
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4.4 Contribution of This Study 
The budget literature argues that budget competition is important for understanding 
the tradeoffs in state higher education appropriation (Tandberg, 2010; Koshal, & Koshal, 
2000). This study focuses on fiscal-budget competition factors, extending the work cited 
here using a South Carolina institution as the unit of analysis. An increase in our 
understanding of  budget competition may enhance our understanding of the dramatic 
reduction in state funding of higher education. This study investigates the variation in  state 
spending for research and public institution. This new perspective will give us a better 
understanding of this important topic. 
The variations in legislator and governor support for higher education 
appropriations have implications on the cost of college, accessibility for lower-income 
Americans, and the quality of public higher education (Weerts, & Ronca, 2006). As such, 
this research will examine the variations in budget competition to help us understand the 
variations in state support for higher education using data from South Carolina. 
4.5 Methodology 
This study used a time-series, or longitudinal analysis, a methodology suitable for 
this research because of both the nature of the hypotheses and the methodological 
advantages of this approach. It is assumed that the variables affecting higher education 
institutions vary systematically with the environmental conditions, including political and 
economic conditions, rather than remaining stable over time. While cross sectional analysis 
is useful for controlling the effects of the organizational environment, it is not appropriate 
for investigating the effects of the environment on public policy. One method for studying  
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the effects of certain environmental conditions is by using time-series data. The 
methodological advantages of time-series analysis have been widely discussed 
(Bohrnstedt, 1969). In addition to permitting a study of environmental effects, this type of 
analysis can help to separate systematic error from random error in prediction equations 
(Coleman, 1968; Heise, 1970). Thus, it allows for measuring the proper time lags between 
variables that do not affect each other instantaneously (Bohrnstedt, 1969), while providing 
information on the directionality of effects between variables. (Bohrnstedt, 1969; Heise, 
1970). According to Campbell and Stanley (I963), a longitudinal design can be used as a 
quasi-experimental design that is subject to fewer problems than a static group comparison. 
This advantage is especially important for studying the results of policy action when it is 
not possible to set up an experimental design. 
 Longitudinal information can also be used to relate historical analysis to 
quantitative studies. However, one problem with time-series analysis is that the data 
acquired are subject to an insoluble sampling problem. One can conduct a systematic 
sample across time for finite time segments (such as every year for a 20-year period), but 
cyclic phenomena may introduce systematic bias in the sample. Events unique to the time 
segment sampled may also have a biasing effect (Wooldridge 7th edition). However, it is 
impossible to conduct a probability sample of the universe across time since most data are 
only reported annually and sometimes not at all. This limitation primarily affects the 
external validity of a study, meaning the research reported here cannot be generalized about 
all U.S. state agencies for all time but can generalize about the agencies under study for the  
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period involved.  Furthermore, it can continue collecting data for other agencies 
and extend the generalizability of the findings to an indefinite (but not infinite) degree. 
This study analyzes a 28-year, time-series panel of budget data from 1990 to 2018 
and other state spending priorities such as:, K-12 Education, Medicaid Corrections, Public 
Safety. The multivariate technique used in this study was multiple regression analysis; 
Regression allows for the description of the amount of variance in the dependent variable 
explained by the presence of two or more independent variables, with model results 
presented as the variance in a dependent variable explained by a combination of the 
independent variables.  Regression models describes how a dependent variable is related 
to two or more independent variables, and while causality is not sought here, regression is 
more useful in predicting relationships than correlation analysis (Wonnacott and 
Wonnacott, 1970). Regression and correlation are closely related mathematically. 
However, multicollinearity is a potential problem when using multiple regression analysis 
when the independent variables are correlated, i.e., there is an inability to tell how much 
variance in the dependent variable is due to any one independent variable. This problem is 
exacerbated as the independent variables become more highly correlated. 
.  Standardization of variables is critical for model interpretation. Long (1997) 
discuss alternative ways of standardizing variables that may help with interpretation. There 
are a number of different alternatives for standardization, which Long  (1997) discuss at 
length. With full standardization, both the X and the Y* variables are standardized to have 
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. An intermediate approach is to standardize only 
the X variables. However, by standardizing only the Xs, we can see the relative importance  
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of the Xs. The usual argument for using standardized coefficients is that they 
provide a means for comparing the effects of variables measured in different metrics. For 
this analysis we utilize Long (1997) spostado programs to standardize coefficients and 
ensure that model coefficients allow for a more consistent interpretation. It is important to 
be aware  that, in OLS, while full standardization (both the X and the Y* variables are 
standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) is frequently done, this 
study used the X-Standardization (independent variables) alone as this is enough to achieve 
the goal of comparing the effects of Xs measured in different metrics, and may be easier to 
interpret since Y is left in its original metric (King 2007). 
 This research  focuses analyzing state spending in higher education and other state 
priorities. The research also attempt to find the relationship between scholarship programs 
and education appropriation. And lastly, to determine the factors affecting scholarship 
programs.  Most of the higher education data used in this study were graciously shared by 
the SC Commission of Higher Education. Over the  time period of the study, this 
Commission published data on Full-Time Enrollment (FTE), degrees awarded and tuition.  
Dependent variables 
 This study models are as follows: state spending on merit-based aid, state spending 
on need-based aid and state appropriation to higher education. The dataset in this study is 
comprised of a collection of variables describing the environment, political and economic 
characteristics of the state of South Carolina for the years 1990 to 2018. The data were 
drawn from a variety of sources, which are described in detail in Appendix 1. Descriptive  
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statistics for each variable are presented in Table 1. State appropriations for higher 
education, state spending on need-based aid and state spending on merit-based aid serve as 
the dependent variables for this analysis.  
Independent Variables 
Data on total state revenues, which measure the size of the state's budget, came 
from the South Carolina state appropriation book. This study derived data for a number of 
the independent variables from a variety of reliable sources, including the SC Commission 
on Higher Education and the South Carolina higher education tuition grant Commission.  
Data for the indicators of state finance came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
 The political variables include measures of party, legislative control, status of the 
governor’s party in the legislative branch and the governor’s party. The first measure in 
this cluster of variables was the proportion of Republicans and Democrats who held seats 
in both state houses’; thereby underscoring that party control, varied throughout the time 
period.   The governor’s political party (1. Governor is  a Republican or Democratic 
Governor 2. status of governor’s party. )  
The economic/fiscal capacity of the state was measured using per capita income. 
These data, which were a measure of the income of the residents of SC, came from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. To test the policy attributes of a state's postsecondary 
education system, the study included measures of a cluster of variables related to higher 
education, including the number of full-time enrollments in different types of higher  
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education institutions, tuition and the number of degrees awarded. This study 
controlled for the enrollment of students in two different sectors: Research institutions and 
public four-year institutions. These two were used because appropriation is not only based 
on the overall number of data availability. The dataset includes  information for SC state 
institutions, research and public four-year institutions from  1990 to 2018, necessitating the 
use of methods appropriate for panel data. All of the methods described in this section are 
intended to recover unbiased parameter estimates, given the challenges of working with 
panel or time-series cross sectional (TSCS) data.  
The following table, 4.2, describes each variable, its definition and the source of 
the variable. 
 
Table 4.2. Definitions and Sources of the Variables 
Variable Description Source 
Total state revenue (in 
thousands) 
Sum of all taxes and other sources of 
incomegenerated by a state in a year.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Historical Report and 
Appropriation Acts 
Total state expenditure 
(in thousands) 
Sum of all expenses generated in a state 
in a year. 
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Historical Report and 
Appropriation Acts 
 Higher-education 
appropriations  
state tax appropriations for higher 
education): The aggregate of higher 
education appropriations, calculated as 
the sum of all higher education funding in 
the state in a year. I also calculated them 
by institution.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Historical Report and 
Appropriation Acts 
Primary- and secondary-
education expenditure (in 
thousands) 
The total appropriation for K-12 
education. 
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
Historical Report and 
Appropriation Acts 
FTE Enrollment (Full-
time equivalent 
enrollment in public 
institutions) 
Calculated as fifteen (15) credit hours per 
semester for an undergraduate student, 
twelve (12) credit hours per semester for 
a graduate student.  
South Carolina Higher 
Education Statistical Abstract 
(https://www.che.sc.gov) 
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Variable Description Source 
SC HOPE Scholarship The SC HOPE Scholarship is a merit-
based scholarship established under the 
2001 SC Education Lottery Act and 
implemented in Fall 2002.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
The Palmetto Fellows 
Scholarship  
The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship is a 
merit-based scholarship established in 
1988 to recognize and encourage the most 
academically talented high school seniors 
to attend college in the state.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
The Legislative 
Incentives for Future 
Excellence (LIFE) 
Scholarship  
The Legislative Incentives for Future 
Excellence (LIFE) Scholarship Program 
is a merit-based scholarship established in 
1998. This scholarship is awarded 
annually to eligible students attending 
two- and four-year institutions in the 
state. The scholarship total is calculated 
as the portion of the State General Funds 
generated from Education Lottery 
revenues.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
Tuition grants  Tuition grants are funded by the State 
General Funds and Education Lottery 
revenues. This program is managed by 
the SC Tuition Grants Commission and 
provides need-based grants to qualified 
students attending SC’s independent 
colleges and universities.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
Need-Based Program 
Public 
The funds appropriated to students from 
low-income families attending Private 
universities and colleges. The need-based 
grant total is calculated as a portion from 
the State General Fund, a portion from 
the Barnwell revenues, a portion from the 
Education Lottery, and a portion from 
other non-recurring fund 
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
State Medicaid 
expenditure 
The total sum of money spent on 
Medicaid in a year.  
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
Medicaid Recipient The total number of Medicaid recipients 
in a year. 
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
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Variable Description Source 
Tuition  Cost of tuition and required fees. SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs 
and Education Lottery 
Appropriations Report 
Population Total number of people in the state in a 
year.  
Bureau of Economic Analysis 
State unemployment rate  Calculated annually as a percentage.  U.S. Department of Commerce/ 
Bureau of Economic Analysis/ 
Regional Income Division 
Political Environment The first measure in this cluster of 
variables was the proportion of 
Republicans and Democrats who held 
seats in both state houses’; thereby 
underscoring that party control, varied 
throughout the time period. The 
governor’s political party (i.e., a dummy 
variable indicating a Republican or 
Democratic governor) and party strength 
in the state legislature (i.e., share of the 
legislature that is Republican or 
Democrat) measure the influence of 
partisanship. 
Council of State Governors 
 
4.6 Results and Findings 
Results for determinants of higher education appropriation 
Table 4.3 below shows the descriptive results for the variables of interest in this 
study, and Table 4.4 provides the results from the OLS regression models, examining the 
relationship between higher education state appropriations and state financial aid; state 
spending for Medicaid and other areas; and higher education characteristics at 4-year 
public universities, research institutions, and technical colleges. This study is empirically 
account for variables to explain higher education funding at three levels of analysis. The 
research further distills and discusses the primary findings with respect to the sources of 
influence on funding for higher education from 1990 through 2018. 
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Table 4.5 shows the results for models examining the relationship between higher 
education state appropriations, state financial aid, state spending on Medicaid, state 
spending on other areas and higher education characteristics at 4-year public universities, 
and Table 4.6 shows the results for models examining the relationship between higher 
education state appropriations, state financial aid, state spending on Medicaid, state 
spending on other areas and higher education characteristics at research institutions. 
Finally, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the results addressing Research Question 3 on the 
determinants of merit-based and need-based scholarships. 
 
Table 4.3. Descriptive results for the variables of interest in this study 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 116 2004 8.402898 1990 2018 
Full-time enrollment 98 65220.69 45584.56 32688 205080 
Degrees awarded 30 7266.967 2295.126 3810 10560 
Tuition 71 5542.437 3529.123 672 13087 
State appropriation 104 8.73E+09 4.92E+10 9.75E+07 4.40E+11 
Need-based public 84 1.80E+07 4924535 9492300 2.54E+07 
Life Program 84 1.30E+08 6.20E+07 0 2.22E+08 
Palmetto Fellow 82 3.36E+07 1.92E+07 63927.3 6.20E+07 
Hope Program 76 5497876 3505614 0 1.03E+07 
Education lottery 64 2.91E+08 7.23E+07 8.07E+07 4.07E+08 
State population 116 4261499 471841.5 3501155 5021410 
Personal inc. (000) 108 1.17E+08 4.21E+07 5.61E+07 1.96E+08 
Per capita income 108 27148 7091.45 16018 39517 
Dept of Educ. app. 103 1.86E+09 4.68E+08 1.14E+09 2.91E+09 
Dept of Educ. exp. 92 1.96E+09 4.23E+08 1.25E+09 2.91E+09 
Total state revenue 108 5.35E+09 1.14E+09 3.31E+09 7.58E+09 
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
State total revenue 96 5.40E+09 1.15E+09 2.16E+09 7.65E+09 
State total app 96 5.68E+09 1.04E+09 3.93E+09 7.95E+09 
Health and Soc. rehab app. 92 1.37E+09 3.68E+08 8.49E+08 2.13E+09 
Health and soc. rehab exp. 68 1.47E+09 3.14E+08 1.05E+09 2.03E+09 
Correction app. 88 4.32E+08 6.59E+07 3.33E+08 5.71E+08 
Correction exp. 68 4.45E+08 5.65E+07 3.63E+08 5.49E+08 
State-wide medical 
spending 
84 4.31E+09 1.70E+09 6017874 7.10E+09 
Need-based public 56 987183.6 109313.7 864565 1213606 
Medicaid as a % of pop. 56 21.36857 1.344975 19.61 24.17 
Higher Ed app. 104 5.98E+08 1.06E+08 4.11E+08 7.81E+08 
Medicaid as share of state 
revenue 
64 0.0990116 0.0086361 0.0810484 0.112017 
Medicaid recipient 57 9.350877 4.185396 1 16 
 
 
Table 4.4 below presents the results for Primary Research Question 1: How does 
state spending on Medicaid and other areas (Corrections, Public Safety, Health and Human 
Services and K12 Education) of state spending  affect higher education funding?  First, this 
study finds some degree of explanatory power in each of the categories of hypothesized 
influences, although, financial aid, higher education climate, and certain policy attributes 
of the state appear to be particularly important. The result of  the analysis in table 4.4 detect 
statistically significant relationships (p < .05) between higher education appropriation and 
14 of the 25 variables that were tested.  
As illustrated  in table 4.4, the share of funding that higher education receives is not 
reduced when all categories of Medicaid  receive increased funding with some exception:   
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Medicaid recipient as a percentage of population and statewide Medicaid 
expenditure are the only categories that dampen higher education funding as this category 
increases. Other categories of state spending on Medicaid as a share of state revenue and 
the number of Medicaid recipients indicate an increase in spending for higher education. 
The results in Table 4.4 also show that when the education budget for K-12 increases, 
funding for higher education does decrease.  The educational expenditures variable has a 
beta coefficient of -3.02E-01, which suggests that for each additional dollar spent on K-12 
education, state higher education appropriation will  decrease approximately by $302 in 
annual state appropriations. This finding is not surprising since K-12 education is often 
viewed as competing directly with higher education for state tax dollars.  The Health and 
Human Service variable has a beta coefficient of -1.67E-01. This suggests that for each 
additional dollar spent on Health and Human Service, state higher education appropriation 
can expect to see a decrease of approximately $167 in annual state appropriations. This 
finding is supported by evidence of a "crowding out" effect in state funding for higher 
education, with increased state investments in Health and Human services and K-12 
Education appearing to displace funding for higher education. 
Total state tax revenue is statistically significant with  model results  presented in  
Table 4.4.  The coefficient on tax revenue reveals that when a state experiences rapid 
annual growth in total tax revenue, policymakers face less pressure to reduce spending for 
higher education. Rizzo (2006) “emphasized that public universities are accustomed to 
their state funding being at the mercy of economic cycles. In bad budget times, higher  
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education typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the 
full expectation that it will be compensated during a recovery” (Rizzo 2006, p.1).   
It is often expected that higher educational attainment and just generally a larger 
population in a state would result in a more supportive environment for financing higher 
education. However, this relationship is more complex than it appears. (Layzell & Lyddon, 
1990) emphasized that state population, college age population, and  school enrolment 
affects appropriation for higher education..  
The composition of the population in a state is also a factor that influences levels 
of appropriations for colleges and universities. Amy (2017) asserts that a larger elderly 
population (age 65+) is one of the state priorities that requires attention of legislatures. 
Attention is given to this age group than college age population. as a result, the expenses 
of Medicaid is incurred on elderly population. This state priority spending could lead to 
trade-off in other state spending areas when state experience budget deficit. 
 Tandberg (2009) confirm a negative relationship between college-age residents 
and education appropriation. This research finds a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between South Carolina’s population aged 18-24 and those 65 and older and 
higher education appropriations. These results support previous research but also highlight 
important areas of future research around population policy preferences. . In addition to the 
age of the population, other demographic factors such as the increase in  the number of low 
income or African American students, influence appropriation for higher education as state  
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governments attempt to meet the needs of  diverse state  populations (Levy and 
Zumeta 2011; Titus 2009). 
The results in table 4.4 shows that the Palmetto Fellows Program appears to 
influence state spending on education negatively.  This analysis indicates distinct 
connections between the state policy climate and public spending on higher education. 
Degrees awarded are not associated with lower levels of state appropriations.  Some may 
assume that higher tuition should be associated with higher education funding.  This study 
anticipated that higher tuition prices would likely to lead to cuts in higher education 
funding. The tuition variable is negatively significance in the Table 4.4  model. Past 
research also suggests that tuition increases is related to linked to per-student 
appropriations.  Titus (2009) study the relationship between tuition and appropriation in 
community colleges and public four-year university. The result concluded that changes in 
tuition at community college  and public four-year institution influenced each other.  The 
findings of Titus study also reveal a relationship between tuition and decline in education 
assistance  at public four-year colleges and universities.  
The result in table 4.4 further demonstrates that an increase in full-time enrollment 
influences higher education negatively. Medicaid spending as a percentage of  the 
population results in a decrease in  funding for higher education, but other categories of 
Medicaid spending such as Medicaid as a share of state revenue and number of Medicaid 
recipients have a positive effect on higher education appropriation.  These findings also 
indicate that the Education Lottery does not have a significant relationship with higher  
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education funding, perhaps suggesting  that the proceeds from this lottery mostly 
fund need-based scholarships.   
Table 4.4. Determinants of Higher Education Appropriation (Aggregate Result: All State 
Institutions Combined) 
 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Full-time enrollment 0.024 -5.20E+07 8058.653 -6.45E+03 
Degrees awarded 0.883 -3.30E+06 3201.695 -1.03E+03 
Tuition 0.000 -4.10E+07 3153.188 -1.30E+04 
Palmetto Fellows Program 0.000 -2.30E+08 1.60E+07 -1.44E+01 
Education lottery deposit 0.123 2.10E+07 7.20E+07 2.92E-01 
Hope Program 0.550 4.40E+06 1.70E+06 2.59E+00 
Life Program 0.000 5.20E+07 4.998 1.04E+07 
Need Based public 0.001 6.60E+07 4.30E+06 1.53E+01 
Need Based private 0.000 5.40E+07 4.871 1.11E+07 
Population 18 to 24 0.034 -6.20E+07 3.10E+04 -2.00E+03 
Population 65 0.039 -1.40E+07 5.70E+04 -2.46E+02 
Per capita personal income 0.178 2.10E+07 3105.033 6.76E+03 
Medicaid as share of state rev 0.000 6.50E+07 0.009 7.22E+09 
Statewide Medicaid Expenditures 0.459 -6.80E+06 1.60E+09 -4.25E-03 
Medicaid as % of Pop 0.000 -1.20E+08 1.177 -1.02E+08 
Medicaid Recipient 0.014 3.40E+07 4.031 8.43E+06 
Technical and Comprehensive 
Education 
0.000 5.00E+07 2.00E+07 2.50E+00 
Social Services 0.723 2.30E+06 1.80E+07 1.28E-01 
Higher Education Tuition Grant 0.420 -1.40E+07 2.60E+06 -5.38E+00 
Public Safety 0.140 1.60E+07 3.80E+07 4.21E-01 
Mental Health 0.000 7.40E+07 2.20E+07 3.36E+00 
Health and Human Services  0.011 -5.50E+07 3.30E+08 -1.67E-01 
Department of Education 0.000 -1.30E+08 4.30E+08 -3.02E-01 
Corrections 0.093 2.50E+07 4.90E+07 5.10E-01 
CHE 0.002 2.10E+07 4.30E+07 4.88E-01 
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 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
EIA  0.000 1.00E+08 1.10E+08 9.09E-01 
Total State Revenue 0.000 -1.90E+08 9.30E+08 -2.04E-01 
State Total Expenditure 0.000 1.90E+08 9.50E+08 2.00E-01 
State Total Appropriation 0.139 -4.80E+07 9.50E+08 -5.05E-02 
* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05 
 
 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 below present the results for Research Question 2: What explains 
variation in state funding for research institution (Clemson and USC Columbia)  and 4-
year  public universities ( The Citadel, Coastal Carolina, College of Charleston, Francis 
Marion, Lander, SC State, USC Aiken, USC Beaufort, USC Upstate, Winthrop) in the  state 
of South Carolina.  The findings show that state spending for research institutions appears 
to be influenced by a variety of state-level conditions, economic variables and the higher 
education climate, which are distinct from conditions that influence public four-year 
institutions. This analysis found statistically significant effects for state spending for these 
institutional variables studied; however, the magnitude of those effects were in an opposite 
direction for public, four-year and research institutions. 
 While state spending in other critical areas such as Corrections, Health and 
Medicaid   compete for state spending for higher education appropriations, expenditure for 
K-12 education serves  as a determining factor for increases in higher education funding 
for research institutions.  The educational appropriation  variable has a beta coefficient of 
3.64E+02. This suggests that for each additional dollar spent on K-12 education, Public 
Four-Year Institutions can expect to receive approximately $364 additional dollars in 
annual state appropriations. This finding is somewhat surprising since K-12 education is 
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often viewed as competing directly with higher education for state tax dollars. However, 
the finding may also be interpreted to suggest that state support for Public Four-Year 
Institutions is aligned with overall support for education in a state.  
As seen in table 4.5, the share of funding that higher education receives is not 
reduced when all categories of Medicaid shares receive increased. The Medicaid variables 
is not significant with higher education appropriation. Again, this finding is surprising 
given that health care is a growing expenditure that is putting a financial pressure on higher 
education. Conventional wisdom is that the state budgeting process is viewed as a "zero 
sum game" with winners and losers (Weerts 2006) 
The tax revenue variable has (total state actual revenue) a non significance level of 
p < 0.774 in the model reported in Table 4.5.  However, the result is not as expected  that 
when a state experiences rapid annual growth in total tax revenue, policymakers face less 
pressure to reduce spending for higher education. While the expectation was that higher 
educational attainment and just generally a larger population in a state would result in a 
more supportive environment for financing higher education. The analysis here does not 
find a significant effect of population on state spending for higher education in public four 
years institution. McLendon et al. (2009) and Tandberg (2009), found a negative 
relationship between college-age residents and education appropriation. The composition 
of the population in a state is also a factor that influences levels of appropriations for 
colleges and universities.  
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Table 4.5 presents the results of determinants of higher education appropriation 
results for public four-year institutions. Based on model results, it does not  appear that  the 
Palmetto Fellows Program  influences state spending on public four-year institutions.  
However, this analysis indicates distinct connections between the state policy climate and 
public spending on higher education. Degrees awarded are associated with higher levels of 
state appropriations.  A key variable for consideration in this model is the tuition variable; 
it is not significant in this analysis. There is some anecdotal evidence that  higher tuition  
could resulting  cuts to higher education funding.  Past research also suggests that tuition 
increases at four-year public institutions are inversely linked to per-student appropriations.  
For example, Cheslock and Hughes (2011) and Titus (2009) have suggested that public 
colleges respond to decreased state funding by raising tuition and fees.   High tuition, 
however, may create unwanted noise by taxpayer and this may prompt the legislatures to 
be sensitive to changes (Amy, 2017). 
The result in table 4.5 further demonstrates that an increase in full-time enrollment 
influences higher education negatively. Medicaid spending such as Medicaid as a share of 
state revenue, Medicaid spending as a percentage of  the population and number of 
Medicaid recipients does not have  effect on higher education appropriation. These findings 
also indicate that the Education Lottery have a significant relationship with higher 
education funding. 
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Table 4.5. Determinants of Higher Education Appropriation (Results for Public Four-
Year Institutions) 
 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Full-time enrollment  0.000 -1.00E+11 5303.679 -1.89E+07 
Degrees awarded 0.002 1.20E+11 1383.651 8.67E+07 
Tuition  0.546 1.40E+10 2923.004 4.79E+06 
Palmetto Fellows Program 0.087 -1.20E+11 1.60E+07 -7.50E+03 
Education lottery Deposit  0.004 1.50E+11 7.40E+07 2.03E+03 
Hope Program  0.417 1.80E+10 1.80E+06 1.00E+04 
Life Program  0.004 1.10E+11 5.121 2.15E+10 
Need Based Public  0.106 6.50E+10 4.99E+00 1.30E+10 
Need Based Private 0.554 -3.50E+10 4.40E+06 -7.95E+03 
Pop 18 to 24 0.970 1.60E+09 3.20E+04 5.00E+04 
Pop 45 to 64  0.206 5.40E+10 5.30E+06 1.02E+04 
Pop 65+ 0.944 1.20E+09 5.80E+04 2.07E+04 
Per Capita Personal Income 0.204 1.30E+10 3209.142 4.05E+06 
Medicaid as Share of State Revenue  0.304 9.00E+09 0.009 1.00E+12 
Statewide Medicaid Expenditures  0.603 2.90E+09 1.60E+09 1.81E+00 
Medicaid as % of Pop  0.111 1.80E+10 1.217 1.48E+10 
Medicaid Recipient  0.437 6.50E+09 4.166 1.56E+09 
Technical and Comprehensive Education 0.027 -3.90E+10 2.10E+07 -1.86E+03 
Social Services 0.421 9.20E+09 1.80E+07 5.11E+02 
Higher Education Tuition Grant 0.026 7.70E+10 2.60E+06 2.96E+04 
Public Safety  0.022 4.80E+10 3.80E+07 1.26E+03 
Mental Health 0.617 1.10E+10 2.20E+07 5.00E+02 
Health and Human Services  0.078 -7.20E+10 3.40E+08 -2.12E+02 
Department of Education 0.013 1.60E+11 4.40E+08 3.64E+02 
Corrections 0.078 -4.90E+10 5.00E+07 -9.80E+02 
Higher Education State Appropriation 0.768 -6.20E+09 1.10E+08 -5.64E+01 
CHE1 0.000 -7.40E+10 4.40E+07 -1.68E+03 
EIA1  0.214 3.50E+10 1.20E+08 2.92E+02 
Total state revenue  0.774 1.50E+10 9.40E+08 1.60E+01 
State Total Expenditure 0.668 -2.50E+10 9.60E+08 -2.60E+01 
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 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
State Total Appropriation  0.327 8.00E+10 9.60E+08 8.33E+01 
* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05 
 
The state expenditure variable in Table 4.6 has a beta coefficient of 9.48E-02. This 
suggests that for each additional dollar spent on K-12 education, Research Institution can 
expect to receive approximately $948 additional dollars in annual state appropriations. This 
finding is somewhat surprising since K-12 education is often viewed as competing directly 
with higher education for state tax dollars. However, the finding may also be interpreted to 
suggest that state support for Research Institution is aligned with overall support for 
education in a state. This finding is supported by evidence of a “crowding out” effect in 
state funding for higher education, with state investments in correction appearing to 
displace funding in higher education. 
The tax revenue variable has (total state actual revenue) is not significance in the 
model reported in Table 4.6. However, the result is not as expected that when a state 
experiences rapid annual growth in total tax revenue, policymakers face less pressure to 
reduce spending for higher education. While the expectation was that higher educational 
attainment and just generally a larger population in a state would result in a more supportive 
environment for financing higher education. The analysis here found a negative significant 
effect of population on state spending for higher education in research instruction. The 
relationship between state population (population 80+) and higher education funding is as 
expected that the composition of a state’s population may impact higher education 
spending negatively. This finding supports McLendon et al. (2009) and Tandberg (2009),  
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who also found a negative relationship between college-age residents and education 
appropriation.  
Amy (2017) asserts that a larger elderly population (age 65+) signifies more 
demand for programs such as Medicare and state officials may cater to this particular 
constituency, placing higher education at greater risk for substantial reductions. In addition 
to the age of the population, other demographic factors such as the growth of the number 
of minority students, affect state budgeting for higher education as state governments 
attempt to meet the needs of these populations (Levy and Zumeta 2011; Titus 2009). 
The results in Table 4.6 shows that the Palmetto Fellows Program appears to 
influence state spending on education negatively. This analysis indicates distinct 
connections between the state policy climate and public spending on higher education. 
Degrees awarded are not associated with higher levels of state appropriations. Some may 
assume that higher tuition should be associated with higher education funding. This study 
anticipated that higher tuition prices would likely to lead to cuts in higher education 
funding. However, the tuition variable is positively significance in the Table 4.6 model. 
Past research also suggests that tuition increases at Research Institution are related to 
education per student funding. For example, Cheslock and Hughes (2011) and Titus (2009) 
have suggested that public colleges respond to decreased state funding by raising tuition 
and fees. High tuition, however, may be unacceptable to the public and attract negative 
attention to policymakers, who may be less willing to pass costs on to students (Amy, 
2017). 
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The result in Table 4.6 further demonstrates that an increase in full-time enrollment 
does not influence higher education. Medicaid spending such as Medicaid spending as a 
percentage of the population have a negative effect on higher education appropriation. 
These findings also indicate that the Education Lottery does not have a significant 
relationship with higher education funding.  
 
Table 4.6. Determinants of Higher Education Appropriation (Research Institution 
Results) 
 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Full-time Enrollment  0.421 -3.00E+07 5096.451 -5.89E+03 
Degrees Awarded 0.001 -8.80E+07 1078.706 -8.16E+04 
Tuition  0.000 1.30E+08 3280.861 3.96E+04 
Palmetto Fellows Program  0.000 -1.50E+08 1.60E+07 -9.38E+00 
Education Lottery Deposit  0.099 2.20E+07 7.40E+07 2.97E-01 
Hope Program  0.330 6.80E+06 1.80E+06 3.78E+00 
Life Program  0.008 3.20E+07 5.121 6.25E+06 
Need Based Public  0.021 3.20E+07 4.992 6.41E+06 
Need Based Private  0.040 4.20E+07 4.40E+06 9.55E+00 
Pop 45 to 64  0.564 4.00E+06 5.30E+06 7.55E-01 
Pop 80 0.000 -6.10E+07 5.80E+04 -1.05E+03 
Per Capita Personal Income 0.912 2.60E+06 3209.142 8.10E+02 
Statewide Medicaid Expenditures  0.771 -4.10E+06 1.60E+09 -2.56E-03 
Medicaid as % of pop  0.053 -6.00E+07 1.217 -4.93E+07 
Medicaid Recipient 0.303 2.20E+07 4.166 5.28E+06 
Technical and Comprehensive Education 0.042 2.60E+07 2.10E+07 1.24E+00 
Social Services 0.622 -4.20E+06 1.80E+07 -2.33E-01 
Higher Education Tuition Grant 0.577 1.30E+07 2.60E+06 5.00E+00 
Public Safety 0.898 -1.80E+06 3.80E+07 -4.74E-02 
Mental Health 0.550 -9.60E+06 2.20E+07 -4.36E-01 
Health and Human Services  0.089 5.10E+07 3.40E+08 1.50E-01 
150 
 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Department of Education 0.566 2.30E+07 4.40E+08 5.23E-02 
Corrections 0.002 -7.30E+07 5.00E+07 -1.46E+00 
CHE 0.102 2.70E+07 1.10E+08 2.45E-01 
EIA  0.149 1.30E+07 4.40E+07 2.95E-01 
Technical and Comprehensive Education 0.445 1.60E+07 1.20E+08 1.33E-01 
Total State Revenue  0.772 -1.20E+07 9.40E+08 -1.28E-02 
State Total Expenditure 0.055 9.10E+07 9.60E+08 9.48E-02 
State Total Appropriation  0.363 -5.70E+07 9.60E+08 -5.94E-02 
* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05 
 
 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below present the results for Research Question 3: Determinants 
of need-based and merit-based scholarships. These results suggest that state spending for 
need-based programs is influenced by a variety of state-level conditions distinct from 
conditions that influence merit-based aid programs.  
The research examines the relationship between tuition and state funding on 
need/merit-based aid. With respect to tuition, the study finds (Tables 4.7 and 4.8) that 
tuition is positively related to state funding for need-based aid programs. This study 
anticipates that high tuition to less likely lead to cuts in state need and merit-based funding. 
The tuition variable is significant in the models reported in Tables 4.8 For need-based 
funding, an increase in higher education tuition increases need-based funding, while an 
increase in higher education tuition does not impact merit-based funding. Other studies 
(Cheslock and Hughes 2011; Titus 2009) have suggested that public colleges respond to 
decreased state funding by raising tuition and fees. However, high tuition costs may be  
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unacceptable to the public and, thus, attract unwanted and negative attention to 
policymakers, who may be less willing to pass these costs on to the student (Amy, 2017). 
An increase in need-based funding allocated in a previous year shows a positive 
relationship with state appropriation. Also, the relationship between merit-based programs 
and state appropriation is significant. There is no evidence of a crowding out effect in South 
Carolina state funding for higher education. The magnitude of the coefficient for need and 
merit-based funding appears to move in a positive direction, with the need-based 
magnitude is higher than merit based.  
This finding also includes the relationships between the state’s economic factors 
and merit need-based funding behaviors over time. As expected, this research finds higher 
levels of per-capita income to be positively associated with higher spending for need-based 
student aid, but it does not appear to influence state spending on merit-based aid. This latter 
result is unexpected in that greater income inequality tends to reduce the likelihood of a 
funding cut. These results are consistent with Amy’s (2017) findings on the explanatory 
variables that explain dramatic declines in higher education appropriations. Amy’s (2017 
findings suggest that, on average, widening wage inequalities are probably less likely to 
result in cuts to appropriations. Tandberg (2009) also found that states with greater income 
inequality allocate more to higher education, perhaps as a strategy to promote educational 
opportunities among poorer residents. 
As expected, an increase in the money from this lottery fund leads to an increase in 
funding for the merit-based Program. As expected, the result in Table 4.7 shows that an  
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increase in the need-based program for private institutions also increases need-
based appropriations for public institutions.  
In the case of need-based aid, increased revenue collection should lead to more 
spending, and vice versa, while an increase in funding from the Education Lottery should 
increase appropriations for merit-based programs, even though not all merit-based 
programs are sponsored by the lottery. Medicaid as a share of state revenue tends to 
negatively impact funding for need-based programs. In contrary, Medicaid as a share of 
state revenue does not impact funding for merit-based programs. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 shows 
that Education lottery deposit positively impact both need-based and merit-based 
programs. 
 
Table 4.7. Determinants of the Merit-Based (Palmetto Fellows) Program in South 
Carolina 
 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Degrees Awarded 0.138 8.20E+05 7657.304 1.07E+02 
Tuition  0.363 -5.00E+05 3082.498 -1.62E+02 
Palmetto Fellows Program  0.510 1.60E+05 3227.219 4.96E+01 
Education Lottery Deposit  0.006 2.60E+06 1.70E+06 1.53E+00 
Life Program  0.000 1.10E+07 7.20E+07 1.53E-01 
Need Based Private 0.000 2.60E+06 4.998 1.60E+06 
Need Based Public  0.006 1.60E+06 4.30E+06 3.72E-01 
Pop 18t o 24 0.068 -6.90E+05 4.871 -1.42E+05 
Pop 45 to 64  0.000 3.20E+06 3.40E+04 9.41E+01 
Pop 65 0.000 -3.20E+06 5.70E+06 -5.61E-01 
Per Capita Personal Income 0.154 -3.00E+05 5.40E+04 -5.56E+00 
Medicaid as Share of State Revenue  0.680 -1.80E+05 3105.033 -5.80E+01 
Statewide Medicaid Expenditures  0.872 6.30E+04 4.031 1.56E+04 
Medicaid as % of Pop  0.844 -5.20E+04 1.60E+09 -3.25E-05 
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 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Medicaid Recipient  0.265 5.50E+05 1.177 4.67E+05 
Technical and Comprehensive Education 0.872 6.30E+04 4.031 1.56E+04 
Social Services 0.003 -1.20E+06 2.10E+07 -5.71E-02 
Higher Education Tuition Grant 0.003 1.20E+06 2.00E+07 6.00E-02 
Public Safety 0.096 -8.70E+05 1.80E+06 -4.83E-01 
Mental Health 0.042 -9.60E+05 3.40E+07 -2.82E-02 
Health and Human Services  0.003 -1.90E+06 2.40E+07 -7.92E-02 
Department of Education 0.201 9.30E+05 2.70E+08 3.44E-03 
Corrections 0.000 4.30E+06 3.40E+08 1.26E-02 
CHE 0.004 -1.60E+06 3.90E+07 -4.10E-02 
EIA  0.250 -2.50E+05 3.20E+07 -7.81E-03 
Total State Revenue  0.000 -3.80E+06 8.40E+07 -4.52E-02 
State Total Expenditure 0.702 -1.70E+05 8.30E+08 -2.05E-04 
State Total Appropriation  0.016 -1.70E+06 8.60E+08 -1.98E-03 
Degrees Awarded 0.000 1.80E+06 8.00E+08 2.25E-03 
* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05 
 
 
Table 4.8. Determinants of Need-based Program (Need-based for Public) in South 
Carolina 
 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Full-time enrollment  0.000 3.80E+06 7776.706 4.89E+02 
Degrees Awarded 0.076 -1.20E+06 3157.312 -3.80E+02 
Tuition  0.000 2.40E+06 3232.705 7.42E+02 
Palmetto Fellows Program  0.001 2.00E+06 1.60E+07 1.25E-01 
Education Lottery Deposit  0.000 1.30E+06 7.20E+07 1.81E-02 
Life Program  0.966 -1.30E+04 4.998 -2.60E+03 
Need Based Private 0.002 1.10E+06 4.871 2.26E+05 
Need Based Public  0.002 1.10E+06 4.871 2.26E+05 
Pop 18 to 24 0.098 2.80E+06 3.40E+04 8.24E+01 
Pop 45 to 64  0.356 1.60E+06 5.70E+06 2.81E-01 
Pop 65 0.003 -1.50E+06 5.40E+04 -2.78E+01 
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 p-value bStdXY SDofX Coefficient 
Per Capita Personal Income 0.000 2.50E+06 3105.033 8.05E+02 
Medicaid as Share of State Revenue  0.000 -1.50E+06 9.00E-03 -1.67E+08 
Statewide Medicaid Expenditures  0.874 -3.20E+04 1.60E+09 -2.00E-05 
Medicaid as % of Pop  0.751 -1.20E+05 1.177 -1.02E+05 
Medicaid Recipient  0.496 -2.00E+05 4.031 -4.96E+04 
Technical and Comprehensive Education 0.000 -1.80E+06 2.10E+07 -8.57E-02 
Social Services 0.000 1.70E+06 2.00E+07 8.50E-02 
Higher Education Tuition Grant 0.002 -1.60E+06 1.90E+06 -8.42E-01 
Public Safety 0.447 -3.20E+05 3.50E+07 -9.14E-03 
Mental Health 0.463 3.80E+05 2.30E+07 1.65E-02 
Health and Human Services  0.000 4.60E+06 2.80E+08 1.64E-02 
Department of Education 0.028 2.20E+06 3.60E+08 6.11E-03 
Corrections 0.000 -1.80E+06 3.90E+07 -4.62E-02 
CHE 0.339 -2.00E+05 3.40E+07 -5.88E-03 
EIA  0.001 -2.10E+06 8.70E+07 -2.41E-02 
Total State Revenue  0.000 5.50E+06 8.40E+08 6.55E-03 
State Total Expenditure 0.000 -5.60E+06 8.60E+08 -6.51E-03 
State Total Appropriation  0.000 4.20E+06 8.20E+08 5.12E-03 
* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Other studies have concluded that as Medicaid spending contribute to the reduction 
in higher education’s share of the state budget. However,  this study showed that higher 
education’s share is not getting smaller, at least in part, because all categories of Medicaid 
shares are getting larger. Medicaid as a percentage of the population is the only category 
that reduces higher education funding. Other categories of state spending on Medicaid such 
as statewide Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid as a share of state revenue and Medicaid 
recipients result in an increase for higher education when Medicaid expands in these  
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measures. However, spending on Medicaid, specifically Medicaid as a share of state 
revenue, does impact funding for merit-based programs. Consistent with other studies, 
(Blumenstyk, 1988; Layzell & Lyddon 1990) This study finds that an increase in state 
population decreases funding for higher education.  
Given the results of this study, there are programs such as Medicaid that have 
displaced need-based programs, but the concerns about the effect of merit-based aid on 
other forms of Medicaid are not supported based on the findings of this study. The overall 
share of funding that higher education receives is not reduced when all categories of 
Medicaid shares receive increased funding with one exception: Medicaid recipient as a 
percentage of population is the only category that dampens higher education funding as 
this category increases. Other categories of state spending on Medicaid such as statewide 
Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid as a share of state revenue and the number of Medicaid 
recipients indicate an increase in spending for higher education. Given this, it may be useful 
to reconceive how these tradeoffs are considered between the two types of aid and higher 
education appropriation.  
In addition, past research, using case studies, has suggested that merit-based aid 
programs affect student awareness of financial aid; however, these results have not been 
verified through systematic evaluation (Turner et al. 2004). The question becomes what the 
alternatives for funding merit-based programs are if lottery funds no longer exist. The long-
term financial viability of merit-based programs is another issue that has thus far received 
little study. For example, if lottery funds were not available, would the state of South 
Carolina be willing to fund both need and merit-based programs from the general revenues?  
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There is no evidence from this research to support the idea that merit- and need based 
programs compete with each other for funding. Rather, each type of program ought to be 
designed to maximize enrollment among those who could benefit from higher education. 
Given the diverse influences on higher education appropriations, a re-examination of state 
financial aid opportunities, financial viability and recipient allocation may be needed (Heller 
2002).  
In contrast to other results, annual gains in merit-based aid are associated with an 
increase in need-based student aid and vice versa. An increase in need-based aid for those 
attending private institutions, the Palmetto Fellow’s Program and the LIFE Program are 
associated with an increase in need-based aid for those attending public institution.  
Future research should use qualitative or interpretive studies to gain a deeper 
understanding of state budgetary dynamics in higher education. A more robust research 
project combining the use of an appropriate framework, theory and model would be helpful 
for developing a model and theory of public university behavior that identifies the 
circumstances and interests that influence how an institution (research universities, 
technical colleges and public or private universities) with particular characteristics will 
respond to an increase or a decrease in state appropriations. Such a model and theory, with 
appropriate empirical support, would provide a logical way of explaining the variation 
across institutions and over time.  
Several different types of conditions can impact the ways in which states finance 
post-secondary institutions. This study suggest that future studies to investigate the 
decisions to finance need-based/merit-based aid if they are inherently political or not.  
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Future studies should examine the influence of the status of the governor’s party in 
the legislature and the governor’s party affiliation on merit/need-based aid. 
Overall, this research finds that state spending for research institutions( Clemson 
University and USC Columbia) appears to be influenced by a variety of state-level 
conditions, economic variables and the higher education climate which are distinct from 
conditions that influence public four-year institutions (The Citadel, Coastal Carolina, 
College of Charleston, Francis Marion, Lander, SC State, USC Aiken, USC Beaufort, USC 
Upstate, Winthrop). Also, state spending in other critical areas such as Corrections, Health 
and Medicaid compete for state spending for higher education appropriations. Further, 
expenditure for K-12 education serves as a determining factor for increases in higher 
education funding for research institutions. State spending in other areas such as Health 
and Social Rehabilitation, Medicaid spending as a percentage of the population, and 
Correctional appropriations leads to a decrease in higher education funding for research 
institutions.  
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Chapter Five: CONCLUSION 
 
 
This study examined the budget behavior and relationship patterns of 36 agencies 
in South Carolina, with the purpose of assessing the degree of stability and change in the 
state’s budget process and extending this analysis to include variables suggested by the 
budgeting and policy literature. Research paper one examines the impact of the 
relationships among the governor’s recommendations and agencies’ political environment, 
type, method of head selection, agency size and agency age on legislative appropriations. 
Research paper two is a qualitative analysis of budget success, strategies and outcomes 
Finally, research paper three examines the determinants of higher education funding and 
the need/ merit-based program. A brief conclusion for each paper is presented below, 
followed by recommendations and suggestion for future research.  
5.1 Paper One Conclusion 
Paper one provides new perspectives on the state of South Carolina’s budgeting 
process. More specifically, this study compares the behavior of multiple agencies 
systematically, concluding that administrators do not uniformly seek to obtain as many 
resources as they can from the governor and the legislature. Agencies do not use the same  
strategy of requesting small increase in the budgetary process. Variations in the patterns of 
gubernatorial recommendations suggest that in some cases acquisitive behavior is 
manifested both in the short term and long-term budget success. This recognition and 
verification of variations in the budgeting strategies of different agencies is an important 
contribution to the current thinking about budgeting and politics. In addition, the discovery  
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of differences among agency strategies suggests potential differences in the 
postures that legislative committees assume vis-a-vis different agency administrators. 
Numerous issues impact the budget process, with two of the most important ones 
being dealing with differences among governmental entities (including agency size and 
legislative processes) and addressing organizational structure with regard to the budget 
process. Failure to address these issues is an impediment to improving the general welfare 
of the citizens. Moreover, they could have a more severe, adverse impact on the budget 
process and the quality of the budget outcome. This research has shown that it is beneficial 
to question why some government agencies are more stable than the other. Political and 
socio-economic factors among others were the traditional answers to this question. Budgets 
may also be used as a means of control. However, these differences in structure may affect 
individual behavior within organizations in such a way that their budget-related behavior 
may differ depending on their structural strategy.  
The budget process in South Carolina was changed in 2014; prior to that date, the 
governor played a minor role in the budgeting process, with the allocation decisions being 
made by   legislative committee rather than the executive branch of the state government.  
In 2014, Nikki Haley, the Governor, dissolved the state Budget and Control Board, which 
had been responsible for preparing the budget. Among its members were the governor, the 
chairman of the senate finance committee and the state treasurer.  Currently, the Budget 
Office is under the control of the governor of the state. Similar to the past, agencies still 
request significant increases (average request is 7.9%, maximum request is 25.715% and 
minimum request is 1.785%) every year, and the legislature still appropriates  
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approximately what the governor recommends.  Legislative appropriation is on 
average .01 to 2.5% more than the governor’s recommendation; however, legislatures also  
cut a governor’s recommendation from .01  to 17 percent of the time over the period studied 
here.  The, the difference between the governor’s recommendation and legislative 
appropriation in the short and long-term budget is  .052% and  .065% respectively  on an 
annual average.   
Previous studies (Sharkansky et al. 1969) report that a governor’s recommendation 
is the prerequisite for legislative appropriation. However, this research highlights a 
different set of possibilities to describe and explain the relationship between the governor 
and the legislature. First, agencies are apparently more assertive  than previous research 
suggests, with agencies requesting on average a 7 to 56 percent increase over current 
expenditures. Two, this research found that the legislature sometimes deviates from 
gubernatorial recommendations.  
Despite the assertion of incrementalism theory, this study conclude that  it does not 
mean that budget officials do not sometimes focus on budget size. While there is no fixed 
formula for arriving at an incremental budget, total budget size is used to aid in incremental 
budgeting decisions. Sharkansky et al. (1969) assume a fixation of budget reviewers on the 
incremental requests of agencies along with the size of request, meaning they consider both 
a request for a budget increase and the agency’s current appropriation. This study concludes 
that budget analysts do not always fixate on the increments that are sought but also consider 
the size of the budget request in proportion to new requests and the agency’s base. This 
finding suggests that examining budget size may also provide information for assessing  
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how effectively agencies anticipate program needs and ensure the most efficient 
and effective use of resources. Legislators may be interested in examining the budget size 
of an agency to understand the issues and trends affecting it to establish the most 
appropriate goals.  
This consideration may occur when there is a need for the governor to announce an 
“across the board cut.” In this situation budget reviewers may also be interested in how 
much of an agency’s budget from the current fiscal year will be allowed to carry over to 
the next fiscal year. The total amount carried forward may suggest to the reviewers that an 
agency with a large request coupled with a large amount carried forward may not need as 
much revenue as it received in the past. Agencies usually avoid having their budget cuts in 
this situation by engaging in last-minute spending. If this is suspected, an agency’s public 
reputation may be affected as it can be perceived as it has a lack of public concern for the 
overall economy.  
This study also found that while frequently legislatures do not appropriate the exact 
amount the governor recommends, they appropriate close this recommendation. 
Legislative appropriation is on average.01 to 2.5% more than the governor’s 
recommendation; however, legislatures also cut the governor’s recommendation from .01 
to 17% of the time over the period studied here. Previous results report that a governor’s 
recommendation is the prerequisite for legislative appropriation. This research highlights 
a different set of possibilities for the relationship between the governor and the legislature. 
Over the time period of this study, 1990-2018, agencies apparently were more acquisitive 
than previous research suggests, with agencies requesting on average a 7 to 56 percent  
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increase over current expenditures. Results support the idea that legislatures deviate 
from gubernatorial recommendations. In 21 of the 36 agencies, the legislature appropriated 
a larger amount than the governor’s recommendation This variation in budget trends may 
be the result of various different factors: general economic growth, inflation, the overall 
ability of the legislature to increase agency budgets, or perhaps some combination of these 
variables. The findings also suggest some willingness on the part of legislatures to restore 
severe cuts in agency requests when they were a result of a governor’s recommendation. 
When looking at long-term budget growth, the legislature appears to be the most crucial 
budget actor, a result consistent with other research that has found legislatures tend to 
support to budget expansion (Lauth 1984).  
In South Carolina, the governor has strong  appointive power but weak  budget 
power because he or she does not have sole responsibility for preparing the budget. 
Legislative budget control has also been enhanced by the establishment of budget 
preparation policies by the Office of Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA). South Carolina 
legislators receive information provided by the RFA, which also reviews the agency 
budgets.   As a result, it is argued that legislators are more informed about agency requests 
and, are therefore, in a stronger position to influence their degree of budgetary success. In 
contrast, the governors of Georgia have strong budget powers, primarily because they are 
responsible for preparing the budget, a power shared only with persons appointed directly 
by them (Schlesinger, 1971).   Barrilleaux and Berkman (2003) found that Governors with 
greater control over the budgetary process are rewarded with an increased emphasis on 
spending that confers statewide benefits. 
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According to Wildasky’s theory of the budget process, a limited tenure imposes 
additional restrictions on the governor’s power. For example, governors with only one term 
in office have not had sufficient time to become acquainted  with the budget, to determine 
how to  direct the process and to convince the administration and legislators to implement 
their preferences. Further, governors with limited tenure are not likely to initiate, for 
example, a tax increase because   it is uncertain whether their administrations will benefit 
from it. Tax increases have a policy lag associated with them and a governor’s term  may  
have ended before the additional revenue  is realized to allow for an increase in spending. 
When asked about the impact of a governor’s tenure on budget requests, one South 
Carolina budget official responded that politics is part of the budget process. Gubernatorial 
budget success depends on the course of action chosen , the formal powers of the office, 
the structure of the administration and  the party composition of the legislature. This study 
suggests that governors should focus on  a balanced and well researched financial/fiscal 
policy ( such as policy to allocate, increase or decrease revenue and expenditure )as this is 
the most important variable since this, in large part,  determines the extent to which the 
governor is able to use  their formal powers  
The governor plays an important role in short-term budget decisions, while 
legislatures play a dominant role in agency budget expansion over time. In South Carolina, 
the weak budgetary power of the governor and the amount of budget information held by 
legislatures have contributed to this phenomenon. This study suggests the need to 
understand agency budget justifications and utilize evidence as a guide in budget 
development. Policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches can make more  
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informed decisions by incorporating rigorous evidence into the budget process, one 
key step being the requirement of agencies to justify budget requests with rigorous 
research. This action can help ensure that funding is directed toward programs that are most 
likely to achieve desired outcomes. According to VanLandingham et al. (2016), one of the 
issues with the budget rules and processes is that legislators require agencies to justify the 
amount of funding requested rather than the results their program would achieve. As such, 
budget justification is required to distinguish knowledge from year over year estimates that 
may or may not be accurate. In general, a justified budget is one supported by evidence 
and provides additional proof that tax payer’s dollars will be spent well.  
The assumption that legislatures rely on governor’s recommendation is further 
investigated by examining the correlation and regression between the governor and 
legislative appropriations in the short and long term. From these findings, we can conclude 
that a governor’s support appears to be a critical ingredient for short-term agency budget 
success. The governor’s recommendation does not appear to support agency budget 
expansion in moderately acquisitive agencies, a result found for other categories of 
assertiveness as well. The results confirm that agencies requesting the greatest incremental 
change in budget will receive the largest percentage growth over their current budget, while 
agencies requesting little or no incremental change will receive little to no growth in their 
budget.  
Correlations between legislative and gubernatorial short-term support were 
significant across all agencies, but correlations between the governor’s and legislative 
appropriation in the long-term were significant only for 22 of 36 agencies, while agency  
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acquisitiveness and the governor’s short-term support were significant in 19 of 36 
agencies. The magnitude of the correlations between legislative and gubernatorial short-
term support is greater, on average, than those between support for budget expansion and 
acquisitiveness in most agencies. However, in terms of long-term budgeting support, the 
results from the model highlight the importance of agency acquisitiveness over 
gubernatorial support. The study concludes that legislative appropriation in the long-term 
strongly influences spending by agencies in South Carolina, suggesting that legislative 
appropriation to agencies may drive or determine agency spending priorities, agency 
expansion and the extent to which they can carry out their programs. 
This study confirms the partisanship hypothesis that the relationship between the 
governor and legislative appropriations depends on the majority-minority status of the 
governor’s party. When legislative control is in the hands of the Democrats and the status 
of the governor’s party is in the minority, a one unit increase in the governor’s budget 
recommendation increases agency appropriations by 1.00563 percent. Short-term and 
long-term success of agency appropriations are higher when legislative control is 
Democratic rather than Republican. While there is insufficient evidence to claim that state 
Democrats are spenders and Republicans are more conservative in their spending, the 
results of model reveal a relationship that provides some support for this idea. Beland et al. 
(2015) investigates whether the party affiliation of governors (Democrat or Republican) 
has an impact on the allocation of state expenditures. They found that Democratic 
governors allocate a larger share of their budget to health/hospitals and education sectors 
than their Republican counterparts. Most importantly, this study provides evidence to  
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suggest that partisanship is an important consideration in the agency-gubernatorial-
legislative budgetary relationship, results consistent with previous findings. While this 
relationship may seem obvious, it is important confirmation of the “budgeting game” in 
practice based on a research lens.  
This study provides no evidence to support a conclusion that cabinet agencies are 
more successful than executive departments in circumventing the governor and dealing 
directly with the legislature on budgetary matters. However, appointed agencies do appear 
to fare better than elected agencies in their ability to acquire funding from the legislature 
when they are unable to acquire it from the governor. The reason may be that appointed 
agencies work hard to build clients, have the support of their clientele, and maintain good 
relationships with the authorizing and appropriations committees. Leloup (1978) concludes 
that agencies feel secure in asking for more when they know they have the backing of 
Congress. Lauth (1984) concluded that cabinet agencies are not more independent of the 
governor in budgetary matters than executive departments. Analysis of the budget 
experience of South Carolina agencies suggests that agency type does not make much 
difference insofar as budget success is concerned. Strong gubernatorial budget powers 
appear to be offset by strong appointive powers at least when it comes to budgetary 
outcome.  
5.2 Paper Two Conclusion 
One important variable determining the behavior of participants in the budget 
process is the adequacy of revenues as confirmed by one of the state’s budget officials 
during the qualitative interviews. The state budget must be balanced, and when revenue  
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increases at a slower rate than expenditures, budgeting usually becomes a form of 
revenue seeking behavior. The primary concern of professional budget managers during 
deficit periods is finding resources to fund programs while at the same time curbing an 
increase in spending. During surplus periods, governors and budget reviewers are 
concerned about opportunities to expand spending. The budget officials interviewed 
explained the relationship between revenue and expenditure using two scenarios. First, 
raising revenue could lead to more expenditures: one could argue that any expenditure in 
a budget must be expanded in line with revenue changes and, therefore, expenditure must 
follow revenue. Hence, cutting expenditures addresses reducing budget deficits and vice -
versa. Second, changes in government expenditure could cause changes in revenue: one 
could argue that any disturbance in the broader economy, such as unstable political 
conditions or natural disasters, leads to an increase in government spending.  
When revenue grows faster than expenditures, the governor’s options expand, 
meaning he has more possibilities to choose from: He may become an advocate of lower 
taxation, or he may join the rank of those arguing for an expansion of state services. One 
budget official responded that the governors who know how to use social media are the 
ones successful in the 21st century. This respondent added that a “…governor should have 
goals. A clear goal will make a good governor. A governor who can articulate their goals. 
A governor has a good plan. A governor who knows how to relate X and Y.” 
One key variable of interest is identifying and understanding the mission of each 
agency and how it plays a role in an administrator maximizing his/her response to the 
internal and external budget environment. It is essential for an agency administrator to  
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know how to engage in the budget environment, especially how to increase new 
requests over the previous ones, which is critical to maximizing agency budget increases. 
This research reveals that agencies have two primary budget goals: one focuses on agency 
growth and expansion and the other on agency stability. Agencies interested in expansion 
may focus on budget growth, i.e. a large percentage increase in appropriation, while 
agencies interested in stability may focus on achieving a larger percentage of the current 
request appropriated. In summary, agencies the mission of an agency will dictate its success 
in the budget appropriation process.  Agency size and age, among many other factors, 
impact its choice of budget strategies. Seeking public attention and support from the 
governor and legislators, increasing agency size, minimizing agency controversy and 
working hard to retain employees are all strategies that can assist an agency administrator 
in maximizing agency budget requests. 
This research also confirms that the budgeting process is complex and influenced 
by many variables (Wildavsky 1974).  Overall, the findings on the perceptions of agency 
budget success implies that agencies should have enough fund to meet program needs and 
also to have flexibility in use of fund.   
Budget official reported that gaining support from the governor provides an avenue 
for program expansion, implying that budget officials are not just concerned about higher 
appropriation alone. The disadvantage of a strong relationship with the governor may mean 
his support for an agency could increase its level of assertiveness in the budgetary process. 
Other factors have been suggested as challenges to the incremental perspective on 
budgeting in the literature on policy and budgeting (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). These  
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diverse perspectives, however, have not been systematically integrated into a 
potentially competing paradigm. To move in this direction, to move in this direction, future 
research could use the variables and classifications  identified in this research to test 
scenarios of state budgets in other states.  For example, the assertiveness categories 
developed in this study may  help to describe the assertive behavior that may be manifested 
by higher education institution during all stages of the budget process. A comparison of  
assertive behaviors in research and public four-year institutions or studying assertive 
behavior that may manifest in other types of institutions could provide opportunities for 
additional analyses and a more robust understanding of the higher education budgeting 
process. 
 One question of importance for further research is to determine if the governance 
structure in a state leads to assertive behavior in a particular or type of institution. Longer 
time series of budget data with more states would allow for a much more expansive 
analyses of these processes.  Such analyses should assess the impact of partisan conflict, 
election outcome and year, the soft skills of governors, and the nature of executive-
legislative relations in budget matters. Future research could also examine how state 
spending on Medicaid and other areas affect a particular agency and its programs.  Further 
information will allow us to examine if  agency success in long- or short-term budget 
expansion is associated with  state spending on Medicaid and other policy  areas such as 
mental health and correction.    
Additional research investigating the impact of loss of revenue on particular 
programs and agencies would also be of value. For example, how would potential changes  
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to the personal income tax system affect agency size and the overall state economy? 
Research in this area would help us to understand more fully the potential benefits and 
disadvantages of loss of state revenue on the long-term economic growth of the state. 
The relationship between an agency and the governor is assumed to be important 
but understanding the linearity and duality of this relationship is an important area for 
future research. For example, does the governor need the cooperation of agencies and if so, 
under what circumstance or in what situations? A critical future research question could 
focus on whether this type of cooperation is needed during deficit or surplus budget 
periods.  
Another important area of future research is the inclusion of more states, more 
agencies and different time periods to discover if results found here are generalizable to a 
larger set of states and agencies. Reconceptualizing variables could also be of value in 
clarifying these relationships. For example, agencies could be grouped based on identified 
typologies and compared based on policy and program area. For example, little is known 
about how state support for state agencies may vary among policy area (regulatory, 
distributive, market-oriented and redistributive). 
Examining the relationships between the decision environments of different 
agencies (executive and legislative arm) and the roles of other budget offices and actors, 
are additional areas for research exploration. There has been considerable research in this 
area at the federal level; however, the research focused on state budget actors and their 
decision strategies is limited. Investigating the relationship among the budget decision  
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making process, public opinion and appropriation is critical for researchers, 
policymakers and politicians.  
Applications of new concepts from other fields of research, such as social capital, 
are worth exploring as well. For example, while many factors have been studied as they 
relate to budgeting, little is known about the mediating and moderating effect of norms, 
trust and cooperation on agency budget outcomes. More research is needed to study the 
conditions necessary to build trust among participants in the budget process and for 
developing social organization capital constructs to allow scholars to appropriately 
measure the effect of trust and cooperation on agency budget success. Organizational 
behavior research would benefit from empirical evidence on how political agencies 
develop strategies to achieve their mission. This study suggests that future investigation 
should focus on other disciplinary lens such as using organization concepts to explain 
variations in the budgeting process and outcome.  
5.3 Paper Three Conclusion 
This study examine how South Carolina budgets for higher education and which 
factors best predict changes in state appropriations. It has been argued that Medicaid 
spending has contributed to the overall decline in higher education’s share of the state 
budgetary pie. This study found that the increase in Medicaid spending only partially 
explains the reduction in education spending. Medicaid as a percentage of population is the 
only category that reduces higher education funding. Other categories of state spending on 
Medicaid such as statewide Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid as share of state revenue and 
state’s Medicaid recipient indicated an increase for higher education.  
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However, Medicaid as a share of state revenue crowds out funding for merit-based 
and need-based higher education support. “Increases in Medicaid expenditure during the 
1980s and early 1990s appeared to have played an important role in the failure of higher 
education appropriations to rise significantly during the 1990s boom” (Kane et al. 2003). 
Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2003) demonstrated how, within a budget of a given size, if 
spending on Medicaid increases because of federal mandates or incentives, funding for 
other budgetary entities is reduced, and “higher education spending is one such 
component” (Archibald and Feldman 2006). Many policy makers argue that higher 
education funding should be a priority. Other studies (Cheslock and Hughes 2011; Titus 
2009) have suggested that public colleges respond to decreased state funding by raising 
tuition and fees. This study found no evidence that higher tuition leads to a decline in 
education funding.  
This study also reveal elements of crowding out effect where state spending in other 
state priorities (Correction and Health categories) appears to displace funding in higher 
education. Previous years appropriation also correlated with current appropriation and this 
led us to believe that in some cases lawmakers used incremental approach in their  decision-
making process. 
 Rizzo (2006) “emphasized that public universities are accustomed to their state 
funding being at the mercy of economic cycles, whereby in bad budget times, higher 
education typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the full 
expectation that it will be compensated during a recovery (Rizzo, 2006 p. 3)”. 
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Several conditions can impact the ways in which states finance post-secondary 
institutions. This study found that the decisions to finance need-based aid are inherently 
not political but the same cannot be said of merit-based aid. The status of the governor’s 
party in the legislature seems to influence merit-based aid. In contrast to other findings, 
increase in  funding merit-based aid are associated with increases in need-based funding. 
An increase in need-based scholarships to private institutions, Palmetto Fellows and the 
LIFE Program are associated with increases in need-based scholarships to public 
universities. When budget environment is unfavorable, balance wheel theory proposed that 
the state will cut higher education appropriation. In the case of need/merit based 
scholarship program, increased tax revenue leads to more spending, and vice versa. 
 
Overall, this research finds that state spending for South Carolina research 
institutions (Clemson University and USC Columbia) appears to be influenced by a variety 
of state-level conditions, economic variables and the higher education climate, all of which 
are distinct from conditions that influence public four-year institutions ( The Citadel, 
Coastal Carolina, College of Charleston, Francis Marion, Lander, SC State, USC Aiken, 
USC Beaufort, USC Upstate, Winthrop). In addition, state spending in other critical areas 
such as Corrections, Health and Medicaid compete for state spending for higher education 
appropriations. Further, expenditure for K-12 education serves as a determining factor for 
increases in higher education funding for research institutions. State spending in other areas  
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such as Health and Social Rehabilitation, Medicaid spending as a percentage of the 
population, and Correctional appropriations leads to a decrease in higher education funding 
for research institutions. 
5.4 Policy Recommendations 
Agency budget success is an important concept because it deals with what 
administrative officials want to accomplish during the budget process and provides insights 
into their budget roles. when the budget process is improved, it may mean an overall 
success of the state. Obtaining enough funds and Gaining flexibility to meet agency needs 
and maintain agency programs at current operating levels means effective program 
administration and service delivery, resulting in increased favorable feedback from 
clientele and other groups. 
A better understanding of the dynamics of budget competition may help researchers 
and legislators to understand the variations in state support for higher education. 
Additionally, the variations in legislative and gubernatorial support for higher education 
appropriation impact tuition, accessibility to disadvantaged Americans, and the quality of 
public higher education. This study finds that an increase in state population decreases 
funding for higher education. It is critical that the state should align their planning with the 
increase in the demographic characteristics of the state. 
Policymakers need to determine how state fund to be used in funding state 
scholarship. How does the scholarship benefit low income family is a question of priority 
that state needs to provide answer? The adverse trade off suffered by higher education  
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during appropriation should be mitigated if the goal of the state is to provide or 
increase opportunity in higher education.  
What is the alternatives for funding scholarship programs are if lottery funds no 
longer exist? The long-term financial viability of scholarship programs funded by lottery 
is another issue that has thus far received little study. For example, if lottery funds were 
not available, would the state of South Carolina be willing to fund both need and merit-
based programs from the general revenues? 
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which community 
members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. Greensboro is the first city 
in the south to implement a participatory budgeting process. In October 2014, Greensboro 
passed a resolution in which it committed $500,000 annually to PB, allowing citizens to 
develop and vote on budget proposals (Afonso Whitney 2017). There is considerable 
evidence that participatory budgeting helps to promote  good governance and it could 
increase the civic responsibility of citizens if practiced well. To avoid this pitfall of 
participatory budgeting , citizens needs to be empowered to use their voices by 
participating in civic life. Also, citizens should embrace a commitment to process integrity. 
This means operating with consistency, discipline, transparency, and accountability. 
In the budgeting relationship the principal could be defined as the governor or the 
legislator and the agent as the agency and department. From the principal-agent 
perspective, the information managed by both is focused on advancing their own self-
interest or maximizing their own utilities. The information is exchanged so that both sets 
of participants might adapt to a dynamic, yet resource-constrained environment (Forrester  
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and Adams, 1987). A major limitation in the budgetary and political environment 
is the imperfect information provided by both the principals and agents or, worse, the 
asymmetric information held by either of them.  
Where there is an asymmetry of information, it is expected that the consequent 
budgetary solution will be suboptimal, with unexpected results. With insufficient or biased 
information, the decision makers cannot estimate the effects of their decisions with a high 
degree of certainty. Asymmetry information creates an imbalance of power between the 
agent and principal and this could make the agreement made to go awry. Budget success 
also depend on quality of information shared between the agency and legislative arm 
otherwise it will be dictated by political trade off .  
The Principal-Agent model can be used to enhance our understanding of the  
relationships between actors in the budget decision making process. Applying the 
Principal-Agent theory and using it as a framework to explore the budgeting process may 
provide an additional lens for understanding the complexities of the budget process. 
Relationships between the participants in the budget process can be more productive and 
achieve better budget results when organizational social capital (trust) is enhanced. 
One important conclusion from this research is that final appropriations for 
agencies are dependent on critical factors other than addition and subtraction to the base 
funding level. The findings from this study will help agencies that are poor (in terms of 
appropriation) and small (in terms of total number of employees) to improve their position 
by taking into consideration factors like their structure and the overall budget environment. 
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Understanding key factors such as size, age and democratic strength has provided evidence 
that rich and large agencies are favored over small and poor agencies. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Model 1: Relationship between agency request and legislative appropriation 
Panes  Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
 
ARTS COMMISSION App 0.592045 Request 0.048495 
   intercept 3.52E+06 
COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND App 0.543146 Request -0.14659 
   intercept 4.54E+06 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS App 0.694506 Request 0.083879 
   intercept 1.85E+06 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT App 0.085754 Request -3.2995 
   intercept 3.98E+06 
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY App 0.678278 Request 0.058258 
   intercept 3.57E+06 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE App 0.247569 Request 0.280799 
   intercept 1.76E+07 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS App 0.592211 Request 0.842643 
   intercept 3.20E+08 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION App 0.114071 Request -2.73683 
   intercept 3.43E+09 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE App 0.390857 Request -1.50145 
   intercept 6.47E+06 
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE App 0.067167 Request 0.170108 
   intercept 5.48E+06 
DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS App 0.652416 Request -0.13384 
   intercept 1.11E+07 
DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL App 0.043466 Request 1.00452 
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Panes  Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
   intercept 1.03E+08 
DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS App 0.690161 Request 0.160707 
   intercept 7.29E+08 
DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE App 0.163584 Request -0.81551 
   intercept 9.03E+07 
DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION App 0.234669 Request -2.15989 
   intercept 8.18E+06 
DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH App 0.218181 Request -1.38876 
   intercept 2.79E+08 
DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES App 0.918024 Request -0.03049 
   intercept 2.78E+07 
DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM App 0.113719 Request 0.604946 
   intercept 2.65E+07 
DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON App 0.88177 Request -0.09681 
   intercept 2.43E+07 
DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY App 0.779041 Request 0.416713 
   intercept 9.73E+07 
DEPT OF REVENUE App 0.543729 Request -0.11087 
   intercept 4.37E+07 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION App 0.135585 Request 0.370239 
   intercept 1.28E+07 
FORESTRY COMMISSION App 0.623024 Request -0.06844 
   intercept 1.84E+07 
HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS App 0.26453 Request 0.621869 
   intercept 2.15E+07 
MUSEUM COMMISSION App 0.843356 Request 0.011515 
   intercept 4.44E+06 
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Panes  Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND App 0.003077 Request 0.363018 
   intercept 1.12E+07 
SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM App 0.52879 Request -0.21411 
   intercept 675709 
SOCIAL SERVICES App 0.919501 Request 0.041536 
   intercept 1.32E+08 
ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED App 0.626536 Request 0.066101 
   intercept 1.48E+08 
STATE LIBRARY App 0.400405 Request 0.215113 
   intercept 9.43E+06 
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION App 0.145348 Request -1.59482 
   intercept 1.95E+07 
WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL App 0.250698 Request -0.40802 
   intercept 4.15E+06 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION App 0.308826 Request 0.180439 
   intercept 3.04E+06 
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Model 2: Relationship between Agency Request and Governor recommendation: 
Row     
ARTS COMMISSION App 0.590638 Govrecmd 0.429958 
   intercept 3.54E+06 
COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND App 0.087049 Govrecmd 0.754467 
   intercept 2.30E+06 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS App 0.303409 Govrecmd 1.65766 
   intercept 1.58E+06 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT App 0.206412 Govrecmd 1.79624 
   intercept 387510 
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY App 0.021447 Govrecmd 2.04101 
   intercept -1.50E+06 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE App 0.039178 Govrecmd 0.657651 
   intercept 1.03E+07 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS App 0.498044 Govrecmd 0.605271 
   intercept 3.15E+08 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION App 0.344 Govrecmd 0.903361 
   intercept 1.35E+09 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE App 0.113355 Govrecmd 0.524911 
   intercept 3.97E+06 
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE App 0.021283 Govrecmd 1.51145 
   intercept 1.95E+06 
DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS App 0.114945 Govrecmd 1.84253 
   intercept -798532 
DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL App 0.113544 Govrecmd 5.42979 
   intercept -2.64E+08 
DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS App 0.012117 Govrecmd 0.438543 
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Row     
   intercept 4.08E+08 
DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE App 0.055274 Govrecmd 1.23124 
   intercept 1.86E+07 
DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION App 0.006305 Govrecmd 0.251767 
   intercept 3.27E+06 
DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH App 0.468278 Govrecmd 1.51988 
   intercept 2.38E+08 
DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES App 0.192631 Govrecmd 2.46568 
   intercept -1.21E+07 
DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM App 0.012641 Govrecmd 1.56057 
   intercept 7.40E+06 
DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON App 0.96782 Govrecmd -0.05762 
   intercept 3.81E+07 
DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY App 0.054172 Govrecmd 1.01021 
   intercept 2.80E+07 
DEPT OF REVENUE App 0.632676 Govrecmd -0.28174 
   intercept 7.80E+07 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION App 0.119555 Govrecmd 3.66672 
   intercept -1.33E+07 
FORESTRY COMMISSION App 0.015034 Govrecmd 4.87744 
   intercept -3.10E+07 
HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS App 0.840469 Govrecmd -0.85856 
   intercept 7.77E+07 
MUSEUM COMMISSION App 0.075721 Govrecmd 1.81676 
   intercept -1.52E+06 
SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND App 0.406702 Govrecmd -4.17143 
   intercept 1.03E+08 
SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM App < 0.0001 Govrecmd 0.7367 
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Row     
   intercept 153164 
SOCIAL SERVICES App 0.789274 Govrecmd -1.97533 
   intercept 6.83E+08 
ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED App 0.807112 Govrecmd 0.600129 
   intercept 2.93E+08 
STATE LIBRARY App 0.012489 Govrecmd 2.19143 
   intercept -4.39E+06 
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION App 0.037801 Govrecmd 5.9358 
   intercept -3.87E+07 
WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL App 0.853017 Govrecmd 0.100446 
   intercept 5.22E+06 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION App 0.014056 Govrecmd 1.60862 
   intercept -341796 
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Model 3: Relationship between legislative appropriation and Governor recommendation: 
Panes  Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
ARTS COMMISSION Govrecmd 0.065043 Request 0.110801 
   intercept 3.50E+06 
COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND Govrecmd 0.000712 Request -0.3627 
   intercept 3.51E+06 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS Govrecmd 0.322618 Request -0.26111 
   intercept 1.87E+06 
CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT Govrecmd 0.958399 Request 0.0283 
   intercept 1.49E+06 
DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY Govrecmd 0.856534 Request 0.026399 
   intercept 3.48E+06 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Govrecmd 0.14019 Request 0.343577 
   intercept 1.53E+07 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Govrecmd 0.801325 Request -0.18413 
   intercept 3.00E+08 
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Govrecmd 0.708758 Request 0.26869 
   intercept 1.85E+09 
DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE Govrecmd 0.041005 Request -1.06847 
   intercept 4.87E+06 
DEPT OF AGRICULTURE Govrecmd 0.273582 Request 0.087721 
   intercept 4.89E+06 
DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS Govrecmd 0.20263 Request 0.169358 
   intercept 8.18E+06 
DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL Govrecmd 0.020266 Request 0.577075 
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Panes  Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
   intercept 9.39E+07 
DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS Govrecmd < 0.0001 Request 0.84619 
   intercept 3.96E+08 
DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE Govrecmd 0.087361 Request -1.34498 
   intercept 8.44E+07 
DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION Govrecmd 0.197555 Request -0.9542 
   intercept 5.23E+06 
DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH Govrecmd 0.168314 Request 0.518577 
   intercept 1.55E+08 
DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES Govrecmd 0.877241 Request -0.02007 
   intercept 2.31E+07 
DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM Govrecmd 0.673752 Request 0.144122 
   intercept 2.55E+07 
DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON Govrecmd 0.193035 Request 0.378899 
   intercept 1.92E+07 
DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY Govrecmd 0.151402 Request 0.649921 
   intercept 7.19E+07 
DEPT OF REVENUE Govrecmd 0.015162 Request -0.56149 
   intercept 4.65E+07 
EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION Govrecmd 0.146682 Request 0.406891 
   intercept 1.16E+07 
FORESTRY COMMISSION Govrecmd 0.002927 Request -0.25294 
   intercept 1.72E+07 
HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS Govrecmd 0.730048 Request 0.080928 
   intercept 2.08E+07 
MUSEUM COMMISSION Govrecmd 0.971827 Request 0.002382 
   intercept 4.34E+06 
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Panes  Line Coefficients 
Row Column p-value Term Value 
SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND Govrecmd 0.323229 Request 0.094609 
   intercept 1.17E+07 
SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM Govrecmd 0.941588 Request 0.010159 
   intercept 522920 
SOCIAL SERVICES Govrecmd 0.041169 Request 0.304915 
   intercept 1.11E+08 
ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED Govrecmd 0.438989 Request 0.054615 
   intercept 1.34E+08 
STATE LIBRARY Govrecmd 0.015926 Request 0.277174 
   intercept 7.61E+06 
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION Govrecmd 0.036394 Request -1.09087 
   intercept 1.60E+07 
WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL Govrecmd 0.123241 Request -0.61523 
   intercept 4.05E+06 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION Govrecmd 0.763473 Request -0.04452 
   intercept 3.16E+06 
 
